For Serbia, partnership with China represents an opportunity to accelerate modernisation and strengthen its international standing, while for China, Serbia serves as a strategic ally in the Balkans, opening access to European markets. The successful development of Serbian–Chinese relations—despite Western pressure primarily on Belgrade, but often also on Beijing, as well as attempts at interference in their affairs—stands as a vivid example of China’s and Serbia’s commitment to an independent course, writes Milan Lazović, Programme Manager at the Russian International Affairs Council.
Over recent decades, Serbia and China have been building strong, multifaceted relations which, by 2026, have reached a new level in their quality. This may be described as an enhanced comprehensive strategic partnership. In 2024, during Xi Jinping’s visit to Serbia, the two countries signed a joint statement on deepening and elevating their comprehensive strategic partnership, and on building a Serbia–China community with a shared future in a new era. At that time, the Serbian and Chinese delegations also concluded around 30 additional agreements on mutual understanding and cooperation across various sectors.
The state visit of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić to China, held from 24 to 28 May 2026, became a landmark event that consolidated the strategic partnership between the two countries, informally referred to as a “steel friendship”. Xi Jinping stated that relations between China and Serbia are regarded as exemplary interstate ties. He also noted that during China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030), the two countries should intensify the alignment of their development strategies, implement Belt and Road Initiative projects, and promote cooperation in transport and energy infrastructure.
Relations between Serbia and China have evolved over the past two decades due to several factors.
First and foremost, there is a convergence of strategic interests: both countries consistently uphold the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in internal affairs. In particular, China supports Serbia’s position on Kosovo, while Belgrade adheres to the One China policy, creating a solid political foundation for cooperation.
Secondly, economic complementarity plays a key role: Serbia is interested in Chinese investment and technology, while Beijing sees Belgrade as an important transport and logistics hub in the Balkans—and more broadly, across Europe.
Thirdly, a certain ideological affinity also contributes to rapprochement: both sides share the concept of a multipolar world and oppose unilateral sanctions and pressure from individual states.
Finally, cultural and humanitarian ties are actively developing: exchanges in education, science, culture, and tourism are becoming increasingly intensive. Since 2006, Belgrade has hosted a Confucius Institute—a cultural centre dedicated to Chinese language and culture.
Serbian–Chinese relations are built upon several key pillars: the economy, defence cooperation, transport, infrastructure, energy, technology and innovation, and humanitarian projects. Despite the highly constructive nature of these relations, at this stage they may be described as asymmetrical—meaning Serbia is more dependent on China. For Belgrade, China serves as a powerful counterbalance to the West and is viewed as a strategic ally—a very high level of regard—especially against the backdrop of strained relations with the European Union. China, for its part, is a more powerful and stable state, capable of withstanding greater pressure. For Beijing, Serbia does not act as a counterweight to anyone, but rather as an important partner in the Balkan region—a “gateway to Europe”.
In economic terms, China is one of the largest investors in Serbia’s economy, financing infrastructure, energy, industry, and agriculture. Cooperation in security and defence includes information exchange, personnel training, arms procurement, and joint exercises. Serbia is the only European purchaser of Chinese weaponry, having modernised its arsenal with Chinese-made supersonic missiles. Thus, the Serbian Ministry of Defence has purchased Chinese medium- and short-range surface-to-air missile systems (HQ-22 and HQ-17), as well as combat drones (CH-95 and CH-92). In 2025, Serbian and Chinese forces conducted joint exercises in China under the codename “Peace Guardian—2025”.
In infrastructure and transport, major projects are being implemented under the Belt and Road Initiative, including railway modernisation and motorway construction. Energy cooperation encompasses both conventional and renewable energy: power plants are being built, and green technologies are being developed. In technology and innovation, there is active exchange in digital technologies, artificial intelligence, and telecommunications, including 5G networks. Humanitarian cooperation is carried out through educational programmes, scientific research, cultural exchanges, and tourism development.
