While Western and Asian educational models compete for influence in the region, Russia has every reason to leverage its historical advantage: its long-standing experience of close cooperation within the common Eurasian space. Investments in education are investments in the long-term sustainability of all Greater Eurasia, writes Artem Dankov.
Amid major shifts in the global economy, headlines about Central Asia and Russia today tend to focus on transport and logistics corridors or energy deals. Yet, a shared future is being forged in lecture halls and teaching laboratories. Joint educational initiatives between Russia and Central Asian states can—and must—become a cornerstone of a common development space across Greater Eurasia, equipping the next generation to compete in the global economy. Facing sanctions, disrupted supply chains, and geopolitical realignments that challenge the Western model of globalization, Russia and Central Asia need to prioritize the integration of their human capital.
Central Asia is a region of unique characteristics, shaped by both its historical and cultural heritage and its current political and economic realities. On the one hand, it developed for centuries within a single political and administrative framework, which fostered unified educational, administrative, and technological models. On the other hand, since independence, the region’s countries have become focal points for external players—chiefly China, Turkey, the United States, and the EU—each advancing its own forms of influence. In this context, the notion of competing development models becomes central, with educational and technological paradigms serving as key markers of foreign policy orientation.
Central Asia is one of the few regions in the world where steady natural population growth continues. Despite labour migration and permanent emigration, the region’s population is growing by almost 2% per year (approximately 1.5 million people). In the 35 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the region’s population has grown by almost 70%, from 48.6 million in 1989 to 83.3 million in 2025. According to the latest data, 50% more children are born in Central Asia every year than in Russia. The average age of the region’s population is under 30; these countries have a young population that will require expanded access to education. Under these circumstances, the choice of university for study, the digital platforms used, regulatory documents in science and education, and scientific and technical partnerships can all serve as indicators not only of a country’s domestic policy but also of its foreign policy preferences.
Higher and secondary education is an important area of Russian humanitarian and economic diplomacy in the countries of Central Asia. Central Asian states maintain a high level of trust in Russian educational standards—a legacy of the Soviet system that today provides Russia with a solid foundation for strategic partnership. Over the past three decades, the export of educational services from Russia has become systemic and serves as an element of the state’s foreign policy strategy. Currently, Russia’s educational influence in the region is exerted through several key channels. First, through the foreign students enrolled at Russian universities (both through quotas and in regular state-funded places under intergovernmental agreements). Second, Slavic universities in Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University) and Tajikistan (Russian-Tajik (Slavic) University) are actively developing. These institutions provide education according to Russian standards and award Russian degrees, strengthening the institutional and regulatory ties of graduates to Russia. Third, the network of branches of Russian universities in Central Asian countries has been expanding in recent years. The opening of such branches is usually secured by intergovernmental agreements and is often funded by Russia. Fourth, summer and winter schools, internships, and online courses, organized both through university initiatives and with the participation of other organisations, play a significant role.
Despite the relative stability of Russian education in Central Asia, it faces a number of challenges. First, over the past 15-20 years, competitors have become more active. Turkey, China, European countries, and the United States are increasing their educational presence in the region through scholarships, the opening of branches of their universities, and the promotion of English, Chinese, and Turkish. Second, high levels of labour migration and demographic growth are creating a demand for mobility, leading to an increased focus on the Turkish, European, and American labour markets and, consequently, on universities in these countries through various scholarship programmes. Third, we are witnessing problems with the quality of education at Slavic universities, as well as at a number of branches of Russian universities, the bureaucratisation of diploma recognition procedures, and a lack of adaptation to local conditions—all of which limit the competitiveness of Russian higher education. Fourth, political risks have become particularly strong in recent years. Anti-Russian sentiment, the influence of external actors, and the internal politicisation of humanitarian cooperation could weaken Russia’s soft power potential in the long term. What should Russia do to maintain and strengthen its position in the educational environment of Central Asian countries? First, expand support for the study of the Russian language at all levels of education (from kindergarten to graduate school). It is widely believed that during Soviet times, the overwhelming majority of the population of the Central Asian republics spoke Russian. However, analysis shows that the spread of Russian in Central Asia during the Soviet period was not universal and was characterised by significant regional differences. According to the 1989 census, only in the Kazakh and Kyrgyz SSRs did the proportion of the population fluent in Russian exceed 50% (83% and 56%, respectively). In the other republics of the region, this figure was significantly lower, amounting to about a third of the population. Russian proficiency among some peoples of Central Asia remained extremely low. For example, in 1989, only 24% of Uzbeks, 28% of Turkmens and Tajiks, and 20% of Karakalpaks were fluent in Russian. In rural areas, knowledge of Russian was much lower, and many local residents could not use it fluently.
The first decades after the collapse of the USSR were a difficult period for the spread of Russian in the Central Asian states. The share of the population proficient in Russian declined from 52% in 1989 to 40%, according to estimates for early 2026. An even more significant decline was recorded in the share of native speakers of Russian, from 24% to 11%. The number of schools with Russian as the language of instruction decreased, and the quality of Russian language teaching declined. The use of Russian in family and everyday communication also declined.
However, over the past 20 years, the situation has gradually improved. Despite significant demographic changes, diminishing opportunities for education in Russian, and its increasingly noticeable decline in public service, Russian has not only survived but also strengthened its position. Today, the number of people speaking Russian in Central Asia exceeds the figures of 30 years ago. In 1989, 26 million people spoke Russian, and according to the latest estimates, by 2026 this number will reach 33 million, with 70% of them using Russian as a lingua franca. This language remains widely spoken in regions bordering Russia, capital cities, large cities, as well as traditional and new industrial centres and tourist areas. The spread of Russian is not limited to people of European descent; it is also in demand among the indigenous population, some of the elite, and the educated.
An important point is that today, the majority of those who speak Russian in everyday life are not ethnic Russians, but representatives of other ethnic groups. Therefore, it is important to support Russian language use in Central Asia.
Second, academic mobility programs (for both students and faculty) and online formats for dual degrees should be more actively developed.
Third, educational programs must be adapted to the labour market needs of the countries of the region. This is perhaps one of the weakest areas today.
Fourth, we must strengthen our digital presence by offering high-quality online courses and open lectures in Russian, integrated with local platforms.
In the 21st century, the boundaries of economic cooperation zones in Greater Eurasia will be defined not only by pipelines and transport corridors. Common professional standards, unified technical knowledge, and human interaction will be crucial. These are precisely the kinds of projects Russia and the countries of Central Asia are currently implementing.
Educational integration in this sense also acts as a barrier against geopolitical fragmentation. While Western and Asian educational models compete for influence in the region, Russia has every reason to leverage its historical advantage: its long-standing experience of close cooperation within the common Eurasian space. Investments in education are investments in the long-term sustainability of all Greater Eurasia.
