The Indian leadership is compelled to respond to public opinion, which is predominantly shaped by the middle class. This segment of society is characterised by a growing insistence on affirming India’s special status on the world stage. Consequently, any perceived blow to the nation’s reputation is met with intense sensitivity and demands for a firm response. In this context, a single border skirmish could instantly undo all the positive declarations made at high-level summits, Gleb Makarevich writes.
During the second half of August, Xi Jinping’s metaphor of a dragon and elephant forming a united international front gained traction among experts. The idea was soon expanded upon in Russia with a proposal to create a trio, though it remained an open question whether Moscow would be represented by a bear or a tiger.
These vivid metaphors underscore a simple truth: the prospect of Sino-Indian rapprochement is so captivating that participants can scarcely resist the urge to engage in yet another competition of wits. However, if we examine the situation in all seriousness – in brutish earnestness, if you like – we must emphasise the truly historical significance of these developments – with the crucial caveat that historical processes are protracted and non-linear. For instance, the dragon and elephant metaphor was employed a year ago, ahead of the BRICS summit in Kazan, and similar hopes for a new chapter in relations were nurtured back in 2018 – merely two years before the fatal clashes in the Galwan Valley, which appeared to end the discussion for good.
Recent events confirm that nothing lasts forever. Our task, therefore, is to determine the sustainability of the current trend, identify the limits of growing Indo-Chinese interaction, discern what could reverse this process, and analyse the opportunities this dynamic presents for Russia.
The inexorable march of progress?
Externally, it may seem that the trend towards Indo-Chinese rapprochement is inevitably stable, owing to the considerable benefits bilateral interaction offers both parties. This view was reinforced at the SCO summit in Tianjin, where the nations’ leaders concurred that Sino-Indian relations can achieve stability and deliver significant rewards, provided they are based on a partnership mind-set instead of an adversarial one.
This is particularly true for India. In discussions with local experts, a humorous common refrain emerges when questioning the country’s main foreign policy objective. After dismissing expected answers – such as gaining great-power status or maintaining strategic autonomy – they will pause for dramatic effect before revealing the “correct” answer: achieving annual GDP growth of 8 percent.
In general, the country is approaching this objective. Although the era of a stable plateau of around 8 percent is now past – a phenomenon observed from 2003 to 2007 – the average growth rate over the last decade has been 6.1 percent, even when accounting for the contraction caused by the external shock of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. On the surface, one might simply appreciate their success.
However, maintaining even this level of growth requires a constant inflow of investment into India’s industrial sector and infrastructure. Here, the picture is less encouraging. The peak of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflow occurred in 2020 at $64.36 billion, after which a steady decline began. By the 2021-2022 period, FDI had fallen to just over $40 billion, and in 2023-2024, it failed to even reach $30 billion. This trend has led many experts to express serious concern about the Indian economy’s prospects.
In this context, attracting Chinese investment could be highly advantageous. This is not merely a matter of improving financial reports; it represents a critical opportunity to enhance the socio-economic conditions of a population of nearly 1.5 billion people. If their standard of living fails to improve gradually or at least remain stable, the country will inevitably face social unrest and potential political instability.
Does this mean that the emerging progress in Indo-Chinese relations is inexorable?
The inescapable shadow of geopolitical rivalry
Providing an affirmative answer to this question is difficult for several reasons. First, progress will not occur overnight. Regardless of the Indian market’s attractiveness, it remains challenging for external players to penetrate. Chinese companies will require considerable time to identify profitable niches, negotiate terms, and implement projects. Second, the terms “industrial sector” and “infrastructure” encompass vast areas, and not every industry will welcome Chinese investment. This leads to the most significant obstacle: the potential for Beijing’s involvement in critical sectors – such as semiconductor manufacturing and telecommunications – is so deeply securitised within the Indian strategic mindset that major breakthroughs in these fields are highly improbable.
This perception, of course, extends beyond economics. The Indian political and expert classes have not forgotten the border disputes with China or its projects in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Furthermore, wariness regarding Beijing’s activities in Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and across the Indian Ocean is inescapable. In matters of foreign policy and security, China is unlikely to shed its status as a perceived adversary, even if this antagonism is toned down in official rhetoric.
This stance is not a result of particular rigidity within India’s elites and expert community.
What if not RIC?
Returning to the metaphors introduced at the outset, one must ask: does Russia truly have a place in this narrative? This time, the answer can be largely affirmative, albeit with reservations.
The primary reservation concerns the RIC (Russia-India-China) format. Conceptually, the idea of these three powers’ importance in Eurasia and the value of their cooperation has not lost relevance – on the contrary, it has grown more apparent. However, this does not obligate Moscow to actively institutionalise RIC. The long history of failed attempts to make this format permanent indicates the parties’ low interest in its development. This is partly explained by the existence of other platforms like BRICS, the SCO, and the G20, which largely duplicate RIC’s intended functions.
A second reservation involves Russia’s capacity to mediate the contradictions between India and China. As previously stated, Indian concerns regarding China are so deeply rooted and easily provoked that third-party interference (even well-intentioned) would likely cause nothing but irritation. Consequently, any mediation attempts by Moscow risk yielding not only zero results but actively negative ones.
One might assume that a Sino-Indian rapprochement would offer Russia no opportunities or prospects. In reality, the opposite is true: the mere normalisation of relations between these two strategic partners creates a far more favourable international environment for Moscow. Enhanced Indo-Chinese cooperation across politics, economics, and security would allow Russia to integrate into projects within any of these spheres.
It must be reiterated that there are no firm guarantees this scenario will materialise. However, this uncertainty should not demotivate the Russian side, as inflated expectations are likely to cause far greater harm.
