Although Russia’s direct trade and investment relations with the parties to the conflict are not particularly significant, Moscow, which advocates for strengthening economic ties with ASEAN, is interested in the region’s stability as a potential platform for expanding trade and investment.
The armed conflict on the Cambodian-Thai border began on July 24, 2025, when a Thai soldier was killed by a mine. Thailand called it a provocation and fired on the Cambodians. The localised incident soon escalated into full-scale military action involving heavy weapons, artillery, multiple launch rocket systems, and aircraft. Both sides accused the other of attacking civilian infrastructure, including religious buildings and medical facilities. The clashes resulted in serious casualties, with over 30 deaths and a mass evacuation of the nearby population, leading to the displacement of approximately 210,000 people, who were rehoused in temporary camps. Thai troops advanced and established control over parts of several border villages in Cambodia, cutting them off and fencing them off with barbed wire. The local population was forced to flee their homes. Despite an internationally mediated agreement (including via the personal participation of Donald Trump) for an immediate ceasefire, clashes along the border continue.
Colonial Roots of the Conflict
The political and legal disputes surrounding the Preah Vihear temple have their roots in the colonial period of Indochina’s history. In 1904, Siam (Thailand) and France, the former protector of Cambodia (1863-1953), signed a Treaty of Delimitation. According to its provisions, in the Dangrek region, where Preah Vihear is located, the border was to follow the watershed line, meaning that the temple belonged to Thailand. The precise delineation of the borders was entrusted to the Franco-Siamese Mixed Commission. In 1907, a French team of cartographers compiled a series of 11 maps, which were sent to the Siamese government. On the map titled “Dangrek - Indochina-Siam Delimitation Commission”, the border ran north of Preah Vihear, thereby placing the Temple on Cambodian territory. Thailand received the maps, did not react in any way, and used them for official purposes for decades, without raising any objections to the border drawn on the map in the Temple area.
With Cambodia’s independence in 1953, the contradictions in its relations with Thailand came to light. The Thai military occupied the Temple territory with its troops, and Cambodia initiated the resolution of the dispute through international legal means at the International Court of Justice in 1959. Cambodia’s international legal position was based on Thailand’s tacit agreement to use the 1907 map. Thailand, however, disputed the legal significance of the map, arguing that it was drawn up with errors and did not comply with the watershed principle enshrined in the 1904 Treaty. In its 1962 decision, the International Court of Justice ruled that the Preah Vihear temple is under Cambodia’s sovereignty, and ordered Thailand to withdraw all military and police forces from its territory and to return to Cambodia all objects (sculptures, steles, etc.) removed from the Temple by Thai authorities. Subsequently, on November 11, 2013, the Court also issued a new opinion on Cambodia’s request, reaffirming its 1962 decision, ordering Thailand to withdraw all military forces not only from the Temple itself but also from the surrounding area.
International Legal Assessment and Geopolitical Challenges
The Russian Federation’s international legal practice is consistently based on the concept of a “multipolar world” and the rule of law in international relations, the cornerstone of which are the peremptory principles of international law enshrined in the UN Charter. The conflict around Preah Vihear challenges several principles of jus cogens, which Moscow cannot ignore.
Open armed conflict between two sovereign states constitutes a direct violation of the principle of peaceful resolution of disputes (Article 2, paragraph 3, of the UN Charter), as well as the principle of the inadmissibility of the threat or use of force (Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter). Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, faces the difficult choice of directly condemning the conflict or remaining silent. Any overt tilt by Russia toward one side or the other could create a dangerous precedent that could be used against Moscow or its allies in other international disputes, while a neutral stance could be interpreted as “weakness” or “indecisiveness”, which Russia's adversaries would be quick to exploit.
The legal uncertainty surrounding the border conflict destabilises the entire Southeast Asian region, which prides itself on its ability to maintain peace and dialogue through the diplomatic framework of the ASEAN Way. An escalation of the conflict contributes to a rift within ASEAN itself, as the principle of consensus is the cornerstone of the Association’s functioning, and a full-scale conflict ‘etween its two members paralyses it and prevents effective decision-making on other international issues, which also narrows Russia’s room for manoeuvre. Thailand has already paid the price with its domestic political stability: the conflict led to the fall of the government in the summer of 2025 and the virtual demise of the “dynasty” of Thailand’s former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who meekly accepted his prison sentence. This predetermined a fundamental reshuffle of political forces.
Destabilisation could lead, first, to increased US influence in the region, as Bangkok will seek support from Washington if the conflict escalates. The US could strengthen its position by acting as a security guarantor for Thailand.
