Valdai Signals

The main result of the Valdai Club meetings was the documentation of the gap between the West’s exaggerated self-perception and the actual situation in the world.

The results of international discussions in Sochi through the eyes of a forum participant. 

It is unknown whether it was the organizers’ goal, but the main result of these Valdai Club meetings was the documentation of the gap between the West’s exaggerated self-perception and the actual situation in the world. Experts from non-Western countries, from Argentina to Japan, had something to show their US and European colleagues. It is noteworthy that the parties used a Russian platform to exchange signals. 

The Valdai International Discussion Club is becoming the main security and policy forum in Eurasia. It offers a good example of what a truly global discussion can look like. The club is respectable, as a matter of principle, which means a certain measure of exclusiveness and respect for all viewpoints that are presented there. Leading experts from the world’s most powerful countries – from Argentina and Arab countries to India and Japan – participate in it. Amid sober international assessments prevailing in the global media, the Western mainstream turns out to be just one of the voices. Remarks by representatives of the US establishment are noted and balanced against the opinions of a reputable international expert audience, from Arabs and Latin Americans to Persians and Chinese, which makes Valdai’s intellectual stock thick and of high quality. 

Within the framework of the discussion club meeting, each participant addressed the consequences of the European crisis in his particular region. Japanese experts noted that the US has needlessly provoked Russia into retaliation in Ukraine. This led to a new rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing. Tokyo is concerned over China’s territorial ambitions in the South China Sea, and regards the potential creation of a Russian-Chinese bloc as undesirable. 

Israel has for the first time run into serious disagreements with the US, which, because of the Islamic State’s successes in Iraq, has opened a dialogue with Tehran behind Tel Aviv’s back. At the same time, one US analyst had to recognize that in the “5+1” negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program, the most constructive proposals are coming from Russia. However, because Moscow has currently found itself in the “club of countries subject to sanctions,” it is not clear how the Russian initiatives will be regarded in the future. If this leads to a setback in the negotiations with Iran, talk of an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear installations could resume. 

Arab experts noted that the political defeat of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as a result of the US-sponsored military coup bears out Al Qaeda’s thesis that it is impossible to replace Arab dictators by peaceful means. As a result, extremism in the region should be expected to intensify. 

Europeans are not seriously wondering about the need to provide financial support to Ukraine. They believe that Russia and the US will have to come to terms on this. At the same time, Germany is giving up its role as an advocate of Russian interests in Europe. Angela Merkel wants to be an EU leader, and so she will have to become more pro-American than the leaders of the Baltic states and Poland. 

Analysis of the presentations made by regional experts points to a trend of deepening regionalism. Every big country is seeking to ensure peace and stability in its region. This trend is the main evidence that US global leadership is not working. 

US experts did not respond to criticism, trying to put a different spin on the others' concerns. Say, the Islamic State is not a global threat. The Ukrainian crisis is also local, while its consequences are affecting not global rules but European security. The Americans were puzzled as to why experts from other countries were so pessimistic in their forecasts regarding the world order that has evolved since the end of the Cold War. According to US representatives, the democratic world theory of the early 1990s is still relevant and is yielding results. 

In the end, the Americans and many Europeans came to the conclusion that the West will not give way in its dispute with Russia concerning global regulations, and so Moscow will have to do it. And since Russia and China are not in a position to claim equality with the West, it will have to acknowledge its subordinate status. 

The plot thickens. If Moscow disagrees, Western experts are playing out scenarios for a possible “Russian response.” In their opinion, modern Russia has three dimensions of global power: nuclear weapons, energy, and information weapons. The last can be used to deliver a blow at the West’s vulnerable spot: disorganization of the world financial system. In a fit of candor, one US expert even said: “If Russia were a normal country, we would have simply bombed it, like Libya.” 

The Valdai discussions showed that the need to search for collective solutions to modern problems is not felt by all parties to an equal degree. There is no consensus between Russia, other non-Western leaders and the US on what is happening on the global and regional level. Russian-US collaboration is institutionally constrained: the activity of a bilateral presidential commission has been frozen, while a number of top Russian officials have been subjected to sanctions. Moscow hopes that the new make-up of the European Commission will be less politicized and less aggressive toward Russia. However, the EU's rotating presidency will soon go to Latvia, which has already declared its intention to invigorate activity within the framework of the Eastern Partnership project. This means further destabilization of European security, and a deepening of global regulation problems. 

Against this backdrop, nevertheless, Russia is still calling for collaboration in the name of common interests. Despite Vladimir Putin’s harsh rhetoric at the Valdai forum, it was a call for building “a new global consensus among the responsible forces” and “a new edition of interdependence.” According to Moscow, European order should be based on the obligations under the 1975 Helsinki Act and the principle of indivisible security in the Euro-Atlantic region. I am confident that the Russian call for collaboration will be heard in the West, but once again, it will not be heeded. Despite the objective demand for the formation of powerful regional organizations and the harmonization of the rules of interaction between them, the West is too focused on itself to properly appreciate the consequences of this trend. 

Western countries have the oldest and most active military organization in the world. Western media dominate the international information space. For this reason, the West can afford to ignore critical points of view. This often leads to a situation where, to use the expression of one European participant, great powers fall victim to their own propaganda. 

Indeed, Western experts had nothing to say to the charges of destabilization in the Middle East. Many of them acknowledge that the policy of Western countries is short-term and depends on electoral cycles. None of them see a strategic goal in the confrontation with Russia or want to make the country their enemy. Nevertheless, they are unable to resist the temptation to preach and censure or the temptation to support “young democracies” wherever they emerge. With regard to Russia, this consolidates the old line of disregard for its interests, based on the thesis of the West’s historical superiority. 

Nevertheless, in the next decade, we are likely to observe the process of the West’s self-perception being brought in line with the actual state of affairs in the world. This process will not be quick. Despite the fact that non-Western countries already account for two-thirds of the global GDP, because of high labor productivity and their technological advantage, the West will be ceding its leadership gradually – which means that the Western-Russian tensions will not finish with the end of the Ukraine crisis. 

It is crucial that relations between Russia and the West do not wear themselves thin to the point of fragility. My question to President Vladimir Putin was about so-called black swans: Could unexpected negative events bring down bilateral relations below the zero level? A collision of submarines, an inadvertent violation of airspace or the accidental death of a foreign national amid outstanding disagreements and deep distrust could push the parties into open conflict. This situation creates a temptation for concerned parties to nudge the situation in this direction. 

So in the short term, Russia and the West have at least one common interest: limiting mutual damage and preventing their relations from worsening even more. 

This article was originally published in Russian on www.lenta.ru

Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.