The third Russia–Africa conference, jointly convened by the Valdai Discussion Club and the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), took place in Pretoria on 28 July 2025 under the theme “Realpolitik Responses in a Fractured World: Rethinking Russia–South Africa Ties in Global and African Context.”
Building on the momentum of the Russia–Africa summits in Sochi (2019) and St Petersburg (2023), as well as SAIIA’s longstanding role in advancing African perspectives in global debates, the conference provided a platform for open dialogue on the evolving nature of Russia–Africa relations. Special attention was given to South Africa’s role in multilateral forums such as BRICS and the G20, both of which are gaining importance as spaces where African priorities can be advanced.
The timing of the meeting was significant. It took place against a backdrop of intensifying geopolitical competition, shifting balances of power, and South Africa’s chairmanship of the G20. In this period of deepening polarisation, dialogue becomes not just valuable but necessary. Its purpose was not to produce agreement, but to foster understanding, to bridge divides, and to create space for pragmatic forms of cooperation at a time when global conversations are becoming increasingly closed.
The discussions highlighted the centrality of history in Russia–Africa relations. Soviet support for African liberation struggles remains an important reference point. Yet participants noted that legacy ties must be translated into new instruments of soft power, particularly through education, scientific cooperation, and people-to-people exchanges.
Concerns were also raised about the sustainability of relations. Weak trade flows, limited institutionalisation, and perceptions of exclusivity within forums such as BRICS were seen as obstacles to deeper engagement. At the same time, the themes of sovereignty and non-interference emerged as recurring themes. These principles were described as vital to building a more equitable world order and were contrasted with what participants saw as Western double standards.
This report synthesises the main insights and debates that emerged during the conference. It goes beyond a record of proceedings and aims to highlight the analytical threads most relevant for policymakers, scholars, and practitioners. The goal is to assess historical legacies, examine emerging strategic alignments, and identify practical avenues for cooperation that reflect African agency, Russian interests, and the broader priorities of the Global South.
Setting the Stage – Russia, South Africa and the Global Order
The opening session highlighted how Russia–South Africa relations are being shaped by a fractured and contested international system. The partnership was presented both as a product of shared history and as a potential instrument for navigating today’s global turbulence. With geopolitical rivalries intensifying, speakers argued that states are guided less by ideology and more by hard interests, which makes pragmatic cooperation between middle powers like South Africa and Russia increasingly relevant.
Dialogue emerged as a recurring theme. In an era of narrowing international debate and deepening polarisation, both SAIIA and the Valdai Club were described as important platforms for sustaining open engagement. As one speaker noted, Western policymakers often appear “out of touch with reality,” making alternative venues for dialogue all the more necessary. The notion of a “new scramble for Africa” was raised, but framed not as a zero-sum contest, rather as a test of Russia’s ability to balance diverse relationships without overextending itself.
From a South African perspective, the discussion linked bilateral ties to broader continental priorities. With Pretoria chairing the G20, speakers highlighted South Africa’s efforts to secure greater African representation in global governance and to prioritise African prosperity at the centre of multilateral reform. The emphasis on historical solidarity between South Africa and Russia was strong. Yet, the forward-looking conclusion was clear: the real test lies in turning legacy ties into tangible cooperation that supports African unity, integration, and agency in shaping the emerging world order.
BRICS, the G20 and the Fractured Order
This session highlighted the central role of BRICS and the G20 as arenas through which South Africa and Russia can navigate an increasingly complex and fragmented international system. South Africa’s 2025 G20 chairship was hailed as a historic first for Africa, while the enlargement of BRICS was described as evidence of its growing appeal to the Global South. Yet expansion was also presented as a double-edged sword: greater inclusivity enhances legitimacy but complicates decision-making. Several participants cautioned that if the grouping widens without sharpening its agenda, it risks drifting into elitism or ineffectiveness.
Economic sovereignty featured prominently. BRICS’ advocacy for loans in local currencies was welcomed as a corrective to dollar dependency. At the same time, South Africa’s efforts to balance clean energy transitions with the need for development highlighted the persistent tension between sustainability and equity. In contrast, Western powers were criticised for shifting resources away from development and toward military spending. Against this backdrop, participants suggested that the Global South has emerged as the true custodian of multilateralism, with one speaker insisting that the G20 could endure even without US participation because of the growing weight of emerging actors.
