The December 2025 elections in Myanmar are being seen as a pivotal event around which future regional and international dynamics will be structured. For ASEAN, the legitimacy of their conduct will be an important, but not the only criterion. Far more significant for a long-term settlement will be Naypyidaw’s ability to resume an inclusive national dialogue and halt the escalation of violence, writes Anna Velikaya.
Myanmar, a multi-ethnic state with a population of 53 million, has been grappling with complex internal conflicts for decades. These manifest themselves in periodic clashes between government forces and various ethnic armed groups, most intensely in the states of Rakhine, Shan, and Sagaing. In the summer of 2025, fighting resumed in the strategically important Chao Phyu region, where Chinese infrastructure projects are being implemented, between Myanmar’s army and the Arakan Army, a Rohingya Muslim rebel group. Myanmar’s military is actively using aircraft, artillery, and drones, while relying on the support of Chinese security forces on the ground. Drug cartels and cybercrime syndicates are actively targeting the Myanmar armed forces (tatmadaw), undermining the economies and security of both Myanmar and China and offering fierce resistance to attempts to eliminate them.
In the wake of the February 2021 constitutional coup, power was consolidated under military authority. By June of that year, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, formally assumed the role of Prime Minister. With the state of emergency – in place since the takeover – finally lifted on July 1, 2025, Myanmar has entered a distinct new political phase. This transition will be defined by the upcoming general elections scheduled for late December. Analysts assess that the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) stands a strong chance of securing a parliamentary majority. In a nation characterised by deep-seated political and ethnic divisions, the USDP presents itself as a consolidating and monolithic force – a potentially critical factor for stability in a state with a complex, multi-layered political architecture. Despite complex domestic political and ethnic tensions, it represents a unifying and cohesive force, which is important for a country with a multi-layered political structure.
Since 2021, Myanmar has been under international sanctions. On August 1, 2025, US President Donald Trump increased tariffs on Myanmar’s exports by 40%. Last year, Myanmar exported $728 million worth of products to the United States, with total trade turnover reaching $922 million. Naypyidaw has hired an American lobbying firm to normalise economic and humanitarian ties with the United States. It may be able to secure some easing of the sanctions regime, as Washington has an interest in redirecting Myanmar’s rare earth metal supplies from China to the United States.
Southeast Asia is critically important to the United States, and Myanmar is challenging its regional authority and international dictates. In this light, the political marginalisation of Naypyidaw is advantageous to the United States, as it does not want to strengthen the regional positions of Moscow and Beijing, which support the current Myanmar government.
Naypyidaw’s foreign policy, balancing cooperation with major powers and resistance to Western pressure, makes Myanmar one of the most controversial players in Southeast Asian politics. Its independent foreign policy (Myanmar became the first foreign country to support the special military operation in Ukraine, and in June of this year expressed its desire to join the EAEU as an observer) is encountering opposition from Western countries and their regional partners.
In this context, the stance of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is paramount. Myanmar, a member since 1997, consistently invokes the bloc’s core principles of peaceful coexistence and respect for sovereignty. Despite the country’s profound internal crisis, its military leadership has successfully sustained a regular dialogue with ASEAN.
For ASEAN countries, the principle of non-interference in internal affairs is a priority. ASEAN’s position on Myanmar is reflected in the Five-Point Consensus (hereinafter referred to as the Consensus), adopted in 2021, which provides for a ceasefire, dialogue, and humanitarian access. ASEAN has established the position of ASEAN Special Envoy for the Implementation of the Five-Point Consensus.
Based on the consensus, ASEAN countries have been working to end the civil conflict in Myanmar for the past four years. However, as former Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya noted, ASEAN is still unable to resolve the conflict in Myanmar. At the ASEAN summit held in Kuala Lumpur in late October, the ASEAN countries acknowledged that there is no regional unity in their approach to the conflict.
At the same time, ASEAN countries welcome peacemaking initiatives, such as visits to Myanmar by the foreign ministers of Malaysia and Thailand in April 2025 and the Malaysian foreign minister in October 2025. ASEAN emphasises the need for a comprehensive, objective, and inclusive ASEAN approach to conflict resolution. The ASEAN countries “take into account Myanmar’s holding of elections in December 2025 and the invitation to ASEAN observers to the elections,” and emphasise the need for “fair and open elections, preceded by a cessation of violence and inclusive political dialogue”. The need for a peaceful and lasting solution to the ongoing crisis based on the Five Point Consensus was emphasised: “We reiterate that the Five Point Consensus remains the fundamental document for resolving the political crisis in Myanmar.” It is important to note that it must be implemented under Myanmar’s leadership, in its interests, and “for the benefit of the people of Myanmar.” During the 2024 ASEAN Summit in Laos, Southeast Asian leaders also called on Myanmar to take concrete measures to resolve the conflict, noting that ASEAN member states must work together to find a collective, consensual solution to the crisis in Myanmar.
ASEAN countries are acutely aware of the complexity of the current conflict and have been making both multilateral and bilateral efforts to resolve it over the past four years.
