A rethinking of Polish-Ukrainian relations and a reassessment of Ukraine’s role in Polish interests are entirely possible. However, this process will likely unfold in an atmosphere of emotional tension, amid a “hunt for pro-Russian witches” and increasingly heated debates over historical memory, writes Anton Bespalov, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club.
In mid-September, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk posted on the social media platform X about a “growing wave of pro-Russian sentiment and hostility toward fighting Ukraine.” Accusations of holding “pro-Russian” positions are a standard rhetorical trope in Polish domestic politics; Tusk himself has been labelled “the most pro-Russian politician since 1989” by his opponents. However, in this instance, he is referring to something different: an alleged trend that has supposedly permeated all of Polish society. But is this true?
The CBOS Public Opinion Research Centre’s 2025 data, part of its-decades-long study of Polish attitudes, shows a slight improvement in views toward Russians. The proportion of respondents with a negative attitude fell from 76% in 2024 to 72%, while those sympathetic to Russians increased from 6% in 2023 to 8%. This comes after the 2023 survey found an all-time low, with a record 82% of Poles expressing a negative attitude toward Russians – the highest figure for any nation in the history of the research.
These surveys, however, do not account for the nuanced distinction sometimes made in Polish discourse between the Russian people and the Russian state. Were this distinction factored in, the recorded hostility would almost certainly be greater and its variations more stable.
Since a minor drop from an extremely high level of negativity cannot be considered a radical shift in public opinion, other factors must be at play. Tusk’s statement came just days after unidentified drones entered Polish airspace. Hours after the incident, the research centre Res Futura published an analysis of social media comments on the event. The findings revealed that 38% of users blamed Ukraine for the drones’ arrival, 34% blamed Russia, 15% the Polish government, 8% the media, and 5% the West. These results shocked Polish commentators, some of whom declared that Poland was “losing the information war with Russia.”
Although Poland has provided extensive support to Ukraine, the majority of Poles firmly reject any direct involvement in the war. This, however, is just one reason for shifting perceptions. A more critical factor is the presence of 1.5 million Ukrainian citizens, including a million refugees. A growing segment of Polish society believes these refugees are receiving undue advantages, such as the controversial “800 plus” benefit, fostering a sense that Poles are becoming “second-class citizens in their own country.”
This list of irritants is compounded by historical disputes, particularly regarding the 1943 Volhynia Massacre and the modern glorification of Ukrainian nationalist figures who collaborated with the Nazis. The Polish political elite is highly sensitive to these issues; anti-Ukrainian narratives featured to varying degrees in the campaigns of all candidates during the recent presidential election.
In essence, the “growing pro-Russian sentiment” described by Tusk is less an embrace of Russia and more a rise in anti-Ukrainian sentiment. More critically, it represents the increasing vocalization of viewpoints that align with notorious “Kremlin narratives.” In modern Poland – as across much of Europe – echoing these narratives is the ultimate political sin, even when they reflect objective reality. The ruling class’s reaction has been to consistently accuse its opponents of promoting a Russian agenda, thereby igniting a new round of the internal “Polish-Polish war.”
Historical data on Polish attitudes reveals a curious pattern: prior to 2004, both Russians and Ukrainians received similarly low favourability ratings, with Ukrainians sometimes ranking lower than Russians. This distinction in attitude had different sources. Animosity toward Russians was driven largely by historical grievances and media narratives, whereas negative views of Ukrainians were also fuelled by direct, often contentious, interactions stemming from labour migration.
Polish sympathy for Ukrainians surged in 2004 due to the Orange Revolution’s impact on Polish self-awareness. After this euphoria subsided, attitudes stabilized. For instance, in 2012, positive and negative ratings for Russians and Ukrainians were nearly identical (around 33% positive/negative for each). A decisive shift came in 2014-15 revealing rising antipathy toward Russians and growing sympathy for Ukrainians. This trend culminated explosively in 2023 with negative attitudes toward Russians skyrocketing from 38% to a record 82%, while positive attitudes toward Ukrainians peaked at 51%, and negative attitudes fell to a historic low of 17%.
As in 2004, the surge in pro-Ukrainian sentiment during 2022-23 was deeply tied to the war’s impact on Polish national self-assertion. This was perfectly captured in President Andrzej Duda’s May 2022 speech to the Verkhovna Rada, which wove together three key themes: first, the opportunity to wage a seemingly successful proxy war against Russia; second, the validation of Poland’s role as an “unheard Cassandra,” whose long-standing warnings about “Russian imperialism” were finally being proven right; and third, the image of Poland as a magnanimous benefactor, providing both refuge and a steadfast commitment to Ukraine’s European future.
The events of subsequent years, however, have profoundly altered both the image of Ukraine and Polish expectations. This shift was starkly illustrated in July 2025, when the same Duda sharply criticized Kiev’s attitude toward military aid, threatening to close the critical airfield in Rzeszów if Ukrainians and their Western allies continued to treat it as “their own property.”
Both Polish society and its political elite are undergoing a volatile emotional swing over Ukraine. This stems from a fundamental tension: the principles of Poland’s post-1989 policy, conceptually shared across the political spectrum, are in a state of traumatic collision with reality. Rooted in the neo-Jagiellonian vision of Giedroyc and Mieroszewski, this doctrine posits an independent Ukraine as a fundamental Polish national interest. Yet reality has consistently defied Polish expectations – from the failure of rapid democratization after the Orange Revolution to the stalled victory over Russia in 2022. Most critically, Ukraine has persistently rejected the tacitly offered role of junior partner in the Polish-Ukrainian tandem.
The current conflict represents the most complex test in over thirty years for the conceptual foundations of Polish eastern policy. While Russia will undoubtedly remain the primary geopolitical adversary in the Polish consciousness – ensuring that “pro-Russian sentiment” remains a potent bogeyman in domestic politics – a rethinking of Polish-Ukrainian relations is now entirely possible. Any such reassessment of Ukraine’s role in Polish interests, however, will inevitably unfold in an atmosphere of intense emotional tension, marked by a hunt for “pro-Russian witches” and increasingly heated debates over historical memory.