The nature of BRICS itself was a subject of debate. Rather than a rigid institution, it was characterised as a flexible forum that allows members to “agree to disagree.” This informality was presented as both a strength and a necessity for managing diversity as the group expands. Some suggested that BRICS may evolve into an “à la carte” model, enabling cooperation in selected areas without requiring uniform consensus. Questions from the floor probed whether BRICS should develop a clearer trade or tariff policy, given the widening differences among its members, or whether its strength lies precisely in avoiding rigid commitments.
The discussion also raised more profound structural questions. What does it mean to speak of a “fractured world order” or of “multipolarity”? Are states actively shaping the new order, or merely adapting to shifts driven by larger powers? Several argued that the Global South is no longer a passive object of competition but an increasingly assertive actor, prioritising industrialisation, regional integration, and technology-driven development. For Africa in particular, continental cooperation (whether through infrastructure projects such as rail integration or more ambitious trade and governance reforms) was highlighted as key to turning agency into material power.
The impact of US policies loomed large. Trump’s pro-industrial strategy, while weakening Europe, was viewed as likely to entrench Africa’s extractive role in the global economy. This serves as a warning that, without stronger industrial policies, more selective engagement with foreign investment, and a greater capacity to resist external pressure, African claims to sovereignty will remain rhetorical. As one participant concluded, genuine autonomy requires material weight, and without it, calls for sovereignty risk becoming hollow.
Historical Memory and the Future of Russia–Africa Relations
This session examined the enduring but evolving role of historical memory in shaping Russia’s ties with African countries. Russia often emphasises its non-colonial past and its solidarity during the liberation era, yet participants questioned how much this legacy still resonates with younger generations. Speakers traced links back to the nineteenth century and highlighted Soviet contributions, including medical assistance, military training, and support for the anti-apartheid struggle. They noted, however, that today’s African youth are less influenced by historical memory and more motivated by tangible and contemporary opportunities. The presence of more than 34,000 African students in Russia today demonstrates that education and scientific cooperation remain crucial avenues of engagement; however, these alone cannot sustain the relationship without a broader vision.
A recurring argument was the need to move beyond symbolic hard power and military legacies toward more practical forms of soft power that more tangibly benefit Africa. Russia was encouraged to expand cultural, educational, and scientific partnerships, particularly with African youth, and to align its efforts with African priorities such as the African Union’s Agenda 2063. In a crowded geopolitical environment, where external actors are competing for influence, such cooperation was considered more relevant than continued reliance on historical narratives.
The metaphor of a “new AK-47” for Africa was used to illustrate this shift. Whereas the original AK-47 symbolised military solidarity during the liberation struggles, participants argued that Russia now needs to demonstrate partnership through non-military means. Cooperation in areas such as space exploration, agriculture, and science was suggested as the kind of practical engagement that could redefine the relationship. Yet constraints remain. The closure of Russian educational institutions in Africa, persistent language barriers, and the absence of Russian media outlets such as RT in South Africa were noted as significant obstacles to building sustained influence.
The discussion also interrogated contradictions in Russia’s image. While its role in African liberation is acknowledged, some questioned whether present-day resource extraction risks replicating the very neo-colonial dynamics that Russia criticises in the West. Comparisons with China highlighted Moscow’s relative weakness, with Beijing seen as far more visible, invested and influential across the continent. Participants argued that the limited trade base between Russia and Africa remains a structural weakness, and that Africa’s long-term competitiveness depends less on external partners and more on regional integration, industrialisation and value-chain transformation.
Participants inquired about the meaning of solidarity when ideals of sovereignty and liberation diverge, and how far Russia’s influence will depend on networks of alums educated there. Some questioned whether BRICS-style cooperation should expand into trilateral or multilateral arrangements that enhance African bargaining power. Several argued that science and technology partnerships could provide the “hard currency” of future engagement, but warned against these being confined to elite circles. For cooperation to be meaningful, it must be broad-based, people-centred and clearly linked to Africa’s developmental priorities rather than external agendas.
The session ultimately revealed a paradox. Historical memory provides a valuable foundation, but it cannot, by itself, sustain Russia–Africa relations. The future will depend less on invoking the past than on building credible soft power instruments, investing in education and science, and aligning with Africa’s own vision for transformation. Without this, calls for solidarity risk sounding nostalgic rather than strategic.
Bilateral Relations at a Crossroads
This session examined the trajectory of Russia–South Africa bilateral relations, situating them within both historical legacies and present geopolitical shifts. Historical ties were acknowledged, from Russian support during the Anglo-Boer War to the Soviet role in the anti-apartheid struggle. These episodes continue to shape perceptions, but speakers emphasised that memory alone is insufficient to sustain the relationship. Younger generations are largely unaware of this history, while Western-centred narratives often dominate public discourse.