Cambodia is one of China’s closest allies in the region. However, despite its traditionally close ties with Phnom Penh, Beijing is unlikely to openly and unequivocally side with Cambodia. Both sides in the conflict are important partners of China, which has invested heavily in both countries’ economies. Any escalation of the conflict or prolonged instability poses direct risks to these investments, threatening projects and economic returns. Therefore, Beijing’s primary interest is not in supporting one side or the other, but rather in quickly resolving the conflict and restoring stability, which is fundamental to economic cooperation. By actively supporting one side, China risks alienating Thailand and pushing Bangkok toward even closer ties with Washington, which directly contradicts China’s strategic interests in weakening US influence in the region. Therefore, Beijing’s most likely stance will be measured diplomatic pressure on both governments to resume dialogue, demonstrating its role as a responsible great power interested in integrative stability rather than short-term political gain.
The shelling of the UNESCO World Heritage site of Preah Vihear has given the conflict an unwanted international resonance. This shifts the dispute from a political to a cultural and civilisational dimension, as it constitutes an act of vandalism that destroys priceless human heritage. The loss or damage of such an asset is not only an irreparable cultural loss but also the destruction of a sustainable source of economic income for the local population, leading to the degradation of border areas.
Beyond geopolitical challenges, the conflict is generating negative economic consequences. The immediate consequence of the escalation was the border closure and the sudden halt of cross-border trade, which was estimated to reach $10.45 billion in 2024. Cambodia could face a threat to its energy security, losing 24% of its hydrocarbon supplies from Thailand. The latter, in turn, is losing a key market, which accounted for 15% of its exports of mineral fuels, oil, and refined products in 2024. The agricultural sector is also negatively impacted, where the disruption of established ties threatens Cambodian farmers with increased debt burdens due to forced sales of raw materials to Vietnamese buyers at reduced prices, while Thai processors face rising costs and raw material shortages. The region’s vulnerability is most clearly demonstrated by the paralysis of highly integrated industries such as the automotive and electronics industries, where disruptions in cross-border component supplies lead to capacity downtime, clearly demonstrating how a local political conflict provokes disruptions in global value chains and forces investors to reconsider their strategies in Southeast Asia.
The border crisis disrupted a key tourism chain in which Thailand had served for decades as a hub, bringing foreign tourists to Cambodia’s Angkor, the country’s main tourist attraction. For Cambodia, this has resulted in a significant decline in tourist arrivals and revenue. In July 2025, there was a 40% drop in tourist arrivals compared to the previous year. Meanwhile, Thailand lost not only a profitable transit business but also a key element of the appeal of its resorts, which offered a diverse range of excursion routes. The border closure and the mass exodus of Cambodian migrants have had a negative impact on the economies of both countries. Thailand faced rising costs due to labour shortages, while Cambodia experienced rising unemployment and a sharp decline in remittances, reaching $2.8 billion or 6.1% of GDP.
The border conflict revealed the relative resilience of the Cambodian economy, which was forced to pursue structural reforms. However, the effectiveness of these reforms remains an open question. Thailand, having abandoned a rapidly growing market, created a vacuum for other regional players.
Russia’s reaction?
The Russian Federation seeks to position itself as an independent great power capable of hearing and taking into account the voices of members of the Global South. However, neither Thailand nor Cambodia see Russia as an “arbitrator”, “mediator”, or guarantor of security in this matter. Russia's political inability to act as a successful “mediator” casts a shadow on its status as a great power and one of the guarantors of the existing international security system.
Although Russia’s direct trade and investment relations with the parties to the conflict are not particularly significant, Moscow, which advocates for strengthening economic ties with ASEAN, is interested in the region’s stability as a potential platform for expanding trade and investment.
In 2016, Russia formally proposed joining the International Coordinating Committee for the Safeguarding and Development of Preah Vihear. However, today, Moscow, positioning itself as a guardian of traditional values and a defender of cultural diversity, could offer more: initiate the creation of a joint development zone in the border region between Thailand and Cambodia with Russia's participation (taking into account, among other things, the interests of the Russian tourism industry and the recent dynamic development of bilateral relations). Such a project would transform a potential conflict zone into an area of mutual economic benefit. Russia could act as a de facto guarantor of stability, an investor in infrastructure projects, and a moderator of dialogue. Reviving this initiative would also be consistent with Cambodia's own statements, which view the temple not only as a cultural monument but also as a “model of peace, development, and cross-border cooperation”.
