The conflict between Russia and the West is cyclical. We have observed it at different turns of history and in different dimensions, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Andrey Sushentsov.
The lack of dialogue between the United States and Russia does not allow us to raise the issue of settling our confrontation by diplomatic means. Our countries exchange blows on the battlefield, although the United States uses an indirect instrument – Ukraine.
The effectiveness of Russia’s actions in achieving the goals of its special military operation confuses and unbalances its opponents. Terror, which Ukraine is increasingly resorting to, is a weapon of the weak regime, a demonstration that both the Western curators of Ukraine and the government in Kiev itself have lost faith in their ability to defeat Russia.
The West is also receiving painful blows. As the Ukrainian crisis develops, obituaries of high-ranking Western military personnel who die under unclear circumstances are constantly published in Western media. Due to the fact that Russia’s confrontation with the West in Ukraine is indirect, still not direct — there is no state of war between us, and we maintain diplomatic relations. This form of indirect confrontation is convenient for many, but it does not exclude the resolution of our problems and also affects those Western specialists who are deployed in the theatre of military operations. For the military, political and strategic establishment of Western countries, these losses are quite sensitive.
The rivalry between Russia and the United States will outlive the Ukraine crisis. This is a structural, long-term rivalry that we will observe, at least, in the first half of the 21st century. [article id="28675″]
However, we should not expect a quick resolution of the crisis in Ukraine itself due to the fact that the government in Kiev does not act in the interests of the state, but offers itself as an instrument of Western strategy towards Russia. Kiev sees itself as an integral part of a large consortium of states hostile to Russia and presents itself as a mercenary squad, ready to sacrifice itself for the sake of the interests of the West, to endure costs in order to solve common problems. None of these tasks are positive for Ukraine, they do not contribute to its economic prosperity or growth, or the preservation and increase of its population. It completely nullifies its development prospects in any sphere and creates a strategic dead end for the development of this territory as an independent state. [citation] Prolonging the crisis further aggravates the situation and will lead to the country becoming depopulated and its management becoming impossible. [/citation] Apparently, these circumstances are the reason why the tone of the discussion in Kiev has changed: the issue of negotiations is being raised; more rational theses are being voiced at meetings with foreign leaders. It is possible that this line is caused by the need to avoid the situation getting out of control and the capitulation of Ukraine. Now Kiev has to support two armies: one is involved in military operations, and the second maintains strict surveillance within the country and on the western border. The loss of control over the situation, the upcoming cold winter and the disorganised heating and electrification systems throughout the country, and the feeling of a growing crisis are forcing the Kiev government to realise that the United States may make a decision for itself that will be far from in line with the interests of Ukraine. In an early 2023 Rand Corporation report, American analysts pointed to the moment when US interests could diverge from Ukrainian ones, and I admit that Kiev has finally read this document.
The conflict between Russia and the West is cyclical. We have observed it at different turns of history and in different dimensions. Many British and French generals, as well as some political figures, in private conversations and in publications, have compared the current crisis with the reincarnation of the Crimean War. In their understanding, this allowed them to limit Russia’s influence in Europe for 20 years, impose inconvenient peace terms on it, and contribute to the displacement of the “Russian factor” that dominated Europe in the first half of the 19th century. Russia defeated Napoleon, left the French capital without demanding a significant contribution, maintained order in Europe for about a decade and was the guarantor of the status quo, the chairman of the Holy Alliance — an organisation that at that time contributed to the preservation of monarchical regimes in Europe and prevented revolutions. [citation] The West found it difficult to forgive Russia’s significant participation in European affairs, and with some vindictiveness they looked for a pretext to defeat it. [/citation] Our relations with the West are not without an important psychological component: the West sees in Russia its “significant other”, i. e. it is projecting all the bad things about itself onto an outside party. As a result, a caricature is formed that has nothing to do with reality, which sober people in the West understand very well. This image is looking for some kind of solution in the form of a victory, which they are still counting on.
We see that the new composition of the leaders of the European Commission is an “attack team”, not a negotiating team, which is investing in another 4-5-year cycle of the continuation of this crisis. The countries of Western Europe also do not have a significant impulse to seek reconciliation with Russia. First, they are still counting on the fact that victory may be delayed, but it is achievable. Second, they are using this opportunity to consolidate Europe along anti-Russian lines. The confrontation with Russia, the attempt to defeat it, the punishment for encroachment on autonomous interests, independent from the West, echo the events of 150 years ago. Our relationship cycles contain periods of war, conflict and crisis, as well as periods of peaceful coexistence. [article id="24447"]