Flexible use of migration policy instruments remains an important key to creating an atmosphere of mutually beneficial cooperation and good-neighbourliness throughout Eurasia, writes Dmitry Poletaev.
The most dynamic of the three migration systems in Eurasia is the Asia-Pacific system. According to UN estimates, the European and Eurasian migration systems are developing at roughly the same pace, but differ significantly in terms of the numbers of international migrants. For example, according to UN data, the European migration system hosted 75 million international migrants in 2019, and this number could grow to 100 million by 2050. The Eurasian migration system hosted 12 million migrants in 2019, and this number could reach 16 million by 2050. In general, according to UN estimates, the number of international migrants by mid-2024 exceeded 304 million people (221 million in 2010, 154 million in 1990), having almost doubled in 35 years. The number of international migrants has grown faster than the world's population since the beginning of the 21st century; the share of international migrants in the world’s population increased from 2.8% in 2000 to 3.7% in 2024.
The general global trend remains the economic opposition between North and South, which entails labour migration from the countries of the Global South to countries of the Global North, but in recent decades, the movement from South to South has become just as significant, and all of these trends are generally true for Eurasia as well.
In the three Eurasian migration systems, the greatest competition in labour migration currently exists and will continue in the future for IT and computer technology specialists, and given the aging population of the countries of the Eurasian and especially the European migration system, for specialists in medicine and healthcare. Educational migration is also significant in all three systems, including as a tool for attracting the most talented young people from abroad for permanent residence by creating conditions for subsequent naturalisation in their countries of study. Environmental migration, driven by climate change, is set to become an important trend in Eurasia, and the number of environmental migrants could reach 200 million by 2050. For example, rising sea levels will impact the future of northern Germany, the Netherlands (which reclaimed part of its territory from the sea), and Bangladesh, which already suffers from coastal flooding. In the longer term, this could also impact Russia, particularly the future of St. Petersburg and the Yamal Peninsula. Environmental migration may also become relevant in the future for the arid regions of Central Asia.
Another major challenge likely awaiting us is forced migration. In South Asia, a new wave of forced migrants could arise due to the escalation of interfaith tensions and the rise to power of radical political forces that practice mass repression against their opponents. Afghanistan remains a hotbed of instability; its population could grow to 80-100 million by 2050. Since the turn of the century, five million refugees have already left the country, mostly for Iran and Pakistan.
European Migration System
With their aging populations, Western European countries are facing a significant labour shortage, which is only growing, and there is a growing need for domestic workers to care for the elderly. While developed European countries can compensate for the shortage of qualified specialists by attracting workers from the “new” EU countries, most foreign workers in the “care economy” are non-EU nationals and include migrants from Moldova and Ukraine. The educational policies of most countries in the European Migration System are aimed at selecting the best foreign students and naturalising them, which also addresses the shortage of qualified workers.
Despite the urgent need for foreign labour, both conservative and right-wing parties are gaining ground in Europe, reflecting the sentiment of a significant number of EU citizens toward restrictive migration measures. Wariness against refugees has led to new regulations imposing strict restrictions on asylum and the creation of a new security system at the EU borders. Reintroduced migration bans and barriers increase the risk of strengthening networks of informal intermediaries smuggling foreigners into EU countries, which can only strengthen Europe's shadow economy through the informal employment of undocumented migrants. Strengthening the “Schengen wall,” taking a more selective approach toward the future citizens of European countries, and measures to tighten controls on undocumented migration will determine the future of migration among the countries of the European migration system in the short and medium term. It should also be noted that, in conditions of economic stagnation, skilled workers from European countries will seek new economic opportunities for themselves both in the United States and Canada, as well as in the countries of Southeast Asia, and there will be less and less reason to talk about “brain drains” in this context.
Asia-Pacific Migration System
India and China, the largest countries in the Asia-Pacific migration system, currently have no need for an influx of foreign labour, but their paths will differ markedly in the future. India, which replaced China as the most populous country in 2023, will continue to have a population surplus and will be more free to export its labour force. China, which is slowly but steadily losing its demographic potential (from 1.4 billion in 2022 to 1.3 billion in 2050 and 0.8 billion in 2100, according to UN forecasts, has a rapidly aging population, and is already relying on industrial automation to avoid future shocks associated with a shrinking working-age population. This could serve as an instructive example for Russia of how to respond to demographic decline. Under current conditions, China, even in the distant future, is unlikely to be a significant contributor to the labour force.
Currently, up to half of the world’s educational migrants come from China and India, and their main destination countries are the United States, Britain, China, Canada, France, Russia, and Germany. However, a gradual reversal of educational migration flows to countries in the Asia-Pacific migration system is predicted. Significant investments in national universities in China, Singapore, and South Korea will reduce outbound student migration from these countries and gradually increase the influx of international students.
A significant share of undocumented migration within the Asia-Pacific migration system, accompanied by labour exploitation and human trafficking, is characteristic of migration ties between Myanmar and Thailand/Bangladesh, Indonesia and Malaysia, Malaysia and Singapore, and Laos and Thailand.
