One of the most significant practical elements of international relations theory as a sub-discipline of political science is the ability to forecast. It is forecasting (effective forecasting which provides a realistic prognosis) that distinguishes genuine expertise from scholasticism. However, there are sizable difficulties in being able to perform this task.
On the one hand, the forecasting option is almost from the outset included in the modern methodology of studying international relations. Here we are talking about arriving at a hypothesis and verifying it as the basis of analysis. This is what distinguishes political science and the theory of international relations from the study of history. When studying history, the source is always the basis of the research. This can be a set of written documents, as well as material objects, for example, archaeological ones. Naturally, the key element for a historian is a critical analysis of the source; not everything that is written in the text is true. But nevertheless, the source is a basic fact for the historian, and only through it is he able to conduct his research (in any case, he should do so, if he is a real historian).
Thus, a very strong positivistic moment is initially embedded into the methodology of studying history. The historian analyses what is there. When a historian goes to an archive, or an archaeologist begins excavations, they do not know what they will find in the end. Of course, they can have assumptions about what to expect from the search for sources, but nothing more. Such assumptions are in no way a comprehensive prerequisite for research. In this sense, a historian essentially does not need any initial theory, concept or hypothesis. The historian searches for sources and only then analyses them, strictly based on what is in them. Analysis makes use of different methods and approaches, of course (for example, Marxist, structuralist, etc.), and here the historian has freedom of choice. But at the core, we repeat, is always the source as a basic fact. To act differently would be to adjust the facts to fit the concept. If, again, we repeat, this is a real historian, and he is not engaged in solving immediate political problems and does not turn to history to serve political interests.
From this point of view, when a person with a professional historical education, brought up on this basic source positivism, comes to the field of political science and the theory of international relations, then, frankly speaking, he is sometimes simply stunned by what he sees. First of all, because the research is based not on a fact, but on a hypothesis. He naturally wonders whether this is a science at all. But that is another topic.
One way or another, the hypothesis has become a key element in the modern methodology of analysing international relations. Such hypotheses can be found in almost every dissertation, as well as in most scientific articles and monographs. The introduction of a hypothesis implies its verification via research. Which is directly related to forecasting in one way or another.
Another thing is that most often in the academic analysis of international relations, the conversation is primarily not about specific events that may occur, but about general trends, or, to use a current buzzword, so-called "megatrends". The hypothesis usually postulates that under such and such conditions, this or that trend will develop. This is the model used by most academic research. If the author decides to add practical recommendations in addition to verifying the hypothesis, they usually boil down to the wish to "continue to deepen" this or that line in foreign policy: in development or in opposition to the identified general trend. It cannot be otherwise with such a methodological approach.
It is clear that such forecasting is of no use for the real process of making foreign policy decisions. We hope that the foreign policy departments already know that it is necessary to "continue to deepen". As a result, much of the academic work in international relations is practically a "glass bead game", to use a well-known metaphor. This is beautiful game in itself, but absolutely useless, which is nonsense for such an applied area of analysis as international relations.
Forecasting specific events is a qualitatively more complex task than forecasting general trends. Here, it is necessary to analyse the process of making political decisions in a particular country or international organisation. Here the situation is further complicated by the fact that a significant part of the information in this area is, for objective reasons, confidential and restricted. An expert, as a rule, does not have access to this information, he does not have all the data for analysis and forecasting. This, naturally, limits him in his work, and he is forced to make a forecast largely based only on his expert intuition and professionalism.
Furthermore, the forecasting of specific events is divided into two different parts. One question is when the predicted event is quite expected, when it naturally fits into the general trend of development of international relations or into the general foreign policy strategy of a particular state or international structure. Such a forecast is quite easy, and most often comes true in practice.
It is quite another matter if, to use Marxist language, quantitative changes are transformed into qualitative ones: when a foreign policy decision goes beyond the status quo, when it breaks established rules and constraints. When even acting in accordance with the logic of general trends, it takes everything to a qualitatively new level. When it crosses the notorious red lines. It is extremely difficult to predict such an event. There are enough such cases in the history of international relations. One example of something only a few Sovietologists were able to predict was the collapse of the Soviet Union, which became a textbook case. There are many other similar cases. The author happened to witness how, among a group of truly highly professional and authoritative foreign policy experts, no one was able to predict an event that broke the red lines a week before it began. Everyone said, "No, this can't happen."
Let us repeat, the professionalism of these experts is not being questioned here. Simply to correctly pinpoint the specific moment quantitative changes give way to qualitative ones is an incredibly difficult task. First, it is conditioned by a huge number of accidents. Second, and even more importantly, among the majority of people, including experts, the conservative approach prevails: breaking the status quo is an unthinkable event, and therefore impossible. The expert immediately begins to calculate the consequences, sees their extreme complexity and exponentially increasing uncertainty, and therefore refrains from such a forecast. We can say that any event that qualitatively changes international relations looks irrational if we operate only with those arguments that have developed within the framework of the previous status quo.
In addition, the adoption of this type of decision is directly related not only to institutional factors, but also to the psychology of the persons making such a decision. The psychological profile of Donald Trump is an obvious example of this. It can be assumed (let us put forward such a hypothesis) that in cases where institutional factors prevail over personal ones, a decision implying the transition of quantitative changes to qualitative ones is unlikely to be made. Institutions are also characterised by conservatism; they have developed and adapted to work within the framework of the previous status quo. Therefore, a sharp change is irrational for them. Such decisions are often made under the influence of primarily personalistic factors, not the least of which is the willingness to take risks and a reduced sense of danger. Or such a decision is made when there is a synharmonism of institutions and personalism. And for its formation, in addition to political will, the ideological, value factor acquires key importance. In a case when the task of breaking the status quo is predetermined by a common idea dominating in a particular political group, then making such a decision is objectively easier. Because ideas and values (if they are real) do not know compromise.
In general, it can be noted that the task of predicting specific international events is one of the most popular tasks among experts, but at the same time one of the most difficult. But it is extremely important for those with foreign policy expertise to interact effectively during the decision-making process.
