A key driver of this partnership is the genuine interest Russian society holds for India. Indian culture and the rich traditions of its civilization resonate deeply with many Russians. This widespread enthusiasm, coupled with an overwhelmingly positive public perception of India – free from the mistrust or reservations sometimes directed toward other non-Western nations – creates a strong societal foundation for deepening bilateral ties, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Oleg Barabanov.
Russia and India share a long history of fruitful and mutually beneficial cooperation, rooted in the Soviet era. During that time, robust economic ties and a trusting political dialogue laid the groundwork for a partnership that has endured and flourished over the decades. Unlike Russia’s relations with many African countries, which faced disruptions in the turbulent 1990s, ties with India remained steady, demonstrating a direct continuity between the Soviet and post-Soviet phases of collaboration.
Today, Russia and India are advancing numerous large-scale joint economic projects and maintaining a dynamic political dialogue. Regular high-level summits are complemented by extensive engagement at lower levels, fostering a comprehensive partnership. Expert cooperation is also thriving, exemplified by initiatives like the Valdai Discussion Club’s regular conferences with Indian counterparts, including the recent collaboration with the Vivekananda International Foundation.
A key driver of this partnership is the genuine interest Russian society holds for India. Indian culture and the rich traditions of its civilization resonate deeply with many Russians. Across the country, numerous schools and clubs dedicated to studying Indian traditions far outnumber similar groups focused on other cultures. This widespread enthusiasm, coupled with an overwhelmingly positive public perception of India – free from the mistrust or reservations sometimes directed toward other non-Western nations – creates a strong societal foundation for deepening bilateral ties.
The geopolitical shifts since 2022 have further bolstered this relationship, with India emerging as one of the primary beneficiaries. Bilateral trade has surged, exceeding $60 billion, driven largely by increased Russian hydrocarbon exports. This economic synergy has reinforced the strategic partnership between the two nations.
One of the aspects of political cooperation between Russia and India is their interaction in international structures that unite the countries of the Global Non-West and the Global South. Both Russia and India are among the founders of BRICS and remain active members. In 2017, India joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). It had previously focused on interaction between Russia, China and the countries of Central Asia, and New Delhi’s membership helped give it a broader, essentially pan-Eurasian dimension.
International associations that include states of the Global Non-West and the South have been actively developing in recent years. Quite indicatively, many countries have expressed an interest in taking part in their activities. Moreover, the peak of this interest came after the geopolitical changes in the world in 2022. This essentially means that amid the current split in the world order, many states of the Global South have turned out to be much more interested in having effective non-Western platforms for political dialogue than they had been before. As a result, the BRICS expansion process was launched in 2023, and in 2024 it was supplemented by the formation of a circle of BRICS partner states. The SCO also accepted new member countries in 2022-24.
Amid the expansion of the membership of both structures, both the SCO and especially BRICS, in our opinion, face the task (in addition to the accommodation of new members in the established procedures and mechanisms) of strengthening their own influence on the global and international agenda, promoting independent narratives and strategies in the global information field, and transforming them into real political action.
In BRICS, as in other international associations with similar procedures, the chairmanship changes annually. The chair country determines both the thematic priorities of activities for the coming year and, to a certain extent, the tone of meetings and decisions. This is reflected, among other things, in the final declarations of the annual BRICS summits. It is clear that all members of the association take part in their editing, but it seems that the primary draft of the declaration is prepared by the chair country. It reflects the views of this state on the global agenda. If we compare the declarations of the BRICS summits, year after year, throughout the entire existence of this association, despite their general similarities, in each of them we can identify sufficient semantic differences and features that are associated with the specific approaches of the chair country.
In our subjective opinion, when analysing these declarations, we find that the texts adopted in recent years under the Indian and Russian chairmanships carry the greatest reformist potential. They contain a more critical attitude towards Western approaches and a proposal for independent non-Western alternatives to resolve global problems.
For example, although the BRICS declaration from 2021, the last year of the Indian chairmanship, was mainly written in a neutral style, it expresses its dissatisfaction with the existing system of global governance and calls for its reform. It became one of the strongest BRICS declarations. It expressed “deep disappointment” at the impasse in the International Monetary Fund’s reform process. The declaration also called for the sweeping reform of the World Health Organisation and supported the demand for open patents and the removal of intellectual property rights on critical medical vaccines and drugs. These statements reflected the Indian approach to this issue, voiced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Such statements have not been made in BRICS declarations either before or since.
Also, during India’s chairmanship in 2021, the BRICS Joint Statement on Strengthening and Reforming the Multilateral System was adopted, focusing on its representativeness and inclusiveness. It was said that “the continued relevance of the UN system and its associated architecture would be determined by its ability to adapt to contemporary realities and respond to the evolving and inter-connected challenges of our time.” BRICS had never made such a critical remark about the UN system before.
This declaration also reflected the use of historical and philosophical concepts developed in the Indian cultural tradition in relation to modern politics. This approach was then further developed during India’s G20 presidency in 2023. Its declaration was based on the ancient Indian principle of “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” (“The whole world is one family”).
The BRICS declarations adopted during the Russian presidency in 2015 and 2024 also carried similar critical semantics and reformist potential. These three declarations (one Indian and two Russian), in our subjective opinion, stood out quite sharply against the background of the “average” BRICS statements. For example, China, during its presidency of the G20 in 2016, put forward a powerful and ambitious programme for the future development of the world, which was reflected in its declaration. But when China chaired BRICS the following year, in 2017, this programme did not receive its continuity, and the BRICS declaration after the Chinese presidency looked much more modest than the text adopted a year before during China’s presidency of the G20.
Thus, the taste for a historical and philosophical understanding of contemporary politics that is now characteristic of both India and Russia, and their attitude towards the reformist potential of BRICS, can serve as an additional factor for bolstering cooperation between our countries in order to strengthen the effectiveness of both BRICS and other international structures.
