Freezing the Ukraine conflict along the contact line, rather than seeking a deeper resolution, suits the US: there will remain a point of tension in Eastern Europe, which will encourage the EU to remain dependent on Washington in terms of ensuring its own security, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Andrey Sushentsov.
Opinion polls show that for Russians, the US elections and Donald Trump’s victory have become a rather significant event of 2024. The data allows us to conclude that Trump is perceived as a more Russia-friendly US president than Obama and Biden: more than a third of Russians have expressed hopes for changes for the better in Russian-American relations. However, contrary to optimistic expectations, the new administration is unlikely to initiate a comprehensive settlement in Ukraine. A more likely scenario for the development of events will be a US move to “freeze” the conflict. What are the origins of such a strategy and what could be its consequences?
The key factor determining Washington’s foreign policy in general and its position on Ukraine in particular is the destruction of the “pyramid of trust” in American hegemony. Its European NATO allies have already invested heavily on military equipment and financial aid for Ukraine, as well as staked their reputations. However, the deteriorating situation of the Ukrainian armed forces, the decline in popularity of President Zelensky and growing public discontent in the EU countries regarding the high economic costs of the conflict, including rising energy prices and increased migration flows, are raising questions among Europeans that are dangerous for American hegemony: has Europe made a mistake in recklessly betting on escalation? Will the Americans be ready to protect their allies in the event of a direct clash between any of them and Russia?
Freezing the Ukraine conflict along the contact line, rather than seeking a deeper resolution, suits the US: there will remain a point of tension in Eastern Europe, which will encourage the EU to remain dependent on Washington in terms of ensuring its own security.
The US does not seek vertical escalation for another reason. The vulnerability of US carrier strike groups to Russia’s hypersonic weapons makes such a step too risky — at stake is not so much Ukraine, but the myth of US military invulnerability. The loss of even one aircraft carrier could cause a chain reaction, rolling back American influence in the Middle East and East Asia. As long as allies in Europe and Asia are convinced that Washington is ready to guarantee their security, the dollar continues to be the main reserve asset, and American financial obligations are perceived as reliable. However, any serious shock, especially a military defeat, could threaten this entire structure. The recent rise in the value of gold and bitcoin are clear symptoms of decline in confidence in the dollar, a search for safe havens in the face of geopolitical confrontation.
On the domestic front, Donald Trump faces fierce confrontation with the US political establishment. The plans for large-scale public administration reforms by Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy, whom Trump intends to appoint to head the new Department of Government Efficiency, threaten to provoke an internal crisis. However, as the experience of Trump’s first term shows, radical impulses usually stall in the bureaucratic machine. The fragility of the “pyramid of trust” in the US strategy in the West will keep the Trump administration from taking drastic steps, either towards escalation or towards finding ways to deeply resolve the situation. The image of an “independent player” may push Trump to high-profile diplomatic actions and escapades. It is not a surprise to hear more loud statements about “buying Greenland”, how good it would be for Mexico and Canada to join the US, or threats against China and Iran. But these actions are unlikely to lead to serious geopolitical “deals”.
The main tasks that the Trump administration needs to address remain unchanged: eliminating the threat that the allies will lose trust in its security guarantees, keeping Ukraine in its sphere of influence as an asset against Russia in the future, and preventing the normalisation of relations between the EU and Russia. The US needs to stabilize the long-term crisis and maintain its predictability.
Russia, for its part, seeks to encourage the US to seriously revise the structure of European security, which is currently based on NATO dominance, and to remove Ukraine from the Western sphere of influence. The irreconcilability of the interests of Russia and the US makes a quick and deep settlement of the Ukrainian crisis impossible. The American strategy will most likely be reduced to an attempt to drag out the crisis, keeping it “on low heat” — with continued arms supplies and the maintenance of the front line, but without decisive escalation. Stable but manageable tension will allow the US to continue convincing Europe to pay for its security, while avoiding excessive escalation and the risk of military defeat. It is difficult to understand why such a prospect would suit Russia.
