Often Africa is portrayed in terms of how outsiders perceive the continent’s external relations. This has led to a misalignment in the perceptions that tend to define Africa’s engagements, which echo the global mainstream narrative regarding who the legitimate state actors are in African external affairs. The inside perspective on how African state and non-state actors with agency would themselves pursue global affairs is often muted or relegated to the periphery.
Over time, interests relating to who constitute Africa’s credible international partners have become more about the kind of expectations that continental actors should be pursuing with external powers and whether such engagements represent a good fit in terms of bilateral relationships. Inevitably, the sense one gets from this outsider framing of Africa’s external relations is that most often, the assumption is that African nations cannot make informed decisions about their relationships regarding how to frame their engagements with external actors. What’s most disturbing is that Africa’s decisions regarding its external affairs becomes less about the equivalency of the engagement and more about how to determine who Africa can engage with.
Not only does this lead to a tension between the outsider and insider framing of Africa’s external engagements, it advances the notion that African actors need to consider how such relations will impact on national, regional and continental perceptions. This does not mean that African countries will stop cooperating with those they do not align with ideologically.
One such area where this can be discerned is in the way the image of Russia is characterised within South Africa, which is informed by global dynamics. There are varying degrees of understanding of this relationship, related to the context of elites and their proximity to influencing policy versus the general public and how these two are influenced by which information they choose to access and how it is interpreted. In shaping the image of how Russia is perceived in South Africa, we see the following set of issues as among the factors that define views of the country.
Historical support during liberation struggles
The historical relationship between the ANC and the USSR laid the groundwork for continued diplomatic and economic ties between Russia and South Africa in the post-apartheid era. There is a nostalgia that is associated with the appreciation for support during the liberation struggles of several African countries. The Soviet Union offered military, financial, and political support to countries fighting colonial rule and apartheid, which has informed lasting impressions. Although there was an awareness of Cold War dynamics, the fact that Russia was never a colonial power in the region was largely interpreted as a reflection of its shared commitment to fighting imperialism and to self-determination. The Soviet Union provided military training, financial assistance, and political backing to the ANC and its armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). Many ANC leaders and members living in exile benefited from Soviet support, and went on to form part of a niche elite class in South Africa. They had greater proximity to decision making, including with respect to business and academia, and played a principal role in shaping more nuanced perceptions. However, putting the sentiment of this relationship aside, it is unclear how much the ANC of today knows about Russia.
In 2024, foreign policy featured more prominently than ever in South Africa’s national elections, with the conflict in Ukraine being a high point of reflection and contention for most political parties in how they represented themselves to their constituents through their positions towards Russia. The ANC was heavily criticised for having too much ideological influence over state policy, which impacted much of its relationships with the West.
The rhetoric strikes a particular chord in that 1) the politics of liberation icons may no longer hold the same gravitas in informing public opinion it once did, and 2) foreign policy issues are used to try influence voter behaviour on domestic issues. However, the ANC’s historical relationship with Russia is not reflected in public opinion, as both positive and negative perceptions of Russian influence are close to those of the ANC’s voter base.
Although Moscow has had to work hard to cultivate a positive image of itself through bilateral relations, the actions of the US and Europe have done more to actively shape perceptions of Russia among Africans. The USA and Europe have played important roles in Africans’ development, but many contend that their actions are perceived as exploitative, self-serving, or inconsiderate of the continent’s interests. Russia’s positioning as a counterbalance in great power politics in sensitive areas like military cooperation, trade, and diplomatic support, have shown Russia as a strategic player capable of stepping in to fill power vacuums or gaps left by other global actors. This also finds resonance in South Africa, but in a more conflicting way; discussions and policy debates become caught in the cross winds, where some contend Russia is an unsuitable actor and others see Russia pushing back against the West’s dominance of the international system as its self-proclaimed custodian.
South African sources of media
Communicating international relations to a domestic South African audience, in general, is difficult. In part, this speaks to how foreign policy is domesticated. However, this is also broadly indicative of the sources of information and who has access. South African news on Russia (and international relations in general) is supplemented by international sources from both Western and eastern media sources, though there is a stronger leaning towards Western media like BBC, SkyNews, CNN, Reuters, Bloomberg etc, as opposed to other perspectives, either written in English or translated from Eastern sources.
