The US alliance is one of the major topics in contemporary international studies. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ alliance policy has formed a complex structure with the aim of maintaining hegemony, based on unipolar advantages and shared values, centred on the Trans-Atlantic and Trans-Pacific alliances. However, during the Trump 2.0 era, the United States has been widely criticised for imposing tariff barriers on its partners and forcing its allies to increase defence spending, which is arguably weakening its alliance system. Unlike the traditional view, the author believes that the goal of US policy in the Trump 2.0 era is not to weaken but to strengthen the alliance, in line with its own strategic goals, so as to make the alliance better serve the national interests of the United States.
1. Factors and Traditions
It is worth noting that the current alliance policy of the Trump administration reflects the “common view” of American conservative elites, which is based on the relative decline of the unipolar advantage and the relatively growing demands on allies to assume responsibility for security and the economy. Therefore, it should be included in the general trajectory of the evolution of US alliance policy following the end of the Cold War.
First, in terms of objectives, since the end of the Cold War US alliance policy has always focused on maintaining its hegemonic advantage. The essence of this policy is to use alliances to prevent the emergence of geopolitical forces that can threaten US hegemony in key regions. In Europe, the United States maintained its security dominance and strategic pressure on Russia through NATO's repeated eastward expansion; In the Middle East, Washington joined forces with European allies in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and maintained its dominant position in Middle Eastern affairs through alliances with countries such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. In the Asia-Pacific region, the United States has gradually transformed the “bilateral alliance system” in the region into a “network alliance system” with traditional allies such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea through its “Indo-Pacific Strategy.”
Second, in terms of fundamental elements, the US alliance policy since the end of the Cold War is built on the material foundation of the US unipolar advantage and the cultivation of common values among allied countries. In terms of materiality, the alliance system requires the US, as the dominant country, to provide significant public goods and material support for its effective functioning. In exchange, member countries of the US alliance system give up some of their sovereignty, recognise US authority, and then turn to the United States for security protection to reduce their own security costs. Since the US alliance system spans the entire world, there are significant differences in historical development, cultural traditions and interests among allies, which makes the United States strive to unify the alliance system with a broader consensus to achieve cooperation. Therefore, ideologies such as “democracy” and “freedom” serve as important means for the United States to achieve unity among its allies and strengthen their support.
Third, in terms of structural elements, the US alliance policy since the end of the Cold War has had a “bilateral” and “asymmetric” character. In terms of bilaterality, the structure of the US alliance system has always been centred on transatlantic and trans-Pacific alliances. The transatlantic alliance has always been the core of the US alliance system. Although Washington has gradually shifted its strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific region since 2010, military expenditure on NATO still accounts for a large part of Washington’s total military expenses. At the same time, the US has been continuously strengthening its alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region in recent years. At the same time, the US alliance system is a typical hierarchical system with pronounced asymmetric characteristics. On the one hand, this asymmetry gives the United States greater flexibility in using its alliance system, but on the other hand, it has become the main source of burden for the United States in providing public goods to its alliances.
2. Directions and Policies
It should be noted that the current adjustment of the US alliance policy by the Trump administration is not a simple abandonment of the previous policy. Alliance policy still inherits the general concept of maintaining US hegemony in the context of the transition of power in the international system. The Trump administration will seek to further restructure the US alliance system in a direction favourable to US national interests to cope with the challenges to the US hegemonic advantage.
First, in terms of objectives, the Trump administration's alliance policy has not deviated from the core goal of maintaining US hegemony, but it has focused more on competing with China through the construction of a new alliance system. At the NATO summit in February 2025, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth stated that “the top priority of the United States is to contain China.” He suggested that “we must recognise the reality of resource limitations and make trade-offs in their allocation to ensure that containment does not fail.” Under this influence, the United States has achieved clarity on the goals of the alliance system, gradually emerging from the Ukrainian crisis and increasing investments in the Indo-Pacific region. In the budget for fiscal year 2026, despite significant cuts in US budget spending, the Trump administration has increased defence spending by 13% and made containing China in the Indo-Pacific region a priority. These changes reflect the fact that the adjustment of the Trump administration’s alliance policy goals is in fact a specification of competition with China against the backdrop of the declining unipolar advantage of the United States.
Second, in terms of fundamental elements, the Trump administration hopes to create a stronger alliance that should contribute not only to ensuring the security of the United States, but also to its economic interests. Trump believes that the US alliance system, based on the material base of the United States after the Cold War, has become a heavy financial burden for the future development of the United States. Therefore, the Trump administration has required NATO allies to increase defence spending to 5% of their combined GDP. At the same time, Trump views equal economic and trade relations as a new basis for the alliance system. The key goal of these measures is to shift economic costs, with a relative weakening of the US power advantages. Thus, Washington intends to create an alliance system that corresponds to the strategic concept of the conservative elites of the United States.
Third, in terms of structural elements, the Trump administration's adjustment of US alliance policy is aimed at achieving a balanced alliance architecture. The Trump administration has repeatedly emphasised that “the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is the main threat to Europe, and its resolution is Europe's responsibility.”
The Trump administration has significantly increased resource investments in the Pacific. US Secretary of State Rubio held talks with the foreign ministers of India, Japan, and Australia, while Vice President Vance visited India, signalling that the United States will shift the focus of its alliance architecture to the Indo-Pacific region and hopes to create a more focused alliance system.
It is clear that US alliance policy in the context of the “Trump shock” is not based on the logic of abandoning alliances, but on the logic of promoting a transformation of the overall alliance system. Changes in perception among the elites and strategic circles of the status of the United States and the real challenges presented by Trump have led to the US desire to create alliances with clearer goals, more equal rights and responsibilities, and a more balanced structure. On the one hand, this transformation process has not deviated from the core US goal of maintaining hegemony. On the other hand, it represents different alliance preferences than those of the Biden administration, based on changing real challenges and adjustments in US domestic politics.
3. Impact and Prospects
First, the Trump administration's adjustment of its alliance policy aims to restore the material power of the United States in the short term. Reducing the provision of public goods to the alliance system to reduce costs and create an alliance system with equal rights and responsibilities is the most important idea the Trump administration is pursuing in implementing the "Make America Great Again" strategy. At the same time, the Trump administration's tough stance on pursuing a "fairer" policy towards its allies also meets the needs of domestic populist sentiments and achieves the goal of mitigating social contradictions. However, in the long term, the Trump administration's dominant preferences, based on the economic logic of “costs and benefits”, and its ignoring of common conceptual factors will weaken the “cohesion” of the US alliance system.
Second, the transformation of the US alliance system will accelerate the arms race in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region, which will have a greater impact on the geopolitical landscape. The “rearmament” process in Europe will significantly change the geopolitical security and economic landscape of the continent. In addition, the Trump administration’s shift of the structural focus of the alliance system to the Indo-Pacific region will exacerbate the security dilemma in the region. Although the tariff differences between China and the US have eased in the short term, the strategic rivalry between the two countries will persist in the long term. The adjustment of the alliance system will become an important critical area in the strategic game between China and the US.
Third, the adjustment of the US alliance policy will further multi-polarise the international system under the conditions of “unprecedented changes in the world in a century”. The European continent will move further toward a “multipolar balance”. The Trump administration’s tariff and trade policies toward its allies will also encourage the countries of the Global South and emerging markets to play a more active role in the international system. This series of changes shows that the adjustment of US alliance policy will further expand the influence of non-Western countries in the international system, accelerate the disintegration of the old international order, and establish a new international order.