Laos: Both countries have historically supported each other. In 2024, direct flights between them were launched. The parties are interested in strengthening cooperation in various areas. To this end, friendship groups between them were established in 2025. On the Myanmar side, the Friendship Group with Laos was headed by Brigadier General Win Maung, and the Lao Friendship Group with Myanmar was headed by Chanthavong Sengamathmonthy, Vice Chairman of the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs Committee. The agenda included prospects for strengthening cooperation through public and business diplomacy.
Cambodia: In Cambodia, contacts with Myanmar are overseen by former Prime Minister Hun Sen, President of the Cambodian Senate and Chairman of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party. As ASEAN Chair, he personally visited Myanmar in 2022 when he was prime minister. Since 2023, his son, Hun Manet, has served as prime minister. He has met several times with Myanmar’s leader, Min Aung Hlaing. By resolving the crisis in Myanmar, Hun Sen wants to demonstrate that Cambodia can contribute to finding a long-term solution that will help Myanmar emerge from the crisis, which in turn would enhance Cambodia’s regional and international status as a peacemaker.
Vietnam: Myanmar has always considered Vietnam a traditional friend and reliable partner within ASEAN, as well as in international and regional forums. Vietnam has closely monitored the situation in Myanmar. At the UN, Hanoi has consistently voiced its unwavering position, which is to respect Myanmar’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity: a settlement must be achieved by the people of Myanmar themselves through agreement, compromise, and the participation of all stakeholders.
Thailand: The Kingdom is a leading investor in Myanmar and an important trading partner. Myanmar Prime Minister Min Aung Hlaing periodically visits the country. Following last year’s meeting between Myanmar’s leader and the Thai Foreign Minister, Thailand has become more actively involved in the search for peace in Myanmar and the restoration of order on the Thai-Myanmar border. The Myanmar-Thailand border is a “grey zone” that is exploited by cybercriminals. Thailand is seeking to demonstrate its support for a peaceful settlement in Myanmar.
Malaysia: During its ASEAN chairmanship in 2025, Malaysia was actively involved in resolving the Myanmar crisis. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim stated that Malaysia has made significant progress, although many unresolved issues remain. It should be noted that Malaysia, a Muslim country, has historically taken the most critical stance within ASEAN regarding Myanmar, as it has received the bulk of the Rohingya refugee influx.
Brunei: The sultanate has a population of less than 500,000 and is interested in ASEAN stability. Following the earthquake in Myanmar, Brunei sent essential humanitarian aid. Notably, it was delivered by a Royal Brunei Air Force (RBAF) aircraft.
Indonesia: ASEAN’s largest country, with a population of 270 million, is seeking to portray itself as a regional peacemaker, and values the prestige and authority of the association in conflict resolution. As Myanmar leader Min Aung Hlaing noted, understanding the humanitarian aspects of the conflict in Myanmar – the country’s culture, legislation, and history – is essential for resolving it. Indonesia, the initiator of the 1955 Bandung Conference, has historically understood the importance of maintaining regional stability and respecting the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of countries in the region.
Philippines: The Philippines will chair ASEAN in 2026 and will continue to follow Malaysia’s strategy regarding the Myanmar crisis. According to the Philippine Foreign Ministry, the country will maintain the Association’s current approach to Myanmar and will consider appointing a permanent ASEAN Special Envoy for Myanmar, replacing the annually appointed representative. This will be discussed during the upcoming ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting in January. In November, a Myanmar delegation led by Thida Oo, the Minister of Justice and Attorney General, participated in the 13th ASEAN Justice Ministers’ Meeting in Manila. A separate delegation attended the 24th ASEAN Senior Law Enforcement Officials’ Meeting, held from November 10 to 13. During the meetings, the Myanmar Minister of Justice spoke about judicial cooperation to promote regional stability and combat transnational crimes such as terrorism, money laundering, and cybercrime.
Singapore: Singapore has played a significant role in conflict resolution. Singapore’s representative, Noeleen Heyzer, as the UN Special Envoy on Myanmar, visited Myanmar and met with Min Aung Hlaing, who agreed to open negotiations and the development of comprehensive solutions. Singapore’s Foreign Minister, Vivian Balakrishnan, stated that there is no “magic” solution to the Myanmar crisis; dialogue must be conducted politically.
Thus, ASEAN’s position on Myanmar represents a difficult balance between the principle of non-interference and the need to respond to a profound crisis that has a direct impact on regional stability, security, and the association’s reputation.
The key conclusion is that the regional approach to Myanmar remains fragmented. Despite the existence of a Five-Point Consensus reached by the states of the region, its implementation has been hampered by pragmatic national interests, historical ties, and varying threat perceptions among the member states. While some states (such as Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) are emphasising dialogue and a respect for sovereignty, others (Malaysia and, to some extent, Indonesia) have emphasised the need for inclusiveness and a humanitarian approach. Thailand and Singapore are taking a more cautious, mediating stance, focusing on the practical aspects: security and economics.