What emerged more strongly was the recognition that implementation has lagged. Despite strategic partnership agreements in 2006 and 2013, progress in the seven areas of cooperation (political, trade, parliamentary, defence, science, technology and humanitarian) has been limited. Participants attributed this to the broader geopolitical climate, the impact of sanctions, South Africa’s image problem with Russia, and a lack of business confidence. While Russian academia remains engaged, Russian companies report insecurity about operating in South Africa.
The discussion highlighted economic opportunities in energy, agriculture, climate cooperation, and precious metals, while cautioning against overly ambitious frameworks that risk becoming wish lists. A clear roadmap and more realistic ambitions were seen as essential. Without tangible progress, bilateral relations risk stagnating in symbolism.
Participants emphasised that the most promising avenue for revitalisation lies in people-to-people and entrepreneurial ties. Education, cultural exchanges and proposals for joint university programmes could help move the relationship beyond the elite or state level. At the same time, entrepreneurs and civil society actors were recognised as crucial for developing practical projects, building trust, and generating the kind of grassroots momentum that governments alone cannot achieve.
Ultimately, the session concluded that the bilateral relationship is at a crossroads. It can remain rooted in history and symbolic gestures, or it can reinvent itself through smaller and more concrete initiatives and a broader base of societal engagement. The question, as framed by several speakers, is whether Russia and South Africa are willing to adapt their partnership to the realities of a contested global order, or whether they will allow it to stagnate.
Trump and the World Order
The final session examined the implications of Trump’s presidency for the international order, asking whether he represents a rupture or a continuation of American foreign policy. While often portrayed as an aberration, participants argued that Trumpism is less revolutionary than it appears. Instead, it reflects longstanding patterns of US self-interest and hegemonic ambition. His rhetoric of “making America great again” was seen as consistent with Washington’s pursuit of primacy, even if presented in more openly transactional terms.
Three dimensions of Trump’s approach were highlighted. First, his confidence in US exceptionalism sustains the image of the United States as untouchable, even as its relative power declines. Second, his trade policies, centred on tariff reciprocity and the drive to reindustrialise, mark a more assertive turn in protectionism. These measures predate his presidency, but he has amplified them, and their effects are already reshaping Europe’s economic strategies and global capital flows. For the Global South, participants warned, this shift risks reinforcing dependency and instability, as capital movements undermine competitiveness and erode development prospects.
Third, Trumpism was described as an ideology in its own right. It is anti-interventionist in rhetoric yet intrusive in practice. His willingness to prescribe how other states, including South Africa, should manage their domestic affairs highlights the tension between American claims to sovereignty and its disregard for the sovereignty of others. For many, this positioned Trump not as an outright enemy but as a powerful opponent whose actions must be carefully managed.
The discussion also stressed continuity. Despite the bombast, Trump’s policies were seen as an intensification of earlier trends, particularly the drive to minimise external limits on US power while imposing constraints on others. Previous administrations may have concealed such ambitions in liberal or multilateral language, but Trump has stripped them bare. In this sense, he represents not a deviation but an acceleration of American unilateralism.
Importantly, participants linked these dynamics to the broader themes of the conference. Trumpism was seen as reinforcing the fractured order, compelling Global South actors either to adapt passively to shifting rules or to coordinate alternatives. The consensus was that critique alone is not enough. To protect their agency, Africa, Russia, and other emerging powers must strengthen multilateral mechanisms, promote economic sovereignty, and invest in cooperative architectures in Eurasia, Africa, and beyond. These steps were presented as vital if the Global South is to avoid being sidelined and to shape, rather than merely absorb, the next phase of global order.
Conclusion: Russia–South Africa Relations in a Fractured World
The conference revealed that Russia–South Africa relations are shaped by three intersecting forces: the weight of historical legacies, the pressures of today’s fractured global order, and the uncertainties of the future, from Trumpism to the contested meanings of multipolarity.
History provides an essential foundation, yet memory alone cannot sustain the partnership. Current realities highlight the limits of trade and institutionalisation, as well as the persistence of image problems and mistrust. Looking ahead, the challenge will be to move beyond rhetoric and symbolism toward pragmatic, developmental, and people-centred cooperation that reflects African agency while accommodating Russian interests.
The key insight from the conference was that agency lies not only with governments but also with societies. Educational exchanges, entrepreneurial collaboration, and grassroots ties could prove decisive in shifting the relationship from one anchored in nostalgia to one that delivers concrete benefits. In an era of turbulence, the future of Russia–South Africa relations will depend on whether both sides can reimagine their partnership as a tool for shared development and a contribution to a more equitable global order.
