Over time, Russia has held a contradictory position within global affairs: vast in territory, rich in resources, and yet persistently vulnerable to external pressures and internal fragmentation (Lo, 2015). In the post-Cold War period, Russia’s identity and role have been contested by global powers, leading to what many scholars describe as a “siege mentality” (Clunan, 2009). The metaphor of the Wandering Kolobok, repeatedly threatened and eventually devoured by those he encounters, encapsulates this precarious existence.
In this regard, President Vladimir Putin emerges not merely as a statesman but as a leader whose style echoes the qualities of Alexander the Great: expansionist vision, charismatic authority, and the pursuit of enduring geopolitical legacies. It is argued herein that Russia’s experience in a Kolobok world is defined by constant pressures of encirclement and predation, while Putin’s leadership embodies a bold, Alexander-inspired attempt to reclaim Russia’s destiny as a central pole of the global system.
Russia as Kolobok: A Geopolitical Metaphor
Through the lens of folktale, Kolobok rolls onward from home, meeting various animals, the wolf, bear, and fox, each of whom wants to eat him. He escapes each predator with his ingenuity, until in the end, he falls prey, consumed by the cunning fox. The tale aligns with Russia’s geopolitical journey: large, visible, resource-rich, and constantly meeting “predators” in the form of rival powers and coalitions (Sakwa, 2017).
Historical Layers of Predation
1. Western Expansionism – From Napoleon’s invasion to NATO’s eastward enlargement, Russia has consistently faced military and institutional encirclement (Mearsheimer, 2014).
2. Asian Pressures – The Mongol-Tatar yoke historically, and more recently China’s rise, remind Russia of its vulnerability on the Eurasian steppe (Lo, 2015).
3. Internal Predators – Domestic oligarchs, separatist movements, and governance challenges can consume Russia from within (Tsygankov, 2016).
Just as Kolobok could never escape all his pursuers, Russia too faces persistent predatory interests seeking to exploit its vulnerabilities.
The Realist Lens: Russia’s Struggle for Survival
According to realism in International Relations, states act in a context of anarchy, where survival is paramount (Waltz, 1979). Adopting this perspective, Russia’s actions should not be considered irrational or exceptional; they reflect the necessity of safeguarding sovereignty in a hostile environment:
Security Dilemma: NATO expansion into Eastern Europe is seen in Moscow not as benign growth but a pressing security dilemma of existential encirclement (Allison, 2014).
Balance of Power: Russia’s interventions in Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), and Ukraine (2022–) may be interpreted as strategic balancing against Western penetration (Mearsheimer, 2014).
Sphere of Influence: Similar to wandering Kolobok seeking space to roll, Russia insists on a maintaining a buffer zone as a means of preventing domination by rival states (Bull, 1977).
In realist terms, Russia’s “Kolobok condition” is affirmed: the state must manoeuvre to survive among intruding rivals.
Putin as Alexander the Great of the 21st Century: Leadership Parallels?
Alexander’s expansion from Macedonia into an empire finds a modern parallel in Putin’s attempts to revive Russian influence in Eurasia (Lo, 2015). Both figures exemplify a personal legitimacy that surpasses institutional authority. Alexander commanded loyalty through his legendary charisma, while Putin commands it through demonstrations of strength and stability, as well as cultural resonance (Clunan, 2009).
Alexander propagated Hellenism as a civilisational mission, while Putin promotes a Russian “civilisational state” narrative as a counterpoint to Western liberalism (Tsygankov, 2016).
For Alexander, empire and personal glory were inseparable; similarly, for Putin, Russia’s resurgence is inseparable from his personal image. This intertwining of leader and state reflects a form of neo-Caesarism, in which the ruler personifies historical destiny (Sakwa, 2017).
Russia’s Civilisational Claim
Using the Kolobok metaphor potentially frames Russia merely in reactive terms, but Putin reshapes the narrative:
Russia ought to be seen not as a victim but a civilisational pole. Influenced by thinkers like Ivan Ilyin and Lev Gumilev, Russia is portrayed as a Eurasian civilisation bridging East and West (Ilyin, 1999; Tsygankov, 2016).
Orthodoxy and Tradition underpin Russian identity against the secular Western liberal framework (Lo, 2015).
Multipolarity is becoming the ideological framework, resisting the unipolar dominance of the West (Sakwa, 2017).
Strategic partnerships with China, India, and the Global South embody Russia’s effort at avoiding external threats by forming counter-alliances (Bremmer, 2010).
Therefore, Putin’s “Alexander strategy” is not only defensive but expansionist in civilisational terms. Through Putin’s Alexander-inspired vision, Russia still finds itself in precarious situation surrounded by predatory actors:
1. Economic Sanctions – Russia’s economic growth and integration are significantly limited by Western financial policy (Allison, 2014).
2. Demographic Pressures – A shrinking population threatens the sustainability of Russia’s military and economic capacity (Clunan, 2009).
3. Overreach Risk – Like Alexander’s empire which extended beyond its capacity, Russia too risks straining its resources in Ukraine and beyond (Mearsheimer, 2014).
4. Internal Legitimacy – Charisma sustains regimes only as long as victories outweigh sacrifices (Tsygankov, 2016).
Therefore, the Kolobok allegory underscores that even the most powerful actors can ultimately be undone by the “fox” of overextension.
Global Implications
For Global Security: Russia’s confrontation with NATO can undermine long-term stabilisation in the region (Allison, 2014), for Multipolarity: Russia encourages challenges to Western dominance, helping to speed up the shift toward a global order based on multiple centres of power (Lo, 2015). On leadership studies, Putin shows that charismatic, almost mythic leadership continues to matter, even in an era typically thought to be dominated by formal institutions (Clunan, 2009).
References
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Bull, H. (1977). The anarchical society: A study of order in world politics. Columbia University Press.
Clunan, A. L. (2009). The social construction of Russia’s resurgence: Aspirations, identity, and security interests. Johns Hopkins University Press.
Gumilev, L. (1990). Ethnogenesis and the biosphere of the Earth. Progress Publishers.
Ilyin, I. (1999). On the essence of legal consciousness. Wildy, Simmonds & Hill.
Lo, B. (2015). Russia and the new world disorder. Brookings Institution Press.
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Sakwa, R. (2017). Russia against the rest: The post-Cold War crisis of world order. Cambridge University Press.
Tsygankov, A. P. (2016). Russia’s foreign policy: Change and continuity in national identity (4th ed.). Rowman & Littlefield.
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