If we imagine Alaska not as an illusion, it creates a unique change in the entire nature of relations between participants in the system of international relations, something that has never happened before, Valdai Club Programme Director Oleg Barabanov writes.
The recent Russian-American summit in Alaska is important not only as part of attempts to resolve the Ukrainian conflict. If the peace process is successful, the meeting in Alaska could be considered a symbolic beginning of a new stage in international relations. It is clear that against the backdrop of the weeks that have passed since the summit without any progress, this may be nothing more than an illusion. Nevertheless, as a theoretical exercise, it is possible to speculate on this topic.
In this context, we can refer to the widely used term “system of international relations”. Within the established understanding of this term, we can outline the contours of this still-illusory Alaskan system of international relations. It should be noted, however, that the term “system of international relations” is most often used, in the words of Pavel Tsygankov, only in a “traditional-historical” sense. In the history of international relations, it does not always mean the actual use of a systematic approach in analysis.
Nevertheless, one of the common techniques in the history of international relations is to identify major chronological stages as systems of international relations. For example, the Westphalian system of international relations after the Thirty Years’ War, the Viennese system after Napoleon, the Versailles-Washington system between the world wars, etc. Following this logic, the Cold War period is defined as the Yalta-Potsdam system. After its end in 1991, textbooks on the history of international relations, as a rule, did not identify any new systems and spoke only of a transitional period from Yalta to something else, characteristic of the modern era. Nevertheless, due to the chronological length of this post-Yalta transitional period, which lasted almost 30 years from 1992 to 2022, as well as certain principles that nevertheless defined the parameters of relations between states and the nature of the system’s functioning, this period was distinguished by its unique specificity and at least minimal stability (no less than within the framework of the Versailles-Washington system, for example). Therefore, in our opinion, the period from 1992 to 2022 can be perceived not only as a protracted transition, but also as an independent system of international relations. Let us call it the post-Yalta system.
Furthermore, the situation changed qualitatively on February 24, 2022. Usually, major military conflicts go beyond the scope of international relations systems; they act as a kind of boundary between different systems. At the same time, within the framework of the current conflict, the principles of the functioning of the international system have already been formed, which have shown their stability over the past three and a half years. Moreover, if Alaska turns out to be an illusion, the conflict will most likely retain its current long-term nature, if it doesn’t become endless.
The main parameter of the global system of international relations is the presence of regional subsystems and the nature of the connections and relationships between them. In the Yalta-Potsdam system, due to its inherent bipolar nature, two regional macro-subsystems could be identified: the West (understood not in a geographical but in a political sense, including, for example, Japan, Australia, etc.) and the socialist countries. In addition, as part of the decolonisation process, a third regional subsystem began to take shape and strengthen (the term “Global South” was not yet in use at that time, so we will call it developing countries, the non-aligned movement). Naturally, each of the subsystems was not absolutely unified and was divided into its constituent parts.
In the post-Yalta system, these subsystems underwent dynamic deformation. This primarily concerned the socialist subsystem. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance led to the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe choosing the political West as their vector of development. Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the formation of new independent states. Some of them (the Baltic States, Georgia) immediately chose the Western vector of development. However, most of the post-Soviet states maintained ties with each other in one way or another, and not least their ties with Russia. Therefore, the resulting network of states could, with some degree of convention, be called a Russia-centric (or pro-Russian) regional subsystem. Within its framework, its own international structures were created (the CIS, the CSTO, and the EAEU). The dynamics of the evolution of relations within this subsystem, as well as the relations of its countries with Russia and the West, were, as it turned out on February 24, of key importance for the functioning of the entire post-Yalta global system of international relations. First and foremost, this process concerned Ukraine as the largest (apart from Russia) state in the post-Soviet space.
In addition, the post-Yalta system saw the consolidation and transformation of the third regional macro-subsystem of the Yalta-Potsdam period. Since the mid-2010s, the term “Global South” became increasingly widespread, symbolising the shared destiny of the developing world. Moreover, with the creation of BRICS, it became possible, in our opinion, to talk about the pairing, the convergence of the Global South and Russia. This convergence can be defined by the term “Global Non-West” and also be considered as a separate subsystem.
In the February system of international relations, this relationship between subsystems has changed. Here we are not just talking about Ukraine. Its own dynamics can also be observed in the Russia-centric post-Soviet subsystem that was characteristic of the previous stage. In fact, only Belarus directly and unreservedly supported Russia in its decision on February 24. That is why, in our opinion, it is now the only real ally of Russia in the post-Soviet space. All other countries, based on their own national interests, have taken a more or less distanced position. Some of them, each for their own reasons, have distanced themselves more than others.
