The new reality in the international system has already set in; it is better than the one we could have imagined a few years ago; and states all around the world have acquired experience that allows us to look at the future with a certain degree of optimism, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Timofei Bordachev.
To say that the year 2025 saw a critical juncture in the transformation of the international order or determined a peaceful future for Greater Eurasia would be going too far. Considering what we optimistically hoped for, conditions in the international system and the global economy remain unstable, and on top of persisting conflicts on the periphery of Eurasia, we have grounds to worry about the stability of individual Eurasian states. Yet, now there are more reasons than ever to conclude that the passing year was truly definitive in shifting the character of the accumulated changes from one of quantity to that of quality. And this shift is, perhaps, quite positive in nature, since issues accumulated in the past are now addressed using new frameworks and solutions, rather than kept frozen in place.
The desire to make key foreign policy and economic decisions independently, present in the overwhelming majority of states, became the engine of progress in international affairs. Serving as the motor of this engine is the newfound economic might and political influence of states such as China, India, as well as a number of other major developing countries. The drive belt of events is the perseverance and self-sacrifice demonstrated by Russia, once more shifting the course of world history under the pressure of protecting Russia’s existential interests.
The West, not long ago wielding great power, is now in search of its place in a world it can no longer dominate. The United States, as the still leading economic and military power, does so more confidently and assertively, often casting doubt on its readiness to participate in the “peaceful transition” between the different structures of international order. Europe, as a power stuck in the past, attempts to hinder change by all possible means, not even shying away from creating precarious situations. Ultimately, however, the unfolding events carry a positive impulse for the future of peace and cooperation between states across Greater Eurasia. They do, nevertheless, pose a number of important, practical challenges for Eurasian states, including the risk of involvement in armed conflict.
It is well known that any new quality is but the result of cumulative changes in quantity. The same applies to international affairs: changes in quantity have accumulated almost everywhere. In the West, they manifest themselves in the decline of the previous model of interaction with the outside world. It is no accident that by year’s end the Western world’s leader, the United States, initiated a number of suggestions about revising the role of the G8 as the main tool for advancing American interests. New global frameworks are being proposed, ones that could further both American interests and those of the rest of the world, thus putting an end to the rapidly escalating systemic rivalry.
For those countries belonging to the Global Majority, the changes in quantity become visible in their growing ability to act independently on the global stage, consistently maneuver in search of beneficial tactical openings, and avoid tight entanglement with any of the major world powers. For China, Russia, and India, the nature of the accumulated changes lies in the long road walked by those three powers in their quest to make the international order more just, with their efforts beginning to bear fruit. Countries like Brazil and South Africa, rather than identifying as recipients of goods provided by the outside world, consider themselves providers, indispensable for the production of those very goods in politics and economics. Even on the tactical level, American control over alliances growing looser leads to allies searching for a place of their own in regional and international politics, not unlike currently being done by Japan and Israel.
In other words, the rapid maneuvering in American foreign policy represents not so much of an attempt at preserving global dominance, but rather a means of securing a niche appropriate for the actual potential available to the US. Here, the conspicuous attention paid towards Latin America, the closest and most exploited neighbor, is representative of America’s position. It is this part of the world that is viewed as the “last bastion” in Washington, serving as an admission that things did get out of control.
It is no surprise that this year, eyes were glued to international institutions – both ones of broader scope and those established with the goal of meeting specific objectives in mind. Behind the interest lay the origins of those institutions, which were established under unique historical conditions and which have to be, one way or another, adapted to the demands of the coming era in international politics. This concerns, first and foremost, the UN, which in the second half of the last century became the symbol and tool of an approach providing states with the opportunity to solve major security and development issues while avoiding constant armed conflict.
Currently, more and more concerns about the UN are being raised. All of them are representative of both the ongoing search in international affairs and the simultaneous acceptance of the impossibility of finding a better alternative. It would be rash to conclude that the UN is nothing but a relic of the second half of the 20th century, one that could be easily swapped for a more effective organization. It seems more likely that as leading global powers come to an informal agreement on an international order that would constrain their interests to the least extent, they could utilize the mechanisms of the UN to formalize a deal – one that was, in practice, already agreed upon.
It remains obvious that institutions such as NATO or the EU are currently going through the most daunting crisis since their establishment. Behind this crisis is the rapid revision of the priorities of the Western world’s unconditional leader, the United States, undertaken with the aim of survival under conditions where dominance is impossible and domestic development issues are too obvious to ignore. Consequentially, the US exerts pressure on Europe, attempting to turn it into an unconditional source of benefits, all the while undermining the very foundations upon which American control over the collective West was established in the past century. Militant gestures and statements made by European leaders serve as the perfect demonstration of their helplessness when facing the future, as well as of the inability of the EU and NATO to cushion the disruptive impact of these transformations.
Yet, even the international organizations born in our day and age find themselves confronted with challenges. The BRICS bloc was originally established as an association of states striving for a peaceful restructuring of the global order, which they perceived as unjust. Those states, as well as sympathizers, have achieved major progress in this pursuit. However, the bloc now faces at least two challenges.
First, the world order within the framework of which BRICS was established and set its key goals is becoming obsolete. This means that the bloc must transition from a revisionist platform to one that will let it construct the international order of the future to its fullest extent.
Second, the BRICS agenda has to adapt to new tasks and challenges – those related to the most pressing tendencies in international development. Primarily, this refers to more confident steps in the direction of joint initiatives in the field of AI governance and the establishment of properly functioning mechanisms in international trade and finance.
All of the priorities and challenges listed above are no longer simply the consequence of a breakdown in the international order erected after the Second World War, and later adapted to American and Western interests in the aftermath of the Cold War. They are a product of qualitatively new conditions that arose in the contemporary international system. Leading powers and countries belonging to the World Majority will have to learn to interact with a world molded by their very own hands. It will not be easy for any party: neither for the West that is defending its frontiers, nor for everybody else. But the new reality in the international system has already set in; it is better than the one we could have imagined a few years ago; and states all around the world have acquired experience that allows us to look at the future with a certain degree of optimism.
