New Delhi is cognisant of the future viability of the Northern Sea Route, given the further thawing of the Arctic and the prospect of improved relations between Russia and other Arctic states over the long term, writes Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash, Junior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation. The author is a participant of the Valdai – New Generation project.
New Delhi’s ambitions in the Arctic reflect a notable ideational shift in recent years. While India has long emphasised cooperation in science and climate research, its Arctic vision now carries a pronounced geo-economics dimension. This evolution stems from the accelerating thaw of Arctic ice and the growing prospect of year-round navigation along the Northern Sea Route (with icebreaker assistance). Additionally, given Russia’s deteriorating relations with the West and the exit of Western investments, technology, and firms from the Russian Arctic due to sanctions, Moscow has welcomed the participation of Asian countries – China and India – in the Arctic. While Beijing has increased its presence in the Arctic over the last decade, India’s presence remains modest. Nevertheless, since the 2020s, bilateral cooperation with Russia in the Arctic region has gained prominence in official discourse. Against this backdrop, tracing the drivers of India’s Arctic engagement, assessing the scope of its presence in the Russian Arctic, and examining the centrality of the NSR in New Delhi’s calculus warrant closer scrutiny.
India and the Arctic
New Delhi shares historic ties with the Arctic. In 1920, India signed the Svalbard Treaty. Eighty-seven years later, in 2007, New Delhi launched its first scientific expedition in the Arctic. In 2008, India inaugurated its first Arctic outpost in Svalbard. The centrality of India’s Arctic policy places emphasis on strengthening cooperation in science and technology, economic and human development, climate change, Arctic governance, and enhancing connectivity. The growing importance of the Arctic in New Delhi’s calculus was reflected in its bid to join the Arctic Council, which was accepted in 2013. Along with India, China, South Korea, Japan, and Singapore were granted observer status in the Arctic Council, which institutionalised Arctic governance on a global level.
Additionally, other neo-realist factors, such as the consolidation of the Chinese firms in the Russian Arctic discourse, combined with the vacuum created by the exit of Western firms from the region, has contributed to growing Indian interest in strengthening engagement in the Arctic. In India’s calculus, enhancing cooperation in the Arctic has positive multiplier effects for the India-Russia partnership. This will build more equity for the Indian public and private sector, enhancing New Delhi’s presence in the Russian Arctic, especially in other sectors such as energy, mining, rare earth materials, and shipbuilding.
In 2021, the Indian public sector’s investment in Russia, particularly in the energy and minerals segments, totalled $16 billion, indicative of a growing interest in strengthening bilateral energy cooperation. Since February 2022, because of the rising discounts, New Delhi became the second largest importer of Russian crude, and bilateral trade exponentially increased, from $12 billion in 2021 to $66 billion in 2025. While crude oil exports add up to a majority of the bilateral trade, non-oil trade subsequently began to increase in bilateral trade. Since the last decade, both countries have expressed mutual interest in collaborating on the extraction of Arctic riches, energy resources, and rare earth materials.
Northern Sea Route
New Delhi’s interests in the NSR stem from the prospects of extending the Eastern Maritime Corridor – connecting the eastern ports of India to Vladivostok and, in turn, connecting to the Russian North. New Delhi’s use of the NSR would enable circular connectivity with Russia along three directions: the existing route via Mumbai to St. Petersburg, the route via the Caucasus using the International North-South Transport Corridor, and, third, the Eastern Maritime Corridor. The NSR would complement these three routes not only in terms of navigation to Europe but also by enhancing connectivity between the Russian Arctic and Indian ports. Using the NSR from the Arctic ports via the EMC to reach Indian ports can reduce the number of shipping days.
In 2023, Alexei Chekunkov, Russian Minister for the Development of the Far East and Arctic, visited India to discuss the transportation of goods via the NSR. In 2024, during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Moscow, both sides decided to set up a working group on the Northern Sea Route under the bilateral intergovernmental commission on trade, economic, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation. During the plenary session of the working group, both sides discussed cargo transit targets, possible training for Indian seafarers in polar navigation, and joint projects for Arctic shipbuilding. With Russian port and shipbuilding facilities working on overdrive, Moscow has begun to offset the requirement of building non-nuclear icebreakers to third countries. Against this backdrop, last year, a $750 million MoU was concluded between Rosatom and the Government of India to build four non-nuclear icebreakers.
Challenges
Even with growing interest and the resultant institutionalisation of cooperation along the Northern Sea route, Indian investments in the Arctic have been negligible on the ground. Currently, India continues to import oil and LNG originating from the Russian Arctic, but external factors such as the threat of sanctions have influenced its engagement. For instance, last year, the Indian Oil Secretary announced that New Delhi would not purchase LNG from the sanctioned Arctic-LNG 2 project. Secondly, even the case for using the NSR for the transit of Indian goods to Europe or North America is not commercially viable. This is due to constraints posed by structural realities and market forces. These include India’s low export-to-GDP ratio (hovering around 20%) with lesser focus on the manufacturing sector, which results in the formation of narrow comparative advantages for New Delhi in its export basket. Additionally, the high cost of transit, lack of ice-class vessels, and the challenge of insuring cargoes complicate transit, reducing the feasibility of the NSR.
Nevertheless, New Delhi is cognisant of the future viability of the NSR, given the further thawing of the Arctic and the prospect of improved relations between Russia and other Arctic states (over the long term), which is why India is aiming to strengthen cooperation along the route. The vacuum created by the exit of the Western firms has created further avenues for joint collaboration in the Arctic. Furthermore, Moscow views New Delhi as a strategic partner in the joint development of the Arctic region and perceives India’s presence positively in the discourse of Arctic governance, which has been dysfunctional since Russia’s special military operation began. The current trends in Russia’s relations with the West are indicative of the further Easternisation of the Arctic, given the increased presence of Asian countries in the Arctic. Against this backdrop, President Vladimir Putin’s upcoming visit to India in early December is likely to place renewed emphasis on scaling up joint investments and enhancing India’s economic and scientific presence in the Russian Arctic.
