China and Russia are not merely deploying parallel soft power practices and instruments, but are gradually converging toward a hybrid configuration that may be described as “strategic soft power.” This emerging form of combined influence integrates infrastructure, media, key resources connectivity, and institutional platforms into a unified geopolitical architecture. Analysis of the Strait of Hormuz crisis, the Ukraine conflict, Russia’s RT, China’s CGTN, the TV BRICS media network, Arctic cooperation, and China’s Belt and Road Initiative demonstrates how soft power has become inseparable from material connectivity and crisis-driven geopolitical alignment, writes Hua Han, Co-Founder & Secretary General of the Beijing Club for International Dialogue.
The evolution of China–Russia relations in the twenty-first century reflects a broader transformation in the structure of global power. As geopolitical fragmentation intensifies and great-power competition deepens, bilateral cooperation between Beijing and Moscow increasingly extends beyond diplomacy, economic exchange, and security coordination. It is now embedded in a broader contest over narratives, legitimacy, and institutional design in global governance: domains commonly associated with “soft power” in the traditional sense. Yet, in today’s geopolitical environment, marked by regional wars, sanctions and fragmented media platforms, soft power itself is undergoing a structural transformation.
Introduction: From Classical Soft Power to Strategic Narrative Competition
The concept of soft power, as originally formulated by Joseph Nye, refers to the ability of a state to shape the preferences of others through attraction rather than coercion. In the post-Cold War era, Western states, particularly the United States and Europe, established a dominant position in global soft power through their control over media ecosystems, cultural industries, higher education, and multilateral governance institutions.
However, the structural environment in which soft power operates has changed dramatically since the mid-2010s. The Ukraine crisis of 2014, the intensification of US–China strategic rivalry, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the subsequent fragmentation of global supply chains have all contributed to the securitisation of interdependence. In this context, soft power is no longer primarily about cultural attractiveness or ideological appeal; it has become deeply embedded in geopolitical competition and systemic resilience.
Within this shifting environment, China and Russia have developed increasingly coordinated approaches to external communication and global narrative construction. Their cooperation does not replicate Western models of soft power; it reflects a different conceptual foundation, one grounded in sovereignty, multipolarity, and state-led governance of information and infrastructure systems.
Theoretical Reframing: Soft Power as Narrative, Institution, and Infrastructure
To understand the transformation of China–Russia soft power cooperation, it is necessary to move beyond the traditional dichotomy between soft and hard power. In practice, contemporary influence operates through a triadic structure that integrates narrative authority, institutional design, and material infrastructure.
Narrative power refers to the ability to shape how global events are interpreted, particularly during moments of crisis. Institutional power refers to participation in and construction of alternative governance frameworks such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and China’s Global Development, Security, Civilisation and Governance Initiatives. Infrastructure power refers to the ability to shape connectivity systems, including energy pipelines, transportation corridors, digital networks, Arctic routes, etc.
In the China–Russia context, these dimensions are increasingly intertwined. Infrastructure shapes narratives, narratives justify institutions, and institutions reinforce infrastructure. This structural fusion becomes particularly visible in geopolitical arenas such as the Middle East, Eastern Europe, the Arctic, and across Eurasian connectivity projects under the Belt and Road Initiative.
The Strait of Hormuz and the Geopolitics of Energy Narrative Power
The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the most strategically sensitive maritime chokepoints in the world, through which a significant share of global oil and liquefied natural gas exports flow. Escalating tensions involving Iran, the United States, and regional actors have repeatedly highlighted the fragility of global energy security systems.
Within this context, China and Russia converge in their interpretation of energy security as a politically constructed rather than a purely market-driven phenomenon. Russian discourse emphasises the destabilising effects of Western military interventions in the Middle East and the consequences of sanctions-based energy governance. China, while maintaining a more neutral diplomatic position, consistently emphasises the diversification of energy supply chains and opposition to unilateral coercive measures.
This convergence is reinforced by structural complementarities. Russia, as a major hydrocarbon exporter under Western sanctions, increasingly depends on Asian markets for energy exports. China, as the world’s largest energy importer, has systematically diversified its supply routes through pipelines from Russia and Central Asia and through maritime and overland corridors developed under the Belt and Road Initiative.
China’s long-term energy strategy is particularly relevant in this context. Over the past decade, it has significantly expanded its strategic petroleum reserves, accelerated the development of renewable energy systems, and invested heavily in electric vehicle infrastructure and battery technologies. These structural adjustments have reduced vulnerability to maritime chokepoints such as Hormuz. At the same time, Russia has benefited from more stable long-term demand conditions in Asian markets.
Thus, the Hormuz crises have functioned as catalysts for reinforcing a shared China–Russia narrative of energy multipolarity. In this narrative, Western-controlled maritime security frameworks are portrayed as increasingly unstable, while Eurasian energy connectivity is presented as a more resilient alternative. Soft power in this context is inseparable from the material infrastructure that underpins it.
The Ukraine Crisis and the Transformation of Legitimacy Narratives
The Ukraine conflict represents a watershed moment in contemporary international relations and has become a central arena of global narrative competition. It is not only a military conflict but also a struggle over legitimacy, sovereignty, and the meaning of international order.
Russia frames the conflict as a response to NATO expansion and as a defence of its national security and civilisational autonomy. Chinese official discourse, while maintaining neutrality, consistently emphasises dialogue, opposition to sanctions, and the importance of respecting the legitimate security concerns of all parties.
