The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, signed on August 7, 2026 by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan, should not be viewed merely as another military arrangement in an already fragmented Middle Eastern security environment. Its significance lies less in the immediate military capabilities of the three signatories than in the model of regional security that it potentially represents. The agreement may mark a transition from reliance on individual external security providers towards a more diversified and networked regional security architecture, in which states preserve existing alliances while simultaneously developing additional mechanisms of collective defence.
The most discussed provision is Article 2, according to which an armed attack against any one of the three countries will be regarded as an attack against all. The formulation inevitably recalls Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, equating the two would be premature. NATO's collective defence commitment is supported by decades of institutional development, integrated command structures, established procedures and extensive operational experience. The Makkah Agreement, by contrast, has so far disclosed neither detailed troop commitments nor the precise mechanisms for activation, command, geographical scope or implementation. Consequently, Article 2 should currently be understood primarily as a political commitment intended to strengthen deterrence.
This distinction is important because the real novelty of the agreement may lie precisely beyond the conventional alliance model. Three concepts from international relations theory help explain its logic: collective defence, strategic autonomy and hedging. Stephen Walt’s balance-of-threat theory explains why states create security partnerships in response not simply to concentrations of power but to perceived threats and uncertainty. The Makkah Agreement reflects this logic, particularly given the recent escalation of regional conflicts, attacks on energy infrastructure, threats to maritime routes and the increasing vulnerability of states to missiles, drones and asymmetric attacks. At the same time, however, the signatories have deliberately avoided identifying a specific adversary. The agreement is officially defensive and does not target any country.
This creates what may be described as an alliance without a formally designated enemy. The absence of an explicitly named adversary does not necessarily weaken deterrence. On the contrary, it introduces strategic uncertainty for any potential attacker: military action against one member may now create the possibility of confrontation with two additional states possessing different and complementary capabilities. Saudi Arabia contributes financial resources, political influence and strategic geography; Türkiye possesses substantial conventional military capabilities and an increasingly sophisticated defence industry; Pakistan contributes extensive military experience and nuclear deterrence. Their combination therefore creates a form of complementary deterrence that none of the three could reproduce independently.
The second relevant concept is strategic autonomy. In the Middle Eastern context, however, autonomy should not be understood as complete independence from external powers. Saudi Arabia continues to maintain extensive relations with the United States, Türkiye remains a NATO member, and Pakistan maintains multiple external security partnerships. The Makkah Agreement therefore does not necessarily represent a rejection of existing Western security arrangements. Instead, it provides an additional layer of security that reduces dependence on any single external actor.
This is where the concept of hedging, developed particularly in the work of Cheng-Chwee Kuik, becomes especially useful. Rather than choosing between competing geopolitical centres, states diversify their strategic partnerships in order to reduce the risks associated with abandonment, excessive dependence or sudden changes in the policies of major powers.
For Saudi Arabia, this logic is particularly evident. The Kingdom has long relied heavily on its security relationship with Washington, while recent regional developments have demonstrated the limitations of assuming that external guarantees will always correspond with Saudi strategic interests. Riyadh therefore has an incentive to diversify its security architecture without abandoning its existing partnerships. The Makkah Agreement provides such diversification. It can strengthen deterrence against attacks on Saudi territory, support intelligence and defence industry cooperation and potentially increase the cost of escalation for actors operating against the Kingdom. It also provides Saudi Arabia with greater room for manoeuvre in dealing with regional crises, including the continuing instability surrounding Yemen.
Pakistan's position is more complicated. Islamabad can benefit from stronger security cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, particularly in relation to energy security, the Persian Gulf and the protection of economic interests. At the same time, Pakistan must avoid transforming a regional defence agreement into automatic obligations in conflicts involving India or Afghanistan. The absence of detailed provisions defining what constitutes an “armed attack” is therefore particularly important for Islamabad. A border incident, conflict involving non-state actors or escalation with a neighbouring state may not necessarily trigger Article 2. Until the agreement's operational mechanisms are clarified, this ambiguity gives Pakistan both additional deterrence and a degree of strategic flexibility.
