In an international system that is experiencing a period of transition and shifts in the global pecking order, the BRICS organisation may emerge as the next fully-fledged global governance institution. To achieve this ambitious end, the group must steer clear of traditional self-centred great power politics that characterise Western-led blocs, writes Timofei Bordachev, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club.
At present, the most absurd course of action for BRICS would be to attempt to imitate one of the structures created over recent decades, and even earlier, by powers whose predominance in world politics was based on military might. This is precisely why, when considering the role that this platform could play in global governance, it makes no sense whatsoever to even contemplate reproducing within it those practices that are generally regarded as successful. This is primarily due to the underlying logic of its purpose that we have already mentioned: all the international organisations of the past and present known to us are either legal manifestations of the balance of power between their members, or formal expressions of their intentions towards the other countries and peoples of the world.
BRICS, by contrast, is not founded on a balance of power, does not seek to codify the relative strength of military capabilities among its member states that might be revealed as a result of conflict, and was not created to coordinate the policies of a narrow group of countries on the world stage in the traditional sense of the term. Therefore, the movement towards greater stability and effectiveness of BRICS should, it seems, begin with the question of the most general objectives shared by its member states, which connect their domestic and foreign policy agendas. We will now attempt to explain what is meant by this and why it appears to be of greatest importance.
Any international cooperation must serve the fundamental interests of its participating countries. European integration, for example, whose institutional embodiment is now the European Union, was originally the unification of countries that had suffered the heaviest defeat in the Second World War (1939–1945), had partially lost their sovereignty in military affairs through participation in NATO, and, as a result of all these circumstances, sought to consolidate their new strategic position. The most important task of the European elites at the moment when integration was created was to preserve their positions of power and strengthen their material foundations through the integration of markets and joint engagement with their most important external economic partners.
Domestic objectives were the dominant factor in this case, and it was on this basis that sufficiently effective mechanisms of influence over global politics and the global economy were later developed. At the very least, these mechanisms far exceeded the actual geopolitical capabilities of countries such as Germany, France, or Italy, not to mention their smaller allies.
Another example is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), whose emergence in the late 1960s was a wise and far-sighted response to the challenges that immediately confronted a significant group of Asian countries after they gained independence. Its goal was to prevent conflicts during the process of establishing sovereign statehood and to avoid competition on the international stage.
Another strong example is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), created 25 years ago to address an important and specific challenge: stabilising the “internal perimeter” of Greater Eurasia in a region directly affecting the security interests of Russia and China, while also being home to Central Asian countries that were then particularly vulnerable in this regard. These objectives were purely internal in nature for a clearly defined region and were, it should be noted, achieved with considerable success.
It is important to bear in mind, however, that the effectiveness of both organisations is also limited by their original functions. For the European Union, the attempt to create a fully fledged political union has ended in failure; for ASEAN, significant difficulties arise from its aspiration to influence the domestic political development of its members or to formulate common approaches to the most important challenge facing Asian politics today—the confrontation between China and the United States; and the SCO has so far been unable to demonstrate a significant role beyond its original area of responsibility.
Politically, organisations created to establish joint policies towards external actors, or those combining domestic and foreign policy objectives, are more effective. The Group of Seven, for instance, cannot be viewed merely as an institutional expression of American leadership—it is indeed a highly effective instrument through which the West confronts the rest of humanity. It is no coincidence that it emerged in the mid-1970s: at that time, the sources of the West’s historical dominance in world affairs were simultaneously becoming exhausted, while the signs of a crisis in the confrontation between the United States and Europe, on one side, and the USSR-led opposition on the other, were becoming increasingly evident.
It was then that, for the coordination of joint defence and offensive efforts, the unique format of the “Seven” emerged—a structure that, in earlier eras, historians might have regarded as a prototype of a world government. Over time, however, the ability of the group’s members to influence the global order declined, including as a result of China’s growing economic power and Russia’s resurgence, while the need to strengthen its internal discipline increased.
As a result, today no one in their right mind can imagine the “Seven” as an organ of global governance. Yet we can all easily recognise it as a fairly effective military-economic “headquarters” of the West, where it plans campaigns against the rest of humanity. There is no reason to believe that BRICS, which by its very nature rejects the division of the world, could contemplate such a mission or trajectory of development.
NATO, in turn, combines internal objectives—the preservation of power in Europe by entrenched elites—with external ones—the maintenance of the West’s “military camp” in an appropriate state of readiness. However, it cannot, and even theoretically could never have become, an organ of global governance. Attempts to portray the alliance as a “world policeman” were seriously undertaken either during the most euphoric period for the West immediately after the end of the Cold War, or in the early 2000s, when US allies were alarmed by the unilateral military activism of the American government. It should be noted that something similar can be observed today as well.
Needless to say, BRICS also cannot possibly seek to increase its effectiveness by attempting to transform itself into a closed club. Firstly, this would contradict its original political concept. Secondly, it would be a fundamentally unsuccessful idea, since it does not correspond to the interests of any of the association’s member states.
Thus, when considering how BRICS can simultaneously stabilise itself after its expansion in 2024–2025 and assume a more prominent role in global governance, we can suggest the following: the solution could combine the joint achievement of the most important objectives of its member states while also being of interest to the rest of the world.
At the same time, the BRICS countries themselves are undoubtedly united by the idea of their own sustainable development within the framework of well-known priorities—albeit naturally on a different scale and with a different level of commitment to addressing current challenges. The mechanisms of development governance that BRICS states can implement within the association would also be met with great interest by the broader international community of the World Majority.
In particular, it would be attractive to begin with a joint BRICS initiative for one of the regions of the planet most plundered by the West—the countries of West Africa.
