In recent months, numerous media reports have suggested that North Korea and the US are not only exchanging signals about a willingness to negotiate but are also discussing specific terms of a potential deal through confidential channels. However, as Andrei Lankov notes, neither a declared readiness for a meeting nor the meeting itself guarantees that high-level negotiations will succeed.
On September 21, 2025, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un addressed a session of the Supreme People’s Assembly in Pyongyang. Discussing relations with the United States, he declared: “If the US abandons its illusions about denuclearisation, a summit meeting is possible.” He further noted that he “has good memories of Donald Trump.” Clearly, these remarks were intended not for the assembly of leading workers seated before him, but for American diplomats and for Donald Trump personally – a man known to greatly enjoy being flattered and praised.
Judging by Kim Jong-un’s recent statements, Pyongyang appears to believe the time has come to negotiate with the United States. In previous months, the North Korean side had only hinted at the possibility of dialogue, contingent on Washington abandoning its demand for the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula – that is, its insistence that North Korea completely renounce nuclear weapons. Now, however, Pyongyang’s position has been expressed with unusual clarity, at the highest level – personally by Kim Jong-un – and in the most formal setting imaginable: a session of the Supreme People’s Assembly.
Simultaneously, Kim Jong-un made it clear that North Korea currently has no intention of engaging with the South. He was unmoved even by South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s recent overture: in a September 19 interview with the BBC, Lee expressed readiness to abandon the demand for North Korea’s denuclearization and agree to a freeze on its nuclear program – precisely what Kim has long sought from Washington. Despite this, Kim remained categorical. In his September 21 speech, he reiterated that he saw no point in contacting Seoul and declared that North Korea had definitively abandoned the idea of unification with the South – a cornerstone of its state ideology for decades.
Kim Jong-un’s recent statement to the United States effectively mirrors Washington’s own sporadic remarks about Pyongyang over recent months. Throughout the past year, both Donald Trump and his official representatives have repeatedly expressed – albeit in general terms – an interest in negotiating with North Korea, often accompanied by personal comments about Kim Jong-un. Most recently, on August 25, Donald Trump told reporters in the Oval Office that he would like to meet with the North Korean leader.
Thus, this diplomatic exchange suggests that negotiations are not only feasible but likely to occur in the coming months. These talks would not, of course, aim for the unrealistic goal of “complete denuclearisation of North Korea.” Rather, they would seek to resume the process that was interrupted in February 2019, when Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un failed to reach an agreement on specific issues in Hanoi.
The draft agreement, which was negotiated but never approved in Hanoi in 2019, stipulated that North Korea would physically destroy a significant portion of its nuclear weapons production facilities while retaining its existing nuclear warheads – thus preserving its effective deterrent. In return, the United States would support a significant easing of the UN Security Council sanctions imposed on Pyongyang in 2017-2019, which, in their current form, effectively block the country from any international commercial activity.
Overall, this diplomatic shift toward negotiations appears expected. Recent months have seen repeated media reports that the parties are not merely hinting at a willingness to talk but are actively discussing specific terms for a potential deal through confidential channels.
Given these circumstances, it is logical to assume that the terms North Korea proposed in Hanoi over six years ago are no longer acceptable to its leadership. Should negotiations resume, it will quickly become apparent that Pyongyang expects a fundamentally different compromise – one that clearly disadvantages the United States. In other words, Trump may find himself compelled to accept a deal on terms far less favourable to Washington than those he demonstratively rejected in 2019.
This dynamic poses a particular challenge for the American president’s well-known ego. Compounding this will be media scrutiny, which will inevitably sensationalize the story, portraying Trump as a naive, weak, and ineffective leader. Given that his greatest fear is being perceived as a weakling or a failure, he may prove entirely unwilling to sign any new agreement seen as less favourable than the one he rejected in Hanoi.
Therefore, while Kim Jong-un’s recent statements indicate that another US-North Korean summit – with its accompanying media spectacle and diplomatic ambiguities – may be imminent, and while dialogue is itself welcome, the long-term strategic outcome of such an event remains entirely uncertain.
