It could turn out that Trump will essentially have no one to rely on in the G20 except Russia. First, because many of Trump’s worldviews are close to the official Russian position, and secondly, because of the established “chemistry” between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Oleg Barabanov.
South Africa’s G20 presidency will conclude with the end of 2025, wrapping up a four-year period in which countries from the Global South held the position. Prior to South Africa, these countries were Indonesia, India, and Brazil. In 2026, the United States will assume the role. Now, in the context of President Trump’s priorities, the US G20 presidency could represent a sharp break with the established practice and agenda of this organisation.
The Valdai Discussion Club has repeatedly analysed the G20’s activities. As a platform where Western and non-Western countries, with their diverse political and economic interests, are equally represented, the G20 has often become both a target for politicization and a battleground for competing visions of global development. Consequently, its decisions have sometimes been made based on the lowest common denominator, amounting to declarations of wishful thinking, essentially “for everything good and against everything bad.”
Traditionally, global issues such as climate change and inclusive development have occupied a significant place on the G20 agenda. Overall, the organization’s documents have, by their very nature, tended to maintain a moderately globalist tone. However, these themes are understood to be inconsistent with President Trump’s political views. Consequently, the proposed priorities for a future American presidency, as reported in the media, demonstrate a clear departure from this tradition. Instead, they advocate for a “back to basics” approach, reminiscent of the G20’s early years.
Established during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, the G20 was then perceived as a purely financial and economic mechanism for developing a coordinated response to the crisis between Western and non-Western countries. Its agenda was later expanded. As part of this “back to basics” approach, potential priorities for the American presidency include deregulation, energy access, and innovation.
Given the differing worldviews of President Trump and most other G20 members, both in the West and the Global South, coupled with Trump’s tough tariff policies, it can be assumed that the work of the G20’s official political and financial tracks will be challenging for the American administration. It could turn out, paradoxically, that Trump will essentially have no one to rely on in the G20 except Russia. First, because many of Trump’s worldviews are close to the official Russian position, and secondly, because of the established “chemistry” between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin.
Earlier, in the context of Trump’s tariff and peace-making initiatives, we already noted that there are essentially only two countries in the world to which Trump has done nothing wrong, and has only tried to do good. These are Israel and Russia. This alliance may seem paradoxical from the perspective of the traditional geopolitical balance of power, yet is perfectly aligned with Trump’s clear understanding of US national interests, and could play a role in the work of the G20 next year.
Naturally, these groups are not without their challenges. One of them is the enormous volume of documents and expert reports they produce, which together exceed a thousand almost every year. Clearly, bringing all these documents to practical consideration is a nearly impossible task. Another aspect is that, over the years of these G20 formats’ existence, a fairly stable circle of individuals and organisations has developed within them, setting their agendas and actively participating in them. The influx of new faces, however, is sometimes limited. To some extent, one could say that these public formats have acquired a somewhat exclusive, closed character. Nevertheless, the significance of these engagement groups is undeniable, both for the work of the G20 itself and for the broader processes of shaping global public opinion.
So, in the context of the Trump administration’s priorities for the G20 presidency, the activities of these public groups could pose a serious challenge to Trumpist approaches to global politics and the global economy. First and foremost, their traditional agenda (already established, one way or another, over the years) runs against Trump’s views. Furthermore, American think tanks, NGOs, and other organisations that were previously involved in the G20 and traditionally would have been expected to organise engagement groups during the US presidency in 2026, also tend to adhere to anti-Trump, liberal approaches. Naturally, all this could lead to the work of thematic groups in their traditional format turning into a kind of anti-Trump manifesto. The recommendations of these groups will not support Trump’s policies, but, on the contrary, criticise them. Perhaps this dissonance will be less noticeable against the backdrop of the G20’s main political track, but, nevertheless, Trump’s opponents, both in Europe and in the developing world, could provide him with the necessary media critics.
It is clear that such a scenario is objectively not in Trump’s interests. To avoid it, his administration would have two main options. The first would be to replace the US organizations previously involved in the G20 with other, pro-Trump entities and task them with organizing the forum’s thematic groups. Recall that there are more than ten of these groups. Assuming this could be done, the new American organizers would then have to influence the representation of other countries within them – a representation that is also largely anti-Trump. This would be considerably more difficult, not least because in many G20 countries, the governments themselves would be providing overt or covert support to these anti-Trump forces. Eager to undermine him, these governments would likely seize the opportunity to channel their discontent through public diplomatic channels.
The second option is more radical: to abandon public thematic formats entirely during the American presidency and confine the agenda strictly to official political and financial discourse. According to media reports, this is precisely the approach the US organizers are favouring. They justify it with a “back to basics” logic, noting that such public formats did not exist in the G20’s early years. They also point to the formats’ alleged ineffectiveness, emphasizing the shortcomings previously mentioned.
Naturally, such a decision to abolish public support for the political track disrupts the entire established architecture or ecosystem of the G20. This will naturally provoke outrage among many public groups in other G20 countries, which will naturally be broadcast by Trump’s opponents into the global media environment. Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that activists from other countries, with the explicit or implicit support of their governments, will decide to continue their work outside the auspices of the American presidency, on their own. This can be done online and without attracting additional funds to organise this process. This could result in documents and recommendations that could become an even more pronounced anti-Trump manifesto than in other cases.
It is clear that such alternative efforts would pose direct political challenges to Trump. He would, of course, pressure other governments to halt this activity. However, they could simply argue that NGOs are independent entities, that such is the nature of democratic principles, and that they cannot interfere. Therefore, it is difficult to say which scenario would create more problems for him.
That said, these potential problems should not be exaggerated. Politicians and media in many countries are already opposed to Trump, yet this has not prevented him from assertively pursuing his agenda.
Such are the possible expectations for the upcoming year of the American G20 Presidency. In any case, it promises to be the most unpredictable and therefore most interesting year in the history of the G20. And, we repeat, Russian-American cooperation could become one of the most important paradoxes of this process.
