It is obvious that similar phenomena may materialize in Central Asian countries. The more developed a country is, the more probable this scenario and the sooner it may happen. For example, it is much more realistic in Kazakhstan than in Turkmenistan. Kyrgyzstan in fact went through a similar revolution a year ago, although it has not been recognized by academics as one of the first “new type” revolutions.
ValdaiClub.com's interview with Andrei Zubov, Professor of Philosophy, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, D.Sc. in History; Director General of Church and International Relations Center, Moscow State Institute of International Relations .
Do you think anti-government protests are possible in Central Asian countries similar to those that raged across the Arab world?
I believe similar protests are quite possible. I think so because the current unrest in Arab countries in the Middle East is essentially different from the powerful fundamentalist movements of the past. These new protests emerge in the younger middle class – although Muslim believers, they are modern people who use the web and do not want to live in an endless authoritarian regime. These young people have traveled to the West and assumed some Western habits and lifestyles. They wish to have a similar political system controlled by society in their own countries, free from corruption and outrageous favoritism.
It is obvious that similar phenomena may materialize in Central Asian countries. The more developed a country is, the more probable this scenario and the sooner it may happen. For example, it is much more realistic in Kazakhstan than in Turkmenistan. Kyrgyzstan in fact went through a similar revolution a year ago, although it has not been recognized by academics as one of the first “new type” revolutions.
All the Central Asian countries are in fact heading for such outbreaks, albeit following different paths and with a different pace. South Caucasus countries are moving the same way, primarily Azerbaijan and Armenia.
This describes the driving forces active within these countries. But are there any external forces interested in destabilizing the region?
There could be. Iran is probably interested in that, and so are fundamentalist groups in Afghanistan. For the Taliban, it must be their favorite fantasy. But they have a different concept, with religious fundamentalism as the cornerstone. That concept is rapidly losing popularity these days, even in Iran and Pakistan where it originated.
Therefore, I believe there are driving forces for a revolution there, but let me emphasize that I am referring to Arab-type revolutions, those initiated by believers. They are nationally-oriented, but have a Westernized mentality and desire to create political institutions similar to the European model. This trend is in conflict with Islamic fundamentalism. Therefore, successful Arab-type revolutions would rather prevent Islamic fundamentalism from infiltrating Central Asia.
As for Western democracies, their morals call for the democratization of these communities ruled indefinitely by greedy dictators. Yet, they are perfectly willing to cooperate with these dictators until their peoples stand up to them, fighting for their rights and freedoms. Once they revolt, Western democracies begin supporting the protesters. This is what happened in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen. This is what we are witnessing in Syria today. Neither Mubarak nor Gaddafi was a rogue or an outlaw in the West until the Egyptians and the Libyans rebelled against them.
Unlike Iranian fundamentalists or the Taliban, the West is not interested in rocking international stability and is ready to put up with dictators as long as they ensure stability without mass violence.
But when these dictators cross some invisible line, some limit of what is acceptable, they lose their legitimacy as far as Western views are concerned, and Western democracies switch to supporting the insurgents who turned against their rulers.
Are the current circumstances in Central Asian countries comparable to those in Arab countries? Is an organized opposition important in shaping prerequisites for a revolution?
In fact, Arab countries in the Middle East have shown that an organized opposition is not important. Their authoritarian regimes have survived to this day using an absolutely foolproof methodology of destroying any kind of opposition, a policy currently termed “trampling down one’s political grassland.”
At the initial stage, the Internet substitutes for an organized opposition. Later, it emerges.
The new-type revolutions are successful for several reasons.
First, these countries are located within a vast area where the same language is spoken. Local Internet users are able to exchange information and share experience regardless of state borders. This makes them realize that the system they are living in is not unique. Moreover, it is quite ordinary, and they are not the first to fight it. Those who started fighting earlier have won. This is an important psychological factor. Arab countries are lucky in this respect because, while spoken dialects differ across the Middle East and North Africa, their writing language is the same. This enables Internet users to communicate freely.
Second, young people have lived outside their countries and even their region and met their foreign peers. As is known, many people from Algeria and Morocco travel to France and other EU countries, Libyans often go to Italy, and Egyptians, to Britain, Germany and the United States. This is an important factor, too. Without an organized opposition, a virtual community emerges, including local people and their compatriots residing abroad, and their peers in neighboring countries. It grows into a large and constantly interacting group, and new leaders emerge there.
We are witnessing a similar process in Central Asia and the Caucasus, where Russian has remained a widely spoken language for international communication. Educated young people speak it because they have attended colleges and universities in Russia, Ukraine or Belarus. They have had experiences living in societies that accord more freedom that are closer to European democracies – like Russia or Ukraine.
A lot of people from Central Asia, Kazakhstan and the Caucasus have visited the Baltic States, Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, and Austria – all of them EU members. This will accelerate the emergence of an organized opposition, especially because it has not been entirely trampled down. There are known potential leaders in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are slightly behind in this respect, although there are prerequisites for the emergence of an opposition there too. Once a virtual opposition shapes online, mass protests can follow any minute, triggered by any event in the region, as was the case in Tunisia and Egypt.
What stand will Russia assume once unrest flares in Central Asian countries? Can any third countries intervene?
Anything is possible in politics. The question is whether it is desirable. I doubt that Russia is capable of the kind of skillful maneuvering Europe performed with regard to Arab revolutions, simply because Russia’s foreign policy is not so flexible, and also because Russia’s own regime is essentially of the same type as Central Asian regimes, albeit more relaxed and Europeanized.
The right approach would be to watch the events carefully and attentively, showing support for democratic initiatives in those countries. This attitude would be morally fair as well as pragmatic because a dictator rarely stands a chance of keeping power when the entire country turns against him. On the other hand, insurgents appreciate support and long remember who provided that support and who tried to help thwart them.
Do you think Russia should provide assistance to Central Asian countries for the sake of regional stability and economic development? How big is the potential for economic cooperation in this region?
There is a great potential, which is only natural I think. The former Soviet republics in Central Asia, and also Azerbaijan, still have strong economic ties with Russia. There are common borders and shared infrastructure. These links should certainly be carefully preserved, fostered and made stronger.
On the other hand, these links can only be durable and reliable if authoritarian political regimes in these countries and in Russia as well transform into a greater democracy. If they do not transform, the authoritarian regimes will collapse one by one, as is happening in the Middle East.
These regimes cannot help each other. In fact, they are wary of supporting each other. Syria’s Bashar Assad never supported Gaddafi, just like stronger monarchies in Jordan and Morocco are doing nothing to help Yemen’s Saleh because an alliance of dictators is very different from a union of countries geared toward civil representation, democracy and people’s involvement in running a country.
A dictators’ alliance is not reliable. It won’t work in the post-Soviet space any better than elsewhere. Therefore, the best way for Russia to preserve and improve relations with its Central Asian neighbors is the gradual democratization in all our countries.