In addition to South African media reporting on South Africa’s foreign policy engagements, it is generally associated with the government’s lack of alignment with a conventional global consensus. Cultural perceptions of Western media portraying African countries as conflict-ridden, poor, and unstable fuels the desire for alternative narratives. While media outlets like RT International and Sputnik can provide an alternative, their traction is negligible. In the case of the RT, the satellite feed has been discontinued on DSTV satellite TV, due to sanctions, but it can be accessed via the internet.
Of course, South Africa is caught between competing narratives that are more interested in shaping opinions through rhetoric, rather than seeking to inform. This is further complicated by those who access their news via social media platforms. In 2024, the South African Competition Commission found that 77% of survey respondents used social media as a main platform for accessing their news, of which, Facebook, TikToK, WhatsApp, and YouTube were ranked the highest. In addition, most of these users preferred to scroll through and read the headlines and snippets only. This survey was launched as there was a concern that social media sources, guided by the market, may impede, distort or undermine competition regulations.
While this does not confirm the level of knowledge people may have about the news and international relations, the general population does need to be better informed. In a separate survey conducted by Afrobarometer, in 2022, South Africans’ perceptions regarding foreign powers generally declined between 2021 and 2023. When asked how respondents felt about Russia’s political and economic influence over South Africa, 11% believed it was very positive, 13% said somewhat positive, 9% said neither positive or negative, 7% said somewhat negative, and 15% said that Russia’s influence was very negative. However, the most resounding finding was that 42% said they did not know enough to answer.
Interestingly, when respondents in the same survey were categorised along party lines, the figure below shows that Russia’s influence is the same in terms of positive views between the ANC and the EFF (24%) while that of the DA is slightly higher, at 27%, and 3% higher than the figure for the EU. The latter seems to dispel the conventional view that supporters in political parties are homogeneous in their attitudes and align with party ideology and thinking.
Source: Jaynisha Patel (2023): As South Africa looks to Russia, how do citizens see influence of foreign powers? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 66, August 22.
A challenge to the global economic and financial regime
South African elites hold that Russia, in certain ways, poses a genuine challenge to the existing economic and financial architecture. The overreliance on the US Dollar and Euro have created geoeconomic conditions whereby it can be weaponized to influence countries into aligning with the interests of the West. While the EU is more aware that the aggressive use of so-called ‘dollar diplomacy’ may encourage countries to seek long-term alternatives, the US seems to be intensifying financial pressure. Since President Trump’s first administration, Washington has been much more open about its desire to become more inward-looking, and protecting itself as a world dominant actor sent a heavy-handed message to the developing world, which has experienced more unstable interaction with the US dollar. Overnight, the world became a much more expensive place to live in, especially for those who have far less control over such dynamics. Therefore, Russia’s desire to create alternative payment systems has become more relevant. Again, this finds little traction beyond mainstream media or it gets caught in the parochial debates of the elites. Ordinary South Africans may broadly allude to Russia’s role in this regard, though it may seem more reactive.
Conclusion
Broken agreements, inconsistent policies, geopolitical rivalries, and perceptions of unfairness or hypocrisy in international dealings have exacerbated a global trust deficit, where multilateral institutions cannot resolve issues. This is evident in the general decline in South African’s positive opinion of foreign powers, as well as their preference for strengthening a multipolar world order. As South Africa navigates its global engagements, perceptions regarding Russia are caught between how competing agendas see the world through their prisms. South Africa’s domestic perspective of Russia is informed by, on the one hand, by a global narrative that tends to see Russia through the lens of the West’s reaction to Moscow on the one hand, and by South Africa’s desire for the strengthening of the multipolar world order on the other.
At the same time, there is an information deficit about Russia, as most of the way Moscow is portrayed is informed by syndicated global news stories from international media houses. Part of SA’s dilemma regarding Russia is that there a dearth of experts familiar with the country. This has led to a situation where some experts tend to assume their perceptions on Russia are the prevailing public view, while those who seek to balance out how Russia is perceived are considered as enablers and Moscow sympathizers. However, the bigger issue, as noted in the Afrobarometer survey, is the need to have more information that helps to shape the public narrative on how Russia is seen in South Africa, and not just by elites trying to impose their views on ordinary citizens. This is where the context of the global trust deficit becomes part of the competing perceptions regarding Russia’s image in South Africa.