For Türkiye, the agreement demonstrates the possibility of operating simultaneously within several security frameworks. Ankara remains embedded in NATO while participating in a collective-defence mechanism centred on major Muslim regional powers. Rather than representing a contradiction, these arrangements can be understood as complementary. Türkiye gains an opportunity to strengthen its position as a bridge between European, Middle Eastern and South Asian security systems while increasing its regional influence. The agreement therefore corresponds not only to security calculations but also to Ankara's broader ambition to act as an autonomous regional power.
Iran is inevitably affected by this development, even though it is not named in the agreement. The emergence of a collective defence mechanism involving Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan increases the potential costs of military escalation against any one of them. Yet it would be premature to interpret the agreement exclusively as an instrument of containment. Its explicit defensive character and the preservation of existing diplomatic channels leave open another possibility: stronger deterrence could create incentives for diplomacy by raising the costs of confrontation. Much will depend on whether Tehran interprets the agreement as an inclusive regional security mechanism or as the beginning of a hostile bloc.
Israel represents another important factor. The agreement does not identify Israel as an adversary, and the three signatories have different approaches to relations with Tel Aviv. Nevertheless, the emergence of a collective defence mechanism among major Muslim powers inevitably changes Israeli strategic calculations. Its potential significance therefore lies not necessarily in the creation of an anti-Israeli alliance, but in demonstrating that future military crises involving regional powers may no longer remain strictly bilateral. The symbolism of signing the agreement in Makkah also adds a broader political dimension, presenting the arrangement as an expression of solidarity among important Muslim states.
The agreement's future significance will ultimately depend on whether it remains a trilateral political commitment or develops into a broader regional institution. The possibility of additional members is particularly important. If other regional states eventually join, the agreement could evolve into a wider security network connecting the Persian Gulf, Anatolia and South Asia. Such a structure would probably not reproduce NATO's centralised institutional model. A more plausible trajectory would be a network of overlapping defence partnerships, intelligence-sharing mechanisms, military exercises and defence industry cooperation. In this sense, the future of regional security may be less about creating a single “Middle Eastern NATO” and more about constructing a web of partially overlapping security arrangements.
Several alternative trajectories are therefore possible. A limited trilateral framework would provide enhanced deterrence but have relatively modest systemic consequences. Expansion could transform it into an important regional security institution. Conversely, if the agreement becomes explicitly associated with containing Iran or confronting Israel, it could intensify regional polarisation and contribute to a new security dilemma. An especially significant long-term possibility would be the development of an inclusive regional mechanism in which current rivals could eventually participate. While Iranian membership currently appears highly unlikely, the possibility illustrates how quickly regional alignments can change when the political environment changes.
The central question, consequently, is not whether the Makkah Agreement constitutes a “Middle Eastern NATO”; such a comparison captures the importance of Article 2 but obscures the more significant transformation taking place. The agreement is better understood as an experiment in institutionalised security hedging and an early indicator of a broader shift in Middle Eastern security politics: three regional powers are creating an additional collective defence layer while retaining their existing relationships with external powers and institutions, reflecting a growing desire not to exclude the United States or replace NATO, but to ensure that their security does not depend exclusively on decisions made outside the region.
Its immediate military effectiveness remains uncertain because many operational details have not yet been disclosed, yet its political significance is already visible, as regional powers increasingly seek to become not merely objects of great-power competition but participants capable of organising their own security. If the agreement develops permanent institutions, meaningful interoperability, defence-industrial cooperation, and wider membership, it could become an important component of a new regional order; if it remains largely symbolic, its impact will be more limited.
In either case, the agreement demonstrates that the Middle East is moving towards a security environment in which states increasingly seek diversified security portfolios rather than single security patrons; a shift that may ultimately prove more consequential than the agreement itself.
