The current crisis in the relationship between Qatar and a majority of Gulf countries, led by Saudis has an important ideological implication and is not simply a competition for leadership in the region and in the Muslim world at large. From this perspective, it is better to examine Qatar in the context of the theory of revisionist powers challenging both the political and ideological the status quo.
This theory became widespread in the western political science, but first and foremost, in respect to the global power balance and universalist neoliberal values. At the Valdai Club, Randall Schweller touched upon this topic in his research, titled “Rising Powers and Revisionism in Emerging International Orders.” With respect to the internal realities of the Arab world, this approach is not so common.
For a deeper understanding of the reasons behind Qatari revisionism and Qatar’s challenge to pro-Saudi status quo in the region, it is better to start from the differing attitudes of these two nations to the phenomenon of political Islam in general and political Wahhabism in particular. Here we see Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s fundamentally different approaches to political Wahhabism, which can explain a lot about the conflict that has flared up between the two countries.
Dogmatically, Wahhabism is a part of the Hanbali madhhab of Sunnism. Using the old Latin maxim “cujus regio, ejus religio” (whoever reigns dictates the faith), the Hanbali madhhab is practiced by ruling dynasties in only several states of the Islamic world (Saudi Arabia, Qatar as well as several non-key UAE Emirates, such as Sharjah. Sunni rulers of other Gulf nations stick to a different (more “moderate”, conventionally speamonarch) variety of madhhab called “Maliki.” This is the case in the key Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, Bahrain, Kuwait and others. Rooted in the traditional Sharif of Mecca and the Caliphate of the Ottoman era, the Hashemite dynasty of Jordan practices the Hanafi madhhab, like most Sunnis in post-Ottoman areas. In this context, the current Saudi-Qatari crisis can be viewed as an intra-Hanbali conflict from ideological perspectives.
Following the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, the abolition of the Caliphate, and the expulsion of Hashemite Sharifs from Mecca by the Saudis in 1925, one of the key tokens of power in the Islamic world, control of the two holy mosques, the Grand Mosque (holding the Kaaba) in Mecca and The Prophet’s Mosque in Medina, was taken over by the House of Saud. The Saudi monarch assumed a very special title in 1986: Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, earlier borne by caliphs. Thus the power of the Saudi dynasty over Mecca and Medina stopped being mere political, as dogmatically it also took on the air of a quasi-caliphate.
In parallel, the second half of the 20th century was marked by a growing popularity of political Islam, movements which had the goal of the renouncing of the secular nature of the state and transforming it according to principles of sharia. In the Shia world, this is the widely known Islamic Revolution in Iran, while in the Sunni world, there was the Egyptian movement Muslim Brotherhood as well as a number of movements in Pakistan. Certain radical groups within political Islam, though not all of them, not only raised the issue of socio-ethical aspects of introducing sharia, but also touted the restoration of a caliphate as the undisputed ultimate goal of political Islam. In this context they did not only question the power of secular Sunni republics (such as Egypt, Tunisia or Pakistan), but the power of the Gulf monarchies as well, and above all, the Saudi monarchs (since the caliphate and the control of Mecca and Medina seemed inseparable). The key dogmatic charge laid by these radical “caliphate mongers” against the Saudi monarchs was that of hypocrisy as they called them Munafiqun (hypocrites). That was how Prophet Mohammad referred to people who said that they stand for the triumph of Islam and sharia while in reality, they were apostates who have wallowed in unbecoming luxury.
The natural response of the Saudi monarchs was acute antagonism towards Caliphate supporters, which was gradually spread to most movements of political Islam at large. Thus, while in the 1960s Saudis supported the followers of Sayyid Qutb, the leaders of Muslim Brotherhood, they later became increasingly alienated from this movement. It should be noted that many global caliphate organizations, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, originated and grew outside the Hanbali areas and they were never dogmatically related to the Hanbali madhhab and Wahhabism (albeit embracing similar principles of Islamic calling – dawat ul-islam).
Meanwhile “anti-hypocrisy” movements started spawning in the Wahhabi environment inside Saudi Arabia as well, ushering in the era of political Wahhabism as an integral part of political Islam. It began with the discussions of the 1970s in theological and university circles, with both ultra-conservatives from the Islamic University of Medina and relatively liberal modernists from Monarch Abdulaziz University in Jeddah ending up with dogmatic indictment of the ruling dynasty for hypocrisy. This first stage of political Wahhabism inside Saudi Arabia climaxed in the revolt of Juhayman al-Otaybi who seized the Sacred Mosque in Mecca back in November 1979 (on the first day of the new age – 1400 as per the Hijri calendar). During his rebellion, al-Otaybe declared that he strips hypocrites from the ruling Saudi dynasty of the right to control Mecca.
The next stage in the struggle of Saudi monarchs against political Wahhabism was connected with Osama bin Laden. While he was waging “jihad” against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, he was favored and supported by the ruling house, but as soon as he launched a “hypocrisy” discourse, with a caliphate phantom looming up, Osama immediately turned into the enemy of the Saudi dynasty.
