Over the last couple of weeks, a new strategy has begun to emerge within the US Republican establishment. Tellingly, it has been dubbed the “normalization” of Trump. The goal – get Trump to abandon his anti-establishment campaign pledges, sideline appointees who are unacceptable to the old elite (such as Trump’s senior adviser Steve Bannon) and prod Trump toward transforming into a “normal” Republican president.
The reason is clear enough. The rejection of Trump by the majority of US political and media circles is growing. Trump’s impeachment and removal from office is being discussed ever more openly. However, it is also obvious that this is not only about Trump’s personal fate. The Republican Party’s image as a whole would also be seriously damaged both by impeachment and by the continuation of confrontational policies. Given that the midterm congressional elections are next year, the Republican Party faces real danger. So, according to a number of influential Republican politicians and experts, it would be preferable to avoid further escalation and try to “normalize” Trump instead.
Foreign policy is a convenient sphere for this “normalization” process in part because, unlike Trump’s economic and social program, it has much less of an affect on broad sections of Trump’s voters. So the abandonment of his foreign policy promises will be less painful for Trump’s base, which is also important in the context of the upcoming congressional elections.
Another aspect is the peculiar balance of forces around Trump these days. The military establishment has significant influence on the decision-making process within Trump’s inner circle. Because the bulk of the Republican establishment has taken a critical or wait-and-see approach to Trump, while Trump himself is lukewarm toward so-called neocons – conservative ideologues from the Bush era – high-ranking military officials led by Gen. James Mattis and Gen. H.R. McMaster have filled the personnel vacuum around Trump. This has led to talk of the militarization of the decision-making process in the administration. Naturally, the military is interested above all in correcting the Trump administration’s foreign policy agenda, not its domestic agenda. Again, unlike civilian politicians, mid-ranking military officials are less affected by electoral instability. Uniformed people will remain in service regardless of who is in power in Washington. Today, amid the political chaos, a rare window of opportunity for independent and decisive action is opening up for them.
One indication of this militarization is the new military team’s effort to convince Trump that he should deal with Russia and China only from a position of strength by taking symbolic actions, such as the missile strike in Syria, so that Trump is regarded as a strong and decisive president in US public opinion, unlike the “weakling” Obama. Generally speaking, the tendency to do the opposite of what Obama did is becoming a pronounced strategy within Trump’s military inner circle. This approach is vindicated by the accolades Trump received for his Syria operation even from his critics. So it is quite probable that in his dealings with Russia, Trump will continue to demonstrate power (even if designed solely for a one-off PR effect, which is something that we can easily adapt to).
Another aspect of this power policy is the eagerness of Trump’s military entourage to escalate the conflict around North Korea. They have repeatedly leaked information to the press suggesting that the US military command does not rule out the possibility that in this conflict North Korea will use nuclear weapons first in self-defense in response to US strikes. North Korea’s old slogan that Seoul will be turned into a “sea of fire” could easily become a reality.
Until now the vulnerability of the South Korean capital has made the escalation of the conflict on the Korean Peninsula extremely unlikely. However, now it seems that the US military is ready to cross the Rubicon. What’s more, this turn of events even seems desirable in terms of the aforementioned power policy. The “single use of nuclear weapons” by North Korea – a term that is gaining currency in US military circles – can break the taboo on their use by the US. In this case it will not appear to be using nuclear weapons first, only carrying out a (justified) retaliatory tactical nuclear strike, which would untie the US military’s hands to pursue other nuclear scenarios. The world as a whole will no longer be immune to the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. Instead of virtual (ideally, never used) strategic deterrence, nuclear weapons could, for the first time since Hiroshima, become actual weapons, the use of which in tactical conflicts would not be prohibited anymore. The North Korean leadership could even be deliberately provoked by Trump’s military entourage into using nuclear weapons against South Korea.
This is also the context in which to regard Trump’s reluctance to extend the current Russian-US New START treaty in 2021, as well as the US’s much touted readiness to terminate the bilateral Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Here, the Americans will intensify pressure on Russia under the pretext of Moscow violating the INF Treaty and possibly provoke it into withdrawing from this treaty first. The ambiguity of the new ABM launchers in Romania, which can launch not only defensive interceptor missiles but also offensive medium-range nuclear-tipped missiles, may come in handy as part of this new strategy.
This concept of reviving nuclear scenarios will evidently go hand in hand with the strengthening of US superiority in conventional weapons. Here, the old “deescalate to win” formula will also be used in practice (but in combination with the revised nuclear factor).
The growing role of the military in Trump’s entourage may also lead to further imbalances between the agencies responsible for foreign policy. Again, there is a growing number of reports that the Trump administration is looking into the possibility of slashing the State Department’s funding by one-third and USAID’s budget by 70 percent. These funds will be transferred to military agencies. The reduction in funding could also lead to a serious change in the State Department’s organizational structure, merging some subdivisions and downsizing the number of employees. Incidentally, a lack of clarity about the State Department’s future structure is one reason why the Trump administration has not yet appointed deputy secretaries of state.
What could neutralize the military’s influence on Trump? His inner circle of family who also have prominent roles in the administration, namely Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner. The family may already be taking the place of the anti-establishment radicals, such as Bannon, who are being sidelined from the decision-making process. However, since the public has developed an even more negative perception of Trump’s family than of Trump himself, under these circumstances, the “normalization” policy will translate, rather, into the further strengthening of the military’s role at the expense of the family. The extremely negative media response to Ivanka Trump’s first major diplomatic debut – her participation in the W20 Women’s Summit in Germany in April 2017 – corroborates this logic.
Yet, it is also obvious that Trump is unlikely to accept his family being sidelined from power and sacrifice his daughter like Steve Bannon or Michael Flynn before him. In this context, the success of the “normalization” strategy will require the “normalization” of Trump’s family, which seems to be a much bigger challenge, both psychologically and politically.
In any event, it is quite clear now that two powerful teams have evolved around Trump, both with major influence on his strategic decision-making: the military and his family. The extreme instability of the current political system in Washington could make the relationship between these two groups highly explosive and conflict-prone. In the next several months, their struggle for influence will determine the internal dynamics of Washington politics. This struggle will largely determine the success of the “normalization” policy that has been put forward by a segment of the Republican establishment. Otherwise the prospect of impeachment and civil unrest in the US will only grow.
How should Russia behave in this context? Which would be preferable to us – a “normalized” and “militarized” Trump or his impeachment (the latter is impeded by the completely unbalanced administrative system in Washington)? On the one hand, Trump’s growing tendency to ignore his election promise to maintain strategic cooperation with Russia, as well as an understandable sense of schadenfreude, make impeachment (and chaos) a desirable prospect. But on the other hand, the further militarization of the foreign policy decision-making process in Washington makes damage control in both bilateral ties and the maintenance of global strategic stability equally important.
In this context, it is significant that despite this trend toward a “power policy,” US military circles are sending signals that they seek closer dialogue between the US and Russia (so-called mil-mil communication) both through official channels and informal bilateral working groups with the participation of high-ranking military officials and security experts. Given the growing influence of the “military faction” in Trump’s inner circle, this channel could become an effective way to maintain bilateral ties at a minimally acceptable level if nothing else.
Oleg Barabanov is Programme director of the Valdai Discussion Club.