In Armenia, the political elite has become convinced that Russia, as Armenia’s military ally, has not done what it could have done, and therefore it would be reckless to rely solely on it in the future. And then there is Azerbaijan, relations with which have deteriorated dramatically in recent months. Other countries in the region are demonstrating this distancing to a lesser extent, but in any case, in our view, we can talk about the emergence of a kind of split within the post-Soviet subsystem in the February era, which separates Russia and Belarus from the rest of the states.
Furthermore, a feature of the February system of international relations has been the consolidation of Russia’s ties with its real military allies and partners. This is primarily true of North Korea and, with reservations and a degree of conditionality, Iran. In addition to them, there are a number of other countries of the Global South that, as a rule, directly support Russia in the February era. Given Russia’s activity in Africa, this includes a number of states on that continent, primarily Burkina Faso, Mali, Zimbabwe, and, with some reservations, a number of others. Venezuela and Cuba hold a similar position. Thus, we can identify a second split in the February system of international relations: within the Global South. It is defined by the same attitude towards Russia as the post-Soviet one mentioned above. As a result, a new transregional subsystem has emerged, where support for Russia is the key factor. Let us not dwell on the derogatory terms used by George W. Bush to describe most of these states: “axis of evil”, “rogue states” etc. Let us call this group of countries a subsystem of solidarity with Russia.
However, this split within the Global South also had its downside. Many states in this subsystem, including its largest countries, also took a more or less wait-and-see, distanced, or cautious position, especially in the first year of the February era, based on their national interests.
Many of these countries are directly and openly calling on Russia to make peace as soon as possible. Among them, it is worth highlighting the BRICS members Brazil, India, South Africa, and, to a certain extent, China (especially in the first year of the conflict). At certain moments, it seemed that Russia and other BRICS members, previously perceived as being in the same boat of the Global Non-West, were now in completely different subsystems. Russia crossed the barrier, the red line that characterised the post-Yalta system, while other countries did not and did not want to.
Furthermore, the February system of international relations was characterised by the absolute, cemented unity of the political West, which qualitatively surpassed the level that was characteristic of the post-Yalta system. The security environment, another important parameter characterising the system of international relations, has also changed dramatically. Assessing the nature of the hostilities and the degree of direct involvement of Western countries in the conflict, which has been increasing month after month, one can observe a serious, if not catastrophic, erosion of the factor of nuclear deterrence, which had a key character in the second stage of the Cold War, after the Cuban Missile Crisis, within the framework of the “mature” Yalta-Potsdam system, and which, albeit with reservations, remained in the post-Yalta system (and largely determined the relatively mild reaction of the West in 2014). In the February system, this situation has changed qualitatively. The reasons for this are a separate topic, but let us note the fact.
Then Trump came along and began to change the established rules of the February system. One of them was the question of the absolute unity of the West. Trump directly called the situation where America pays for everything (or for a great deal) in the West’s support for Ukraine (which is a key parameter of the February system) contrary to the national interests of the United States. Another parameter that Trump questioned was the erosion of nuclear deterrence and the rejection of nuclear fears within the security environment that characterises the February system. It seems that it was precisely this absolutely serious perception of the nuclear factor that became one of the key arguments for Trump in his course toward rapprochement with Russia in order to establish peace. Third, Trump has essentially (at least for now) shifted the burden of responsibility for the conflict from Russia itself to the largest countries of the Global South – China and India, which became the key beneficiaries of discounted Russian hydrocarbons during the February era. Fourth, Trump has begun to exert global pressure through customs duties and tariffs on the vast majority of countries in the world, both on US allies in the political West and on countries in the Global South. Among the latter, in addition to India and China, it should be noted that Trump’s primary targets include South Africa and Brazil. In fact, over the past few months of Trump’s time in office, we can only think of two countries that he hasn’t done anything bad to (at least so far) and has only done or tried to do good things for. These are Israel and Russia. Of course, the reasons in both cases are different, but we can identify a new subsystem which, if the Alaska project is implemented, could become the cornerstone of a new system of international relations. This is a group of countries to which the US does not do anything bad in its national interests. The EU is outside this subsystem, while Russia is inside it.
Such are the contours of the Alaskan system of international relations. If we imagine Alaska not as an illusion, it creates a unique change in the entire nature of relations between participants in the system of international relations, something that has never happened before. At least, it has never been seen in any of the international systems of the 20th and 21st centuries. It is understandable that such Alaskan parameters may seem very tempting to Russia. It is understandable, perhaps unfortunately, that this is most likely just an illusion. The February system of international relations will be with us for a very long time, if not forever.