Although these positions are not identical, they reflect a shared scepticism toward the Western normative monopoly in global governance. Both China and Russia emphasise multipolarity as an alternative organising principle of the international order.
China’s role in this context has expanded beyond diplomatic positioning. It has increasingly strengthened engagement with the Global South through the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and expanded economic cooperation with ASEAN, Africa, and Latin America. These engagements have helped reduce the dominance of Western-centred diplomatic frameworks and have indirectly provided Russia with broader diplomatic space in non-Western regions.
The Ukraine crisis has therefore accelerated the transformation of soft power into a contest between epistemological systems. Competing actors are no longer merely influencing opinions; they are competing over the definition of legitimacy itself.
Media Ecosystems: RT, CGTN, and TV BRICS as Narrative Infrastructure
The evolution of media platforms such as RT, CGTN, and TV BRICS reflects the institutionalisation of alternative narrative systems in global politics.
RT, as a Russian multilingual broadcasting network, is designed to challenge Western media dominance by providing alternative interpretations of international events. Its role is not necessarily to achieve universal attraction but to introduce narrative plurality into global information flows. Despite controversies in Western discourse, RT functions as a strategic communication instrument that amplifies Russian perspectives in global debates.
TV BRICS represents a more recent development, reflecting the collective communication ambitions of emerging economies. Unlike RT, which is nationally rooted, TV BRICS operates as a multilateral media platform connecting Russia, China, India, Brazil, and South Africa. It represents a shift from unilateral narrative projection to distributed narrative production.
China’s CGTN adds a different dimension to this ecosystem. CGTN operates as a global multilingual media platform that integrates development narratives, connectivity narratives, and stability narratives into a coherent communication strategy. Its expansion in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America reflects China’s broader strategy of embedding media presence within economic and infrastructural engagement under the Belt and Road Initiative.
Together, RT, CGTN, and TV BRICS form an emerging triadic media architecture that challenges the historical dominance of Western media systems. In this configuration, media is no longer merely a communication channel but a form of geopolitical infrastructure that shapes global perception structures.
The Arctic: Strategic Commons and Emerging Cooperative Competition
The Arctic region has become an increasingly important arena for both cooperation and competition. Climate change has opened new shipping routes and resource access, making the region strategically significant for global trade and energy systems.
Russia, possessing the longest Arctic coastline and extensive resource endowments, occupies a central position in Arctic governance. China, while geographically distant, identifies itself as a near-Arctic stakeholder and has expanded its engagement through scientific research, shipping exploration, and infrastructure investment linked to the Ice Silk Road component of the Belt and Road Initiative.
China–Russia cooperation in the Arctic includes energy exploration, scientific collaboration, and shipping route development along the Northern Sea Route. For Russia, Chinese participation provides investment and infrastructure support for Arctic development. For China, Arctic routes offer potential through the diversification of global shipping systems and reduced dependence on traditional maritime chokepoints.
From a soft power perspective, Arctic cooperation constructs narratives of scientific collaboration and global commons governance. However, these narratives are increasingly constrained by securitisation pressures from Western Arctic states, revealing the limits of soft power in highly militarised environments.
The Belt and Road Initiative as Narrative Infrastructure
Beyond discrete case studies, the Belt and Road Initiative itself represents a central mechanism of China’s global soft power transformation, with indirect but significant implications for Russia. BRI is not merely an infrastructure project; it is a systemic framework for redefining globalisation through connectivity.
Through railways, ports, energy pipelines, and digital infrastructure, BRI constructs long-term patterns of economic interdependence that generate narrative effects. Connectivity becomes a form of legitimacy, and infrastructure becomes a form of discourse.
Russia participates in this system through coordination between the Eurasian Economic Union and BRI, particularly in energy corridors, Central Asian connectivity, and Arctic development. This alignment reinforces a broader Eurasian integration logic that challenges Western-centric globalisation models.
Synthesis: Toward Strategic Narrative Power
Across all examined cases, a consistent pattern emerges. China and Russia are not merely engaging in traditional soft power projection, they are constructing a systemic environment in which narratives, infrastructure, and institutions are mutually reinforcing.
Energy systems such as those shaped by Hormuz volatility, conflict narratives such as the Ukraine conflict, media ecosystems such as RT, CGTN, and TV BRICS, Arctic cooperation, and the Belt and Road Initiative collectively demonstrate the emergence of a new configuration of influence. This configuration may be conceptualised as strategic narrative power, in which material capabilities and interpretive authority converge.
Conclusion: Soft Power Reconfigured
The future of China–Russia soft power cooperation lies in its transformation into a structurally embedded system that integrates infrastructure, communication, and geopolitical alignment. Soft power is no longer a separate domain of cultural attraction; it has become inseparable from the material architecture of global order.
The Strait of Hormuz, the Ukraine crisis, media ecosystems such as RT, CGTN, and TV BRICS, Arctic cooperation, and the Belt and Road Initiative together illustrate this transformation. China and Russia are not merely responding to Western soft power dominance; they are actively constructing alternative systems of meaning, connectivity, and governance.
Whether this emerging system leads to stable multipolarity or deeper fragmentation remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that soft power in the China–Russia context has already evolved into something fundamentally different: a strategic narrative system embedded in the infrastructure of global politics itself.
