Wider Eurasia
A Civilisational Turn: China and Russia at the Forefront

The civilisational paradigm has reappeared in the political discourse of many countries, accompanying the emancipation of the world majority and the transition to a multipolar and democratic order. China and Russia are at the forefront of this epoch-making transformation, and the leaders of the two countries have recently adopted the civilisational perspective with regards to both domestic and international development. In analysing the conceptual dimension of this civilisational turn, Valdai Club expert Ladislav Zemánek concludes that, despite certain differences, the paradigm is supportive of creating synergies between Beijing and Moscow at the moment.

The civilisational turn in the past and today

Even though the civilisational paradigm is on the rise, it is not a completely new phenomenon. It has appeared throughout the world in the past, with its emphasis on its own history, traditions, and peculiar social patterns, together with its claim to an autonomous development path and values. These aspirations were often accompanied by a sense of superiority and universality of values and the socioeconomic model of a single country, empire, or civilisation. Today, it is especially the context and character that are new. The current reappearance of the civilisational paradigm is intertwined with the decline of neoliberal globalisation, the liberal international order and the Western development model on one hand, and the transition to a multipolar world, the emancipation of the Global South, and the entry of the world majority into the main scene of international politics on the other hand.

The rise of the civilisational paradigm indicates that political actors seek new forms of legitimacy, social organisation, and thinking about their own countries and peoples, and their role in the international system. It can also be perceived as a reaction to the self-proclaimed universality of the Western model and as an instrument of countering the hegemonist policies of the world minority. As such, the present paradigm largely insists on the plurality of civilisations and their equality. It is far from coincidental that China and Russia, as the main engines of the transformation of the international order, have recently introduced the idea of civilisation into their official political discourse.

Economic Statecraft
A State as Civilisation and Political Theory
Ivan Timofeev
For a long time, Russia preferred to rely on the principles of realism in foreign policy. However, the very fact that Russia has thrown an open challenge to the United States and its allies in the situation around Ukraine is a significant precedent. If the “Russian rebellion” is not suppressed, the blow to US prestige could be extremely painful. Such a blow would not necessarily bring down the US leadership. However, it can become a factor in its erosion, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Ivan Timofeev.
Opinions


China and the Global Civilisation Initiative

In the People’s Republic, references to the specificity of Chinese civilisation appeared especially after the death of Mao Zedong. Deng Xiaoping introduced the concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics, reflecting the efforts of the Communist Party of China to develop its own socioeconomic model and Chinese-style modernisation. This strategy built on earlier tendencies to implement sinocised Marxism that appeared no later than in the late 1930s. Before the end of the twentieth century, Chinese leaders extensively discussed the construction of a socialist spiritual civilisation in their country, even though they tended to address it in traditional Marxist terms of an economic base and ideological superstructure. Xi Jinping Thought as the most recent contribution to the development of socialism in China goes much further, bringing about a comprehensive perspective on the Chinese model and global development as a whole with a civilisational paradigm as an integral feature.

In March 2023, Xi Jinping presented the Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI) to political leaders from around the world. Together with the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative, it constitutes one of the pillars of China’s overarching vision of a ‘community of shared future for mankind’. The GCI has both an internal dimension and an external dimension. The former integrates the revolutionary course of the CPC and its numerous achievements with positive aspects of the imperial past and its millennia-long traditions. The current political discourse highlights continuities rather than discontinuities, interpreting China as the most long-lived continuous civilisation in the world. From this perspective, socialism is one of the stages of China’s civilisational trajectory and the only possible path to achieving the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and the Chinese Dream.

