On September 11, the Valdai Club’s Moscow site hosted a discussion titled “Expert Forecasting of International Relations.” The moderator, Oleg Barabanov, described foreign policy forecasting as a critical applied task for experts and for communication between the expert community and foreign policy agencies.
He noted that academic experts are limited in their forecasting capabilities because a significant portion of information on national policies and relations is non-public and classified in any country. Consequently, Barabanov proposed a distinction between two fields: forecasting broader trends, which is feasible, and predicting specific events, which is far more complex.
“Theorists really don’t like to forecast – and they don’t like being forced to do it. We find ourselves in a kind of ’scissors’: we cannot forecast, but we really need to,” said Igor Istomin, head of the Department of Applied Analysis of International Problems at MGIMO. He spoke about the programme his department is implementing to study expert forecasting and presented some preliminary conclusions.
Speaking about the difference between the forecasts of specialists and non-specialists in a specific area, Istomin noted that the range of opinions on a given issue among non-specialists is paradoxically often smaller than among specialists. At the same time, the accuracy of forecasts from these groups is practically the same for the short term, but in long-term forecasts, specialists are apparently somewhat more accurate.
An interesting feature, according to the researcher, is that experts who make more accurate forecasts have little faith in themselves as forecasters and in the possibility of forecasting in general. It is also important that the expert community is conservative – experts in general tend to underestimate the probability that an event will happen.
Speaking on the subject of forecasts, Istomin added that the Russian expert community predicts events in domestic and international politics with roughly equal accuracy. However, it is clearly better at forecasting conflicts – or their absence – than cooperation, and makes more accurate predictions concerning the non-West than the West.
Maria Khodynskaya-Golenischeva, Deputy Director of the Department of Foreign Policy Planning at the Russian Foreign Ministry, emphasized that foreign policy planning is inherently linked to forecasting. She noted that Russia has formed a unified regulatory framework for forecasting within public administration, including foreign policy, with the main global trends and prospects outlined in the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation.
She went on to detail a number of difficulties in this field. Firstly, the international environment is highly unpredictable. Participants in international relations can behave illogically, impulsively, and contradictorily – a factor that intensifies as tensions between states grow. Moreover, not all aspects of international relations are amenable to quantitative or qualitative analysis, a challenge compounded by the emergence of “black swan” events. Secondly, the quality of forecasting is affected by a lack of accountability, which relaxes experts and inevitably weakens intellectual discipline. Thirdly, the effort is complicated by the absence of a unified methodology for forecasting the international situation; there is no tool that guarantees accuracy. This is further exacerbated because international relations is a domain where subjective factors play an enormous role. As heads of state and decision-makers are people with their own strengths and weaknesses, rational foresight is difficult and mathematical models are largely inapplicable.
While predicting major trends is important, it offers little value for medium-term forecasting. “The tuning fork for us is the national interests of Russia,” Khodynskaya-Golenischeva summarized.
Denis Degterev, professor at the National Research University Higher School of Economics and chief researcher at the Institute of African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, argued that in this era of global transformation, nearly all international academic communications are strategic. “When researchers write, they try to influence those who read,” he stated. He cited the American “Global Trends” report – published every five years – as a prime example, emphasizing that the United States uses it to present a vision of the world as it wishes others to see it. “It is important to construct a picture of the desired world that we would like to have,” Degterev advised. He added that in this process of constructing the future, it is essential to combine one’s vision with that of researchers from the World Majority. He is convinced that greater effort is needed to develop expert networks among non-Western internationalists.
Andrea Bianchi, an independent political researcher from Brussels, addressed the practical aspects of forecasting. He emphasized that effective foreign policy forecasts must always begin with the history of an issue, then integrate key factors such as geography, culture, and national character. When these elements are ignored, he argued, and when foreign policy decisions are made without engaging the expert community, the entire practice of forecasting enters a state of crisis. Bianchi concluded by noting that Europe currently suffers from a pronounced deficit in both analytical depth and forecasting capability.
