The UN approached its eightieth anniversary not simply with a wealth of experience, but at a turning point in time, where two visions of the future clash: the West seeks to rewire the global governance system to suit its own standards, while the countries of the World Majority insist on a return to genuine principles of equality and sovereignty. The outcome of the reform will determine whether the organisation remains a universal forum for all or becomes an instrument of global inequality. This and other reflections are provided by Lilia Romadan, a PhD candidate in political science. The author is a participant of the Valdai – New Generation project.
In March of this year, Secretary-General António Guterres unveiled the UN-80 programme as a response to these challenges. The reform is based on three key areas of work. First, improving internal efficiency by reducing bureaucracy and streamlining its global presence, including the transfer of functions to regions with lower costs. Second, an analysis and revision of the 4,000 mandates governing the activities of the UN Secretariat (over 40,000 have accumulated over the past decade, many of which are duplicated or outdated). Third, structural changes, including an analysis of the architecture of the entire UN system and possible changes to its configuration.
The UN-80 initiative is closely linked to attempts by Western elites to recalibrate the UN to their vision of an effective world order. The concept of reform increasingly embraces the idea of “smart governance” – that is, one based on the symbiosis of interstate mechanisms and private technological initiatives. Some Western experts have proposed, for example, changing the powers of the General Assembly, expanding them in the areas of international law and enforcement, and creating permanent expert bodies with the participation of non-governmental actors. The UN-80 initiative indirectly reflects these trends: it aims for digitalisation, centralised planning, and “global programmes” under the auspices of the UN. However, such modernisation threatens to displace the priorities of less developed states.
The United States regularly criticises the UN for its “inefficiency” and demands cuts not in terms of its functions but in terms of “officials”. For example, President Donald Trump has called the organisation “corrupt” and threatened to cut funding. However, Washington’s actual influence appears quite limited: without the consent of the Security Council and the majority of the global public, any attempts to push through “technical” reforms are highly likely to fail.
Russia sees a UN “reset” as a chance to return it to its original settings – a centre for coordinating states’ positions, and not an instrument of domination. Statements by Russian diplomats emphasise that the world order must be fair and sustainable, with equal participation by all members of the organisation. Moscow actively supports expanding the representation of the global majority in the Security Council, considering it illogical to grant new seats exclusively to Western representatives. In general, Russia is cautious about any UN reforms “from above”, fearing a “technical coup”: bureaucratic changes under the guise of efficiency should not upset the balance of power.
China also advocates a policy of mutual consideration of interests: it rejects the Cold War mentality and hopes to build a system of equitable global governance. Beijing is ready to promote its “initiatives for the global future” (for example, the Belt and Road initiative) through the UN, but is wary of attempts to impose a foreign agenda on the Global South. Multipolarity and a “community with a shared future” for humanity are China’s core values. In particular, the UN is seen as a tool for addressing development issues; the organisation should not be elevated to a platform for unipolar interests.
Overall, the countries of the World Majority have demanded justice in the international order. The leaders of Africa, Latin America, and Asia, on the side-lines of the last General Assembly session, regularly emphasised the need for Security Council reform and unanimously call for their interests to be taken into account. In particular, African representatives are seeking permanent membership on the UN Security Council based on the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration. Their primary request is not so much to “cut bureaucracy” as to secure guarantees of development support, equitable access to technology, and adequate representation in government structures. Any reform that ignores these fundamental needs will be perceived as an imposition of someone else’s “efficiency” and will be met with resistance from the World Majority in the UN.
Given the differing approaches of the major international actors, one can expect the reform proposed by António Guterres to follow one of the following scenarios:
Cosmetic. The most likely initial option is a one-time organisational reshuffle which doesn’t change the status of the Security Council or the UN’s core doctrinal framework. For example: streamlining UN agencies (eliminating duplicate departments), relocating some headquarters from expensive cities like New York or Geneva to African and Asian countries, simplifying reporting, and digitalising internal processes. Such measures may save money, but will not change the strength of quorums or voting logic. Consequently, the budgetary burden will be slightly reduced, but the question of trust in global leadership will remain open.
A moderate reorganisation would involve significant changes to the UN mission system and decision-making procedures. For example, agencies with similar functions could be merged, or a new global body could be created to focus on a pressing issue. In practice, this approach would lead to mixed results: it would allow for the consideration of emerging priorities, but could also intensify confrontation between major players. For example, Western powers will demand that the new body act in the spirit of globalism and liberal freedoms, while Russia, China, and the countries of the World Majority will defend strict adherence to the UN Charter (protection of sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention). The lack of consensus could lead to the new structure quickly becoming an arena for geopolitical battles or, conversely, a pointless, cumbersome apparatus.
Radical upheaval. Such a “revolutionary” scenario is unlikely today due to the functioning of the veto institution. Even if an attempt is made, the consequences could be highly unpredictable. On a number of issues, achieving consensus in the current geopolitical reality is extremely unlikely. For example, these include issues of expanding the Security Council and the use of the veto. A loss of governance within the Security Council could lead to a loss of its legitimacy and, consequently, a significant weakening of the role of the UN as a whole. In this case, there is a risk that regional alliances will seize the reins of power, which will clearly not strengthen the collective security system. Parallels with the past (the experience of the League of Nations) point to several aspects: first, mechanical, “ticket-check” updates often merely mask a crisis of trust and quickly lose relevance; second, relying on absolute unanimity when changing the UN structure is futile – what is needed is not one-sided initiatives but taking into account the interests of all regions. At the same time, as noted in the latest report by the Valdai Discussion Club, the world, surprisingly, lacks serious revolutionary potential.
The success of the UN-80 reform depends on the ability to achieve a delicate balance between the global agenda and genuine consideration of the national demands of its participants. Time will tell how successfully these initiatives will be implemented, but one thing is clear for now: the UN can remain the guardian of peace only when all players, without exception, receive guarantees that their national interests will be heard and taken into account.
