As a Eurasian power, Russia has historically sought to develop relations with various centres of power and with all its neighbours, particularly in times of crisis along its borders. Today processes of structural transformation in our economy, diversification of foreign economic ties, and the strengthening of cooperation with our neighbours are accelerating—and among the causes is the search for new solutions in the context of the crisis in Ukraine, notes Mikhail Galuzin, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, in his address at the Valdai Club during the presentation of the report “Russia and Its Neighbours: Mutual Responsibility and Joint Development”.
Today, as in the years preceding the First and Second World Wars, the world has entered another period of global transformation. The principal rivalry is unfolding between the outgoing hegemon, the United States—and its closest allies—and a new, rapidly developing power centre, China. A redistribution of economic and, consequently, political power in favour of the states of the Global South and the World Majority is actively under way. New regional leaders are emerging and beginning to play an increasingly active role in world affairs. I concur with the authors of the report Russia and Its Neighbours: Mutual Responsibility and Co-Development that the impact of these processes on the foreign policy position and internal development of Russia’s neighbouring states will be long-term in nature.
This complex geopolitical context is compounded by another powerful factor—the Fourth Industrial Revolution, which is erasing the familiar boundaries between the digital, industrial, and biological spheres, transforming technological chains and the social structure of society. This compels Western countries to act more aggressively and assertively in order to preserve their dominance and accelerates the pace of developments.
No doubt, one of the most significant elements in the unfolding global processes is the confrontation between Russia and the West, which began neither in 2022 nor 2014. Rather, it has been a constant in our relations, while all periods of thaw were temporary and, evidently, opportunistic on the part of the EU and NATO countries. The Ukrainian crisis itself did not arise overnight; it was the result of a prolonged and persistent Western policy of NATO enlargement, the advance of military infrastructure towards Russia’s borders, and the disregard for the principle of indivisible security enshrined in pan-European documents. Their objective is to inflict a strategic, historical, cultural, and civilisational defeat on Russia, to remove our country from the ranks of great powers responsible for maintaining international security and shaping the international order. This crisis undoubtedly has a profound impact on developments throughout our Near Abroad, as well as on our relations with the CIS states. On this point, I must respectfully disagree with the authors of the report, who suggest that the prospects of our policy towards the countries of the Near Abroad should not be linked to the outcome of the conflict in Ukraine. The world is closely observing ongoing developments, noting how consistently and firmly we defend our sovereign course and interests, uphold the rights of Russian and Russian-speaking citizens, ensure our security, and resist Western pressure.
As a Eurasian power, Russia has historically sought to develop relations with various centres of power and with all its neighbours, particularly in times of crisis along its borders. Today processes of structural transformation in our economy, diversification of foreign economic ties, and the strengthening of cooperation with our neighbours are accelerating—and among the causes is the search for new solutions in the context of the crisis in Ukraine.
Above all, this concerns relations with Belarus, our closest ally and strategic partner. Our large-scale cooperation across all areas, integration within the framework of the Union State and its advancement, are developing steadily. Joint programmes are being implemented in industry, energy, and finance, and coordination of macroeconomic policy is being reinforced. Together with our Belarusian allies, we are effectively countering the sanctions and legal aggression of the collective West. In the context of intensified NATO military activity in Europe, the formation of a common defence space aimed at ensuring strategic stability was a logical step. In accordance with the Treaty on Security Guarantees within the framework of the Union State, which entered into force in March 2025, Moscow and Minsk have assumed mutual obligations to protect each other’s sovereignty, independence, and constitutional order, as well as the inviolability of the Union State’s borders, employing all available forces and means, including nuclear weapons.
Relations with the countries of Central Asia are no less a priority for Russia. We are bound by longstanding historical, cultural, and humanitarian ties, as well as deep economic interdependence. Under unstable international conditions Russia supports the efforts of the region’s states to strengthen their resilience and sovereignty. Cooperation is developing both on a bilateral basis and within multilateral formats, including the Eurasian Economic Union and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Particular attention is devoted to countering transnational threats, developing transport and energy infrastructure, and expanding investment and industrial cooperation.
In the South Caucasus, our country continues to act as an important participant in normalisation and stabilisation processes. We are interested in establishing sustainable mechanisms for dialogue, in the unblocking of transport routes, and creating conditions for the region’s economic development. In the face of intensifying external competition, we are undertaking all necessary efforts to prevent the South Caucasus from becoming an arena of geopolitical rivalry.
The EU and the United States seek to drive a wedge into our relations with our neighbours and to draw them into Western intrigues against Russia. I emphasise that we support the sovereign choice of our partners. Despite unprecedented pressure exerted by the West, our relations with the states of Central Asia and the South Caucasus are built upon the principles of strategic partnership and alliance. At the same time, those states themselves understand that Western partners have nothing tangible to offer in place of cooperation with Russia.
For our part, we attach considerable importance to the development of cooperation within multilateral frameworks—the CIS, the EAEU, the CSTO, the SCO, and CICA. We see substantial potential in these structures in maintaining regional stability, advocate the development of horizontal ties between them, and the utilisation of their individual advantages. We continue to work jointly with our neighbours on creating a new security architecture in Eurasia, open to the accession of all countries of the continent. It envisages a system of mutual guarantees based on the principles of equality and indivisibility of security.
Taking into account the crisis of the European security system and the creation of new Asia-Pacific regional military-political blocs directed against China and Russia, we are pursuing strategic partnership with China. Russian-Chinese relations are characterised by high levels of trust and resilience. Trade and economic cooperation is expanding, alongside collaboration in energy, transport, industry, and high technology. Coordination of positions on the international stage contributes to the formation of a more just multipolar world order, the consolidation of the Global South, and benefits the countries along our shared external perimeter. It should be noted that our interaction is not bloc-based and is not directed against third countries; it is founded on the convergence of long-term interests and respect for national choice.
In the context of the renewed dynamics of Russia’s relations with our neighbours, it is important to understand that the confrontation between Russia and the West serves as a litmus test in the perception of our country by the states of the Global South. They are closely observing how Russia achieves its objectives, maintains its commitment to a “pivot to the East”, defends its identity, and strengthens its sovereignty. Today, they see that in response to attempts at external coercion our country does not retreat into isolation, but instead builds a more diversified and resilient system of external ties.
In these circumstances, it appears that the principal sphere of our work must consist in strengthening our own sovereignty and that of our neighbours across economic, cultural, and industrial spheres. Only this can enhance our collective resilience in the face of Western pressure, which will undoubtedly continue to intensify.
We are convinced that long-term stability across Eurasia is possible only under conditions of multipolarity, where no state or group of states may claim exclusivity or dictate its will to others, and where any regional initiatives are genuinely viable and promising only with the participation of the Russian Federation.
