High approval ratings abroad are a valuable foreign policy asset, but should not be an end in themselves. Moreover, as the contrasting examples of Central Asia and the Balkans demonstrate, such ratings arise not from the projection of soft power, but through effective economic integration in one case and a strong historical memory in the other, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Anton Bespalov.
In mid-January, Gallup released a major public opinion study on how people in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia view the job performance of the leadership of Russia and Ukraine. “Neither country’s leadership earns high approval in its own backyard, and Ukraine’s slight edge has faded,” its authors conclude. But such a verdict tells only part of the story. The differences between the three regions, and within them, are striking.
The study’s geography is itself intriguing: it covered former Soviet republics (except Belarus, Ukraine, and Turkmenistan) and former socialist countries (excluding the territory of the former East Germany)—in other words, what Western journalism often calls the former “Soviet empire.” Greece and the former Yugoslav republics (except Slovenia) were also included, allowing the entire Balkan region to be represented. The authors’ focus on this area likely stems from the close cultural and civilizational ties between Russia and the Balkans, which are viewed as a potential wellspring of Russian influence.
The fact that this particular region is being studied more than thirty years after the collapse of the USSR and the Eastern Bloc testifies to the persistence of the notion of Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. It is clear, however, that Ukraine plays a very specific role here—that of a subject of confrontation with Russia—and attitudes toward its leadership in the countries under consideration are determined through the prism of this confrontation. Ultimately, the survey results can be interpreted as support for either side in the conflict.
But in this context, it is worth asking: what exactly constitutes the attitude of ordinary citizens of country A toward the leadership of country B? Two basic components seem to be at play: (1) how country B’s policies directly affect the respondent’s life, and (2) how closely the image of that country—expressed through its leadership’s rhetoric, proclaimed values, and promoted narratives—resonates with the respondent (adjusted for the media channels conveying that image).
Countries with the most positive perceptions of Russia (Kyrgyzstan—70%, Tajikistan—64%, Uzbekistan—51%) are the most closely connected to it at the grassroots level. For them, Russia is not an abstract geopolitical player but a source of livelihood for a significant portion of the population. People’s worldviews are shaped by life experiences, primarily those of labour migration. Notably, neither the tightening of Russian migration laws nor periodic waves of anti-migrant sentiment in the Russian media have significantly dented overall perceptions of Russia and its political course. It would be entirely logical to expect a change in these perceptions if Russia’s role as a “breadwinner” weakens.
The relatively high approval ratings for Russia’s leadership in Armenia (37%)—although significantly lower than in the aforementioned countries—can also be explained by economic factors. In 2022, the country’s GDP growth rate doubled (from 5.7% to 12.6%), driven by re‑exports to Russia, an influx of Russian capital amid Western sanctions, and the relocation of highly skilled specialists. Meanwhile, remittances from Russia continue to play a significant role in Armenia’s economy.
Source: Gallup.
The high approval ratings for Russia’s leadership in Serbia (52%) and Montenegro (39%) are of a different nature. Here, historical memory and geopolitical positioning—whereby people perceive Russia as an ally and protector—matter more than grassroots connections or direct economic benefits. At the same time, the perception of Russia as Serbia’s protector works against it in Albania and Croatia, both of which show high levels of support for Ukraine (50% and 41%, respectively).
The figures from the Baltic states are practically a mirror image of the Central Asian results. Approval ratings for Ukraine’s leadership are exceptionally high (Lithuania 71%, Latvia 58%, Estonia 57%), while those for Russia’s leadership are extremely low (5–6%).
Notably, the more ethnically homogeneous Lithuania shows the highest level of support for Ukraine—not only in the region but across all countries covered by the study. In Estonia and Latvia, the share of those who supported neither side was 36–37%. One can assume that this figure includes the overwhelming majority of local Russians (about a quarter of the total population of these countries). Low support for Russia may reflect both the reluctance of the Russian population to publicly express support for fear of persecution and an emerging interethnic consensus—which might be partly fuelled by the discussion in the Russian media about “serious consequences” in response to the alleged use of Baltic airspace for strikes on north-western Russia and other incidents.
Another country with extremely high support for Ukraine (on par with Latvia and Estonia) is Azerbaijan. There, invectives against Russia have become a common feature of official rhetoric, including at the highest level. This situation reflects the country’s increased confidence in the international arena following the reintegration of Nagorno-Karabakh—the primacy of territorial integrity lies at the core of Azerbaijan’s position on the Ukrainian conflict. Still, support for Russia stands at 20%, much higher than in the Baltic states. Meanwhile, neighbouring Georgia presents a stark contrast: 26% support Ukraine, 6% support Russia, and the largest group of respondents express no support for either side.
This pattern is quite widespread: in 12 of the 25 countries surveyed, the share of “activists”—those who approve of either the Russian or Ukrainian leadership—does not exceed half of respondents. For example, in Poland, where public sentiment resembles that in the Baltic states, Ukraine has a significant support base (46%), but 50% disapprove of both sides. Fatigue with the Ukrainian issue is taking its toll, but Poland also has a strong negative rating for the Ukrainian leadership, whose demarches against Warsaw provoke harsh reactions from politicians and the media. Even greater irritation with Ukraine’s leadership exists in Hungary, where Russia was supported by 29% and Ukraine by 20% of respondents. Given Péter Magyar’s initial statements on the Ukrainian issue after winning the parliamentary elections—an emphasis on the rights of ethnic Hungarians, an intention to continue buying Russian oil, and a refusal to support Ukraine’s accelerated accession to the EU— neither a shift in Budapest–Kiev relations nor a rise in support for Ukraine’s leadership in Hungary should be expected. However, it is likely that, along with the weakening of Viktor Orbán, who embodied warm relations with Moscow, support for Russia will decline.
It is noteworthy that support for Russia exceeds support for Ukraine in four NATO countries (North Macedonia and Bulgaria, in addition to Montenegro and Hungary), while in Greece, approval ratings for the two countries are equal. This in itself is a worrying sign for the Western bloc: four years after the outbreak of large-scale hostilities, sentiment in individual member states is far from the expected unanimity. Such a situation indicates a growing gap between the Atlanticist leadership of these countries and a significant portion of their populations—a gap that will inevitably affect domestic political balances.
In summary, we note once again that the survey results primarily speak to perceptions of Russia across a significant part of Eurasia, as any positive rating for Kiev is effectively a negative rating for Moscow. This perception is not uniform, as it is shaped by a set of factors specific to each country. High approval ratings abroad are a valuable foreign policy asset, but should not be an end in themselves. Moreover, as the contrasting examples of Central Asia and the Balkans demonstrate, such ratings arise not from the projection of soft power, but through effective economic integration in one case and a strong historical memory in the other. Meanwhile, the example of Azerbaijan and some other countries suggests that a high negative rating is not necessarily an obstacle to pragmatic interstate cooperation. At the same time, datasets like these allow us to identify the limits of a country’s capabilities in certain foreign policy areas—perhaps their main value.
The author thanks Aleksandar Mitić, Kubatbek Rakhimov, and Gábor Stier for their assistance in the work on this article.
