Valdai Club

Hopes had been pinned since the formation of the new government on financial and economic breakthroughs, radical reforms, an influx of foreign aid, and a renewal of the political class, but developments have taken the exact opposite direction, heralding even more severe economic and social collapses, a shake-up of international confidence in Lebanon, and a standstill in international support measures, writes Dr. Amal Abou Zeid.

Lebanon has entered a difficult phase, one of its most delicate and dangerous since 1975. This is not only due to the war and its resulting destruction, devastation, losses, and burdens that exceed its capabilities and resources, but also because of the war’s repercussions and the profound changes it has brought about at all levels: demographic, geographic, social, political, security-related, economic, and financial. Lebanon currently stands at the heart of a catastrophic humanitarian situation, a national disaster, and geopolitical shifts that threaten its stability, internal security, and national equilibrium. The situation is subject to internal dynamics, primarily political dynamics with sectarian and regional dimensions and backgrounds. These dynamics have contributed to heightened tensions and fuel an atmosphere of mobilisation, incitement, anxieties, and fear for the future and destiny. These dynamics are linked to a number of driving factors, most notably:

1) The national political division regarding the war, who caused it, and who bears responsibility for it and its consequences. One group views the war as part of Israel’s plans and aggressive intentions against all countries in the region, while another group holds Hezbollah responsible for dragging Lebanon into a conflict that serves no Lebanese interest and only benefits Iran and its interests.

2) The issue of restricting the provision of weapons to the Lebanese state, which implies ending Hezbollah as a military organisation and its role and function as a “resistance.” This issue is strategic and vital for both sides: on the one hand, the state will not tolerate any compromise on extending its authority over all its territory, and the time has come to achieve this goal, given the current opportunity, support, and insistence from the international community. On the other hand, Hezbollah refuses to surrender its weapons and integrate into the state project.

The state project, meant to be inclusive and unifying for all Lebanese components, has become a source of polarisation and division instead of a source of attraction and unity.

3) The fear that the war’s outcome will be exploited to fuel internal political conflict, leading to actions based on a winner-loser mentality. This applies to both sides of the conflict. The Shiite duo does not consider the issue to be one of “party and weapons,” but rather one of “sect and destiny,” and they are wary that the war could be a prelude to containing and weakening the Shiite role. Conversely, Hezbollah’s opponents anticipate the party’s retreat inward, whether in defeat or victory, to compensate for its losses and gain political and authoritarian advantages, or to consolidate its control and dominance over the state and improve its position.

4) The current situation on the Lebanese-Syrian border and the future of the relationship between Lebanon and Syria. Here, concerns and risks are distributed in two directions:

• The risk of conflicts and clashes erupting on the eastern border between Syrian forces and Hezbollah.

• The risk of the new Syrian regime infiltrating and expanding its influence and role into the Lebanese interior, starting from the northern border. The Syrian factor is fuelling Lebanese tensions and anxieties, and it can only be addressed within the framework of rebuilding trust and establishing an equal relationship based on mutual respect, non-interference in internal affairs, and adherence to the unity and finality of the Lebanese entity. 

5) The underlying conflict surrounding the future of the political system is already beginning to surface and will intensify, taking on a clearer and more pronounced form after the war. Following a series of crises and wars that have plagued Lebanon and shaken its foundations, many forces and segments of society have become convinced of the necessity for a change in the political system and the introduction of radical reforms. Events and crises have demonstrated that the Taif Agreement is no longer sufficient as a framework to guarantee sustainable stability. A comprehensive review is now required to identify the shortcomings and gaps and to arrive at a stable formula for governance.

6) There is a growing fear and anticipation of widespread “internal chaos” that will destroy stability and security within the country and deliver a fatal blow to the normal course of life and what remains of the foundations of economic resilience. This chaos manifests itself in various forms on the streets, including acts of violence, murder, theft, and sectarian and regional clashes. Three factors contribute to fuelling this chaos and causing the situation to spiral out of control:

• Political and sectarian mobilisation, particularly on social media platforms.

• The social and economic repercussions of the population displacement crisis.

• The weakening or slackening of the state’s security grip for numerous political, practical, and moral reasons.

7) The intensification of the political conflict, which now harbours all the elements of an explosion. This conflict currently revolves around the government; between a majority faction clinging to it, its policies, and its decisions, and a minority faction which rejects it and sees a need for, and an advantage in, its downfall. Since the avenues for change through political and normal means have been closed with the extension of the parliament’s term, which automatically led to the extension of the government’s term, resorting to non-political means and street protests is the most likely course of action, thus increasing the level of risks and the likelihood of negative scenarios.

8) Feelings of frustration and disappointment that exacerbate the desire to surrender to the status quo and engage with extremist options and trends that prioritise confrontation and clashes over participation and dialogue. This state of frustration, bordering on the abandonment of hope for a secure and guaranteed future, and a lack of trust in the state and the existing authority, is the result of cumulative factors and causes over decades, particularly in the last five years, and has been exacerbated by developments in recent months that have defied expectations and hopes. Hopes had been pinned, since the formation of the new government, on financial and economic breakthroughs, radical reforms, an influx of foreign aid, and a renewal of the political class. However, developments have taken the exact opposite direction, heralding even more severe economic and social collapses, a shake-up of international confidence in Lebanon, and a standstill in international support measures. Added to all this is the political deadlock resulting from the forced extension of the parliament and the government, and the political situation’s intractability, which offers no solutions or ways out.