The collapse of the old Cold War order back in the 1990s–2000s was followed by a surge of political Islam and its amalgamation with “jihadism” in the course of military conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya, Central Asia and other areas. In that new environment, caliphate structures got a much wider field for their activity and buildup along with greater opportunities for recruiting new adepts, than before. Saudis again found themselves in a very ambiguous situation. On the one hand, global propaganda of dogmatic Wahhabism as “pure Islam” became one of the most important strategic areas of Saudi ideological expansion. Under warlike activities and swift blending of Wahhabi forms of the Islamist calling with jihad, the very term “Wahhabi” became synonymous of the Islamist terrorist in general, regardless of their dogmatic views. On the other hand, the logical development of the Political Wahhabism doctrine inevitably led to the caliphate discourse, which Saudis would like to avoid by any means.
The rapid development of “Takfirism” in the radical political Islam in recent years (from “takfir” – accusing of impiety) further fueled the indictment of Saudis for hypocrisy. Dogmatically, Takfirism goes back to the hadith that the entire Islamic Ummah community would eventually be split into 73 groups of which 72 would stray from Islam, with only one group being righteous (firqa al-najiya) and true to original Islam. Accordingly, many radical followers of political Islam declared themselves that only righteous group, bringing takfir against everyone who disagrees with them, including against Munafiqun hypocrites. This was one more complex political-dogmatic threat to the Saudi authority.
It is in this environment that Qatar increased its activities. On the one hand, it is the only nation apart from Saudis, ruled by the Hanbali Wahhabi dynasty (not counting small UAE emirates). On the other hand, it is against the Saudi rather than the Qatari dynasty that the anti-hypocrisy protest of political Wahhabism is directed. Therefore, Qatar deliberately assumed the function of the standard-bearer in political Wahhabism, offering its support to various radical groups (including to the ones dogmatically unrelated to the Hanbali madhhab). Unlike the Saudis, Qatar does not fear contacts with caliphate propagators.
The foreign political context after Barack Obama came to power in the United States also facilitated Qatar rising to prominence. Both the new US President and Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State shifted the priorities in their Middle East policy, disassociating themselves from their traditional ally in Saudi Arabia and loomonarch for a new anchor in this region. They stayed their choice on Qatar. In the meantime, the Arab Spring dynamics resulted in de facto legalization of numerous groups within political Islam.
As a result, with a rather transparent support of the Qatari (backed by Obama and Clinton), the consolidation of some radical groups related to Muslim Brotherhood commenced. Later these groupings would evolve into ISIS in its new formation. Al Jazeera and other pro-Qatar media become a mouthpiece for radical preachers of political Islam, such as sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi and others. At the same time, the unwillingness of Bashar al-Assad to build a new gas pipeline from Qatar to the Mediterranean over the Syrian territory sparked a conflict in Syria and the role of Qatar in launching those processes is also quite transparent. This policy began under the former Emir of Qatar Hamad and continued under his son Tamim who replaced him on the Qatari throne as well as under the new Qatari minister of foreign affairs Khalid al-Attiyah who is considered the godfather of many radicals in political Islam.
The results are well known. On 29 June 2014, ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi officially proclaimed the creation of a caliphate. This brought about a very delicate situation of de facto “rival caliphs” in the Sunni world. On the one hand, we have the Saudi monarch having the caliphate title of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, but on the other hand, we have his challenger, the ISIS caliph, accusing him of dogmatic hypocrisy. There was a temptation of schism whereby the Muslim Ummah could undergo a split. To avoid this outcome, Prophet Mohammad and his early followers developed a special hadith at the dawn of Islam. It says that if Muslims are called to pledge allegiance to two caliphs they should kill one of them – a very simple means to evade the schism. The rise of the ISIS caliphate obviously poses a direct challenge both to the power and life of Saudi monarchs, as per this hadith.
In this context, the role of Qatar is quite indicative. Numerous websites of proponents of political Islam rather transparently describe the following scenario of fighting for the caliphate: Saudi monarchs should be legitimately overthrown as Munafiqun hypocrites and lose their control over the Two Sacred Mosques. Yet the ISIS caliph is a war criminal and will never be recognized by the majority of the Ummah. He must do all the “dirty” work of creating the true caliphate and then leave the stage. Who then will become the true caliph?
At this point, radicals of political Islam often turn to the Qatari Emir. On the one hand, he is the only Wahhabi ruler apart from Saudis and hence the defender of “pure Islam”, who cannot be accused of takfir. On the other hand, unlike Saudis, he is not a hypocrite, since Qatar provided real support to the struggle of political Islam movements for sharia (and caliphate).
This opens very tempting prospects for Qatari emirs: using the fight of caliphate supporters (consolidated with Qatari support) and replacing, at least morally, at the initial stage, Saudi monarch in the position of quasi-caliphs, the Custodian of the Two Sacred Mosques, and maybe even the full-fledged caliph of the Sunni Ummah.
Eventually, in this context the revisionism of Qatar assumes not so much the political dimension, as rather a very serious dogmatic dimension, being closely linked with the struggle of political Islam for changing the status quo in the Sunni Ummah of the 21st century. Now Saudis, supported by Trump, try to nip these sentiments in the bud. However, even if they succeed, they will still be indicted for hypocrisy and takfir, while Wahhabi Qatar will continue to remain a viable dogmatic alternative to Saudis in the future.