Even before 2026, Serbia and China had concluded a number of landmark agreements that laid the groundwork for further rapprochement. In 2016, for instance, a memorandum of understanding was signed on jointly advancing the Belt and Road Initiative, marking the starting point for infrastructure projects. A free trade agreement aimed at increasing trade volume was also actively promoted. Among implemented infrastructure projects are the modernisation of the Belgrade–Budapest railway (the Belgrade–Novi Sad section, launched in 2022), construction of the E-763 motorway, part of Pan-European Corridor X, as well as the reconstruction of the Port of Belgrade and the creation of a logistics centre.
In the energy sector, the Chinese company PowerChina participated in the construction of a hydropower plant on the Lim River, while the China National Petroleum Corporation cooperated in oil and gas infrastructure. In industry and technology, a significant step was the opening of a Huawei telecommunications equipment manufacturing plant and Zijin Mining’s investments in copper and gold mines in Serbia’s Bor District. Humanitarian initiatives included the establishment of Confucius Institutes in Belgrade and Niš, as well as student exchange programmes and scientific internships. As a result, trade turnover between Serbia and China increased from approximately 800 million dollars in 2010 to around 4 billion in 2025, placing China among Serbia’s top five trading partners.
Aleksandar Vučić’s state visit to China in May 2026 marked the culmination of years of rapprochement. It was timed to coincide with the fifteenth anniversary of the strategic partnership and signalled a transition to a new phase of cooperation. The programme included talks with President Xi Jinping, meetings with the Prime Minister and other senior officials, participation in the “Serbia–China: New Horizons” business forum, visits to high-tech enterprises in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, as well as cultural events and meetings with representatives of the Serbian diaspora.
The outcomes of the visit were substantial and spanned multiple sectors. Politically, the strategic partnership at the highest level was reaffirmed, a joint statement was issued supporting sovereignty and territorial integrity—including positions on Kosovo—and on building a community with a shared future in a new era. Positions were also aligned on international security issues and the foundations of a multipolar world order.
Economically, Serbia and China signed a free trade agreement providing for tariff reductions on 90 per cent of goods, a memorandum of cooperation in the digital economy (artificial intelligence, 5G, cybersecurity), and an agreement to establish a joint investment fund worth 2 billion dollars to finance infrastructure and industrial projects. In infrastructure, construction of the E-80 motorway (Belgrade–Pristina, including the Serbian section) was launched, an agreement was reached to modernise the Niš–Dimitrovgrad railway with the participation of China Railway Group, and plans were outlined for a multimodal logistics hub in Belgrade.
In energy and environmental cooperation, contracts were signed for the construction of a 300 MW wind farm in Serbia’s Banat region, agreements were reached on hydrogen energy and green technology development, and modernisation of the Pančevo thermal power plant using Chinese carbon capture technology was planned. In technology and industry, the opening of a Huawei R&D centre in Belgrade for 6G development was announced, along with expansion of electric vehicle battery production at the EVE Energy plant in Kragujevac, and joint projects in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. Humanitarian cooperation gained new momentum through an increase in quotas for Serbian students at Chinese universities to 500 per year, a cultural exchange programme for 2027–2029 (including exhibitions, festivals, and theatre tours), and the launch of the “Discover Serbia” tourism initiative for Chinese visitors.
The 2026 visit opened new opportunities for both Serbia and China. For Serbia, partnership with China offers a chance to accelerate modernisation and strengthen its international status; for China, Serbia acts as a strategic ally in the Balkans, providing access to European markets. At the same time, certain challenges remain: balancing relations with the EU, the United States, and Russia, minimising risks of debt dependence on Chinese loans, ensuring the environmental sustainability of large infrastructure projects, and competing with other regional countries for Chinese investment. The success of this alliance will depend on the ability of both sides to address emerging issues and strike a balance between national interests and global challenges.
In conclusion, Aleksandar Vučić’s state visit to China in May 2026 not only consolidated existing achievements, but also outlined ambitious plans for the future. Cooperation between the two countries extends beyond economics, encompassing politics, security, technology, and the humanitarian sphere, and lays the foundation for a long-term, stable strategic partnership—highly valued in both China and Serbia. The successful development of Serbian–Chinese relations, despite Western pressure primarily on Belgrade, but often also on Beijing, as well as attempts at interfering in their affairs, stands as a striking example of their commitment to a sovereign course. The dynamic evolution of these relations, despite obstacles, once again exposes the European Union’s attempts to engage in unfair play and unscrupulous competition.
