The close bilateral relationship between China and Russia is one of the most important features of the evolution of international relations in the early 21st century. At the same time, the changing international order has also created new areas for Sino-Russian cooperation.
Today, politicians and scholars from the PRC habitually refer to the changes in the modern international order as “a big change not seen in a century” (百年未有之大变局). Xi Jinping’s foreign policy thinking is actually the main guiding principle of modern Chinese diplomacy, as it vividly reflects the basic approaches of modern China to international relations, great power politics and international institutions.
Xi Jinping’s Foreign Policy Thinking: From Regional to Global
In general, Xi Jinping’s foreign policy thinking can be divided into two levels: the logic of decision-making and political practice. At the level of decision-making logic, the Chinese President emphasises that Chinese diplomacy is grounded in the leadership of the Communist Party, and that the adoption of important diplomatic decisions by China should be promoted by the CPC Central Committee within the framework of unified planning. At the same time, this thinking also highlights the importance of the Sinicisation of Marxism and the fact that the country’s diplomacy should serve the cause of the rebirth of the Chinese nation.
At the level of political practice, especially when it comes to China’s understanding of the current international order, Xi Jinping’s foreign policy thinking consists of three main concepts.
The first concept is great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics (中国特色大国外交). China emphasises the non-confrontational nature of Sino-American relations, the stability of Sino-European relations and the possibility of cooperation in Sino-Russian relations.
However, the United States already considers China its main competitor. Therefore, Beijing’s main goal is to keep bilateral relations from breaking through the “red line fence”. In interaction with Europe, attention is focused on the fact that both sides must continue to develop stable and predictable economic and cultural ties, while also facilitating interaction between markets.
Cooperation between China and Russia as partners rather than allies actually maximises the flexibility and space for adjusting relations between Beijing and Moscow. At the same time, the two states recognise that “friendship has no boundaries, and there are no forbidden zones in cooperation,” and that it “is not directed against third states”. Therefore, despite the difficulties in economic cooperation between China and Russia under the influence of Western sanctions and the international situation, Beijing still regards Sino-Russian relations as a “classic model of great power relations”.
The second concept is the Community of the Common Destiny of Mankind (人类命运共同体)). The political elite of the country believes that as overall power rises, China will be able to exert more influence on international institutions. Therefore, the leadership led by Xi Jinping has proposed numerous frameworks for cooperation, including the Belt and Road initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Within the framework of the Community of the Common Destiny of Mankind, countries can form a more effective interdependence, as a result of which they will be able to reverse the “zero-sum game” and the “security dilemma”. On the one hand, this stems from the ideas of classical Chinese philosophy, and on the other hand, from the practical experience of contacts between China and the East Asian states at the beginning of the 21st century.
The third concept is international relations of a new type (新型国际关系). According to Xi Jinping, existing interstate relations, especially between large states, are unlikely to be able to address the new challenges of the 21st century. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a “concept of joint, sustainable security”. At the same time, compared to other Chinese leaders, the President of China considers the country’s active participation in global governance as an important source of legitimacy of the country’s power in the international system. As a result, Beijing has shown a more active attitude towards global problems. At the same time, China pays great attention to the development of rules in the field of new international governance, including cyberspace, the Arctic, and digital technologies.
Changing the International Order: Elements and Evolution
International relations scholars usually emphasise three key elements in the creation of an international order: the power structure, the guiding idea, and international institutions. From this point of view, we find that the international order of recent years has undergone accelerated evolution with respect to all three elements:
First, a complex process of bipolarization is taking shape in the power structure. The US sees China as the only country capable of systemically challenging US dominance in the future. But at the same time, the complicated economic, political, and security ties between the two countries have made it difficult for Washington to end all-round engagement with China. In view of this, two hierarchical systems have emerged in the Asia-Pacific region: a security system centered on the United States and an economic system centered on China. The vast majority of medium and small states at the same time maintain close ties with the United States and China and do not want to “choose a side.” Engagement + Hedging will continue to be a long-term policy choice for most Asia-Pacific countries.