These goals are also beneficial to the international community. The external dimension of the GCI entails principles that contribute to the transformation of the international order and the emergence of a posthegemonic world. The Chinese Communists have acknowledged multiple modernities, a diverse array of civilisations, and the equality of different ways of life, in contrast to the universalist claims of Western postliberalism. Common values such as peace, development, justice, democracy and freedom have not been abandoned, but must materialise according to the needs of individual countries, since there is no single path to or model for modernity, prosperity, and good governance. Insisting on common values has universal implications, as it presupposes the existence of good global governance, economic globalisation, and shared prosperity. Foreign Minister Wang Yi has recently described this vision as an equal and orderly multipolar world and a universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalisation. This appeal to global cooperation is priceless when going head-to-head with the ongoing shift to fragmentation and confrontation.

Institutionalisation of democratic multipolarity

In Russia, polemics about the civilisational character of the large, multinational country have constituted an important part of intellectual and political history, at least since Petr Chadaaev published his famous Philosophical Letters. However, it was only in March 2023 when the civilisational paradigm entered the official state discourse. The Concept of Foreign Policy defines Russia as a unique civilisation, bringing a new perspective on Russia and its place in the world. Similarly to the Chinese approach, the Russian interpretation addresses not only the internal development of the country but also the global dimension. According to Russian President Vladimir Putin, the emerging multipolar order is an order based on civilisational states and a balance of interests between them.

Apparently, most Russian leaders tend to conceptualise the “civilisational turn” in positive terms as a process related to the country’s pivot to the East, the redistribution of politico-economic power within the international system, and the establishment of a multipolar order. From this perspective, Russia’s civilisational paradigm is not about negating or clashing with the West, but about developing ties with new power centres around the world and cooperative relations regardless of mutual differences.

Russia does not want to establish alliances and blocs to confront Western countries and is not interested in a new Cold War or “iron curtains”.

Instead, the final objective is the institutionalisation of multipolarity, the democratisation of world order, and the development of alternative structures in security, the economy, finances, technology, and other domains.

Differences and shared interests

When comparing the approaches of the two countries, certain differences can hardly be overlooked. In the case of China, there is a tendency toward universalism and idealism. It is linked to the insistence on globalisation and integration and to a global ethos emerging from the unprecedented economic achievements of the country’s socialist system, as well as the revolutionary nature of the CPC. China benefited from neoliberal globalisation and participation in the liberal international order, which had some effects on the thinking of its leaders. Therefore, the concept of a global village, which became a “brand” of neoliberal globalisation, can coexist with the Confucian idea of harmony and Cold-War-born peaceful coexistence together with the references to both ancient Chinese civilisation and Marxism. Such heterogeneity is an inevitable product of the complex historical development as well as flexibility related to post-1978 pragmatism.

The universalist side of China’s vision for the world may be closer to idealism in contrast to Russia’s inclination to realism that presupposes the existence of conflicts between countries (or civilisations) and a certain degree of mistrust of supranational instruments of governance and the benefits of globalisation.

This basic difference between both approaches is analogous to the difference between “negative” and “positive” coexistence. Although both Beijing and Moscow claim allegiance to the principles of peaceful coexistence as the basic norms of international relations, China has moved away from simple peaceful coexistence to what Wang Yiwei characterises as harmonious and positive coexistence. The latter is characterised in terms of shared destiny, common development and prosperity, joint governance, and win-win solutions, apparently underpinning common values instead of limiting itself to a mere modus vivendi. The question is whether Russia will move in the same direction or not.

In any case, discursive differences need not result in ideology-driven disputes or a divergent position on international issues. Beijing and Moscow have a fundamental shared interest in countering hegemonism and building a democratic and multipolar order. In light of these goals, the civilisational paradigm is supportive of creating synergies between China and Russia at the current stage of development.

Economic Statecraft
A Civilisational Approach to State Building
Evgeny Tipailov
In the further formulation by Russia of its foreign and domestic policies in the context of the growing multipolarity of the world, it is advisable to take into account the number of other features of the functioning civilisational systems, and the civilisational approach itself is actively developed and applied as one of the promising integrated tools in the practice of state building, writes Evgeny Tipailov.
Opinions
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.