Another interesting country in the Asia-Pacific migration system is Japan. For a long time, it did not use immigration programmes to address labour shortages. However, in 2019, it launched its first labour migration programme for semi-skilled jobs in identified sectors with a labour deficit, and for the first time, it allowed semi-skilled migrant workers to remain in Japan indefinitely.
The example of the Asia-Pacific migration system demonstrates how dynamically migration flows can change in a relatively short period of time.
The Eurasian Migration System and Russia
The main flows of labour and educational migration within the Eurasian migration system are directed toward Russia. However, over time, migration within the Eurasian migration system is becoming increasingly differentiated and multi-vector. Kazakhstan has gradually become a destination for labour migrants from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Central Asian countries are actively seeking new destinations for their labour migrants and, in turn, are becoming destinations for educational migrants. For example, Uzbekistan is establishing relations with South Korea to export its labour force, and labour migrants from Tajikistan are seeking work opportunities in Turkey, South Korea, the UK, the US, and the UAE, and educational migrants from India are discovering Kyrgyzstan. Labour migrants from Moldova have largely reoriented their search for work to countries within the European migration system, and Ukraine, since the start of the Special Military Operation, has become a source of forced migrants heading to Russia and European countries.
Despite all the changes of recent decades, Russia’s demographic trough, as well as its economic attractiveness, the preservation of the visa-free space within the CIS, a common historical past, the status of the Russian language as a language of interethnic communication, and the unification of Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan in the EAEU, are shaping sustainable long-term trends in the influx of labour and educational migrants, as well as permanent residents, into Russia. Despite restrictions on the employment of foreign workers, which are different for Russian regions, an increase in the cost of patents, the introduction of the mechanism of the register of controlled persons, the labour influx into the Russian Federation from the countries of the Eurasian migration system has not stopped and has not radically changed its vector. The introduction of a pilot program using the Amina app to mitigate the limitations of the registration system in areas most acutely affected by labour shortages in the Russian Federation (Moscow and the Moscow region), despite the complexities of its implementation, has become clear evidence of how the economic need to attract foreign workers can remove administrative barriers to their stay. It is also important to note the fatigue of the native Russian population regarding the negative effects of mass labour migration, which is managed with virtually no funding for integration measures, as evidenced by population surveys.
The new Concept of Migration Policy until 2030 significantly differs in spirit from the previous Concepts of 2018 and 2012, and focuses on a shift toward accepting migrant workers without families, effectively limiting their short-term opportunities to settle in the Russian Federation. Initiatives to introduce new barriers to migrant children’s access to Russian schools and to curtail rhetoric at the federal level about the importance of integration programmes for migrant workers are also being developed. At the same time, regions of the Russian Federation (such as Moscow, Moscow Region, St. Petersburg, Leningrad Region, Yekaterinburg, etc.), which receive the main flows of foreign labour, continue, albeit in a very limited form, to engage in migrant integration activities, without completely curtailing them and attracting funds from regional budgets.
Controversial changes in Russia’s immigration policy will largely determine its future within the Eurasian migration system, which is invariably linked to the use of foreign labour. In the short term, Russia is unlikely to be able to abandon the large-scale use of foreign labour. For example, the Ministry of Labour’s personnel forecast shows the need to replace approximately 12.2 million workers in the Russian economy by 2032. This means the need to attract more than 1.5 million workers to the labour market annually, primarily blue-collar workers. Given the demographic situation, the already-underway reorientation toward training local skilled personnel will not significantly reduce the need for skilled migrant workers. This does not diminish the importance of efforts to increase labour productivity, stimulate the birth rate, and reduce mortality, which will have a long-term impact. Efforts aimed at repatriating compatriots, as well as skilled migrants who left the Russian Federation after the start of the Special Military Operation (SMO), also appear relevant.
We should expect a further increase in educational migration, which is due to Russia’s officially stated position to increase the number of foreign students to 500,000 by 2030.
In the medium term, if Russia hopes to reduce its critical dependence on foreign labour, it is necessary to continue the already-underway automation of production, increase labour productivity, and build a support system for mature workers.
In both the medium and long term, the serious shortage of both skilled and unskilled labour in Russia will likely force it to seek new sources of migrants, due to the already depleted migration potential of Central Asian countries, which currently account for three-quarters of labour migration to Russia. Efforts to establish new migration contacts with India are already visible. Ties with Southeast Asian countries, as well as possible cooperation with African countries with significant demographic potential, also appear promising.
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The limited scope of this text does not allow for a full coverage of all migration characteristics of the Eurasian regions, but migration processes are a highly sensitive topic for all countries in the Eurasian region, and there is no single solution to addressing migration issues. One thing is clear: new horizons for a multipolar world are being shaped, in part, by the constantly changing, multi-vector impact of migration processes, and flexible use of migration policy instruments remains an important key to creating an atmosphere of mutually beneficial cooperation and good-neighbourliness throughout Eurasia.
