The political and socioeconomic situation in Central Asia is dynamic: today’s economic underdogs can surge ahead tomorrow, seemingly stable regimes can collapse in a matter of days, loyal security officials turn out to be the main conspirators, and various ethnic groups who were dining in the same cafe yesterday are now involved in communal clashes and unrest, Artem Dankov writes.
The current development challenges facing the Central Asian countries are rooted in four key contradictions. First, population growth, coupled with a resource-based economy, a lack of investment, and technological backwardness. In essence, the economies of Central Asian countries simply cannot accommodate such a large population.
Established socioeconomic models cannot create the necessary number of jobs, support the reproduction of high-quality human capital, or provide the population with the necessary infrastructure. At the same time, Central Asia remains one of the fastest-growing regions in Eurasia. The combined population of the five countries in the region exceeded 83 million by the beginning of 2025, with an annual increase of approximately 1.5 million. By comparison, countries with comparable populations, such as Germany, Iran, and Turkey, are growing much more slowly – by an average of 100,000, 150,000, and 500,000 people per year, respectively.
A second major contradiction is that the region is geographically located in the centre of Eurasia, but lacks direct access to priority markets (Europe and East Asia). This creates difficulties with exports and necessitates complex foreign policy configurations to ensure supply stability. Examples include the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, commissioned in 2001, which carries over 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, and the Central Asia-China gas pipeline, which accounts for almost 100% of Turkmenistan’s gas exports. Furthermore, there are serious limitations to export opportunities due to insufficient infrastructure, depleted mineral resources, and other factors.
Third, a major challenge for Central Asia is the growing disparity between regions in economic growth, living standards, and access to basic resources, services, and technology. The classic model of urban-rural inequality has been supplemented by differences between small and large cities, large cities and capitals, as well as social contradictions within major cities. Over the past 30 years, Central Asia has achieved significant success in the fight against poverty, but the greatest progress has occurred in rural areas – urban poverty has declined more slowly.
The fourth contradiction revolves around the processes of modernisation and archaisation of social structures, as well as the adaptation of societies in Central Asian countries to global social and technological changes. Migration, urbanisation, internet penetration, digitalisation, and the platform economy are, on the one hand, destroying traditional social structures, but on the other, they are introducing archaic elements into the modern world that were previously impossible to replicate.
The current priorities for the countries of Central Asia are easy to identify. They require high rates of economic growth, enhanced transport, logistics connectivity amid growing urbanisation, the development of the electric power industry and public utilities infrastructure, the resolution of pressing social issues, a strengthening of regional security, and the prevention of both traditional (political instability, terrorism) and new (environmental, critical technologies) threats.
For sustainable economic growth, Central Asian countries recognize the urgent need to diversify their production and exports. Developing their industrial, agricultural, energy, and service sectors is key to generating jobs and reducing a long-standing dependence on commodity exports.
Kazakhstan is the only country in the region that, in the nearly 35 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, has managed to achieve the level of economic development and corresponding standard of living of Eastern European countries. The economic success of the other countries is difficult to assess, but per capita GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) provides interesting comparisons. According to World Bank data for 2024, Turkmenistan is comparable in this indicator to Latin American countries (for example, Brazil, Colombia, or Paraguay), Uzbekistan is comparable to the Arab Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya), while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are comparable to poor countries in Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. However, no significant changes in this hierarchy have occurred over the past 15-20 years. Essentially, economic positions are being preserved, significantly reducing the international competitiveness of these countries. It is this very lack of domestic investment and technology that drives the region’s so-called multi-vector foreign policy – a strategic leitmotif born of necessity.
Another important priority is the development of transport infrastructure, both regionally and within each country individually. For Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, the issue of transport connectivity was partially resolved through massive railway construction in the 1990s and 2000s. By the mid-2010s, these countries had completed the creation of unified national railway networks linking all regions and major cities. This problem remains a pressing issue for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as they still lack rail connections between their northern and southern regions.
The condition of roads in Central Asian countries leaves much to be desired; with rare exceptions, they cannot provide adequate logistics for either local freight carriers or transit traffic. Demand for air travel is growing regionally and internationally, and most airports require modernisation and expansion.
The development of the electric power industry is a separate issue. A severe energy shortage is one of the main obstacles to industrial development and improving living standards. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the population of Central Asia has increased by almost 70%, while electricity production has increased by only 30%. A qualitative leap in economic development requires a doubling of electricity production over the next 15 years. There is currently much talk about constructing nuclear power plants in Central Asia. In August 2025, Rosatom launched construction of the first nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan. There are preliminary agreements for the construction of two more nuclear power plants in Kazakhstan by Chinese companies. More than 20 power plants of various types are being built across Central Asia: hydroelectric (for example, the Rogun Hydroelectric Power Plant), thermal power plants, solar power plants, and wind power plants. However, this number is clearly insufficient.
The challenges of developing the electric power industry are closely linked to the broader context of urban public utility infrastructure development. In recent decades, it has become clear that rapid urban growth is not accompanied by the necessary modernisation of urban public utilities. For example, only 67% of Tajikistan’s population has access to clean drinking water, and only 41% of the country’s residents are connected to centralised water supply systems. In neighbouring Uzbekistan, the situation is slightly better – as of July 2025, 81.5% of the country’s residents are provided with clean drinking water, but in the southern regions, this figure barely exceeds 60%.
The foreign policy priorities of the Central Asian countries are quite clear. The key player in the region is China. Currently, it is of interest to Central Asia primarily as the only major investor in the regional economies, willing to take on large projects even with questionable returns.
Russia’s position remains strong. Its importance to Central Asia is determined by two factors. On the one hand, Russia is the largest, though not the only, accessible labour market for millions of migrant workers from the region. Even citizens of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, who traditionally have not focused on the Russian labour market, are increasingly going to Russia to work. On the other hand, despite all the difficulties and restrictions of recent years, Russia remains attractive for vocational education and immigration.
Western interest in Central Asia and its economic influence in the region have recently been declining. Nevertheless, Europe and the United States are major investors in certain sectors of the Central Asian economy. They are still viewed by regional elites as a safe haven for the transfer and storage of capital, for educating the children of elites, and for establishing and expanding ties with global financial and industrial groups. The West holds a strong position in education and media policymaking. Another player, Turkey, is more of a dark horse. While promoting narratives of cultural and linguistic affinity with the countries of Central Asia and seeking to act as a model for socioeconomic and political development, Turkey, for a variety of reasons, is not always able to back this up with real economic or political success.
Overall, the political and socioeconomic situation in Central Asia is dynamic: today’s economic underdogs can surge ahead tomorrow, seemingly stable regimes can collapse in a matter of days, loyal security officials turn out to be the main conspirators, and various ethnic groups who were dining in the same cafe yesterday are now involved in communal clashes and unrest. Therefore, foreign policy landscapes can also shift under the influence of the “multi-vector” approach, but domestic priorities and challenges remain constant.
