The ongoing geopolitical crisis has given Algeria a unique opportunity to establish itself on the European gas market, yet the country’s long-term prospects depend on sound strategic planning and its ability to adapt to the European Union’s “energy transition”, argues Alena Lisenkova, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of International Studies at MGIMO University and the Faculty of International Relations at St. Petersburg State University. The author is a participant of the Valdai – New Generation project.
Complications in relations with Russia have fundamentally transformed the structure of the European Union’s energy imports, opening a window of opportunity for previously far less influential players. Norway has, quite predictably, become the new leader in pipeline supplies, moving from second to first place and increasing its share from 38.1% to 50.8%. Although it is not a member of the union, Norway is close to the EU in values, ideology, and geography. Far more noteworthy are the changes concerning Algeria, until recently another comparatively minor player on the European energy market.
In 2022, with its 6% share in EU natural gas imports, Algeria came in fourth–fifth place alongside Azerbaijan; by 2025, it had increased its share to 17.7%. At certain points since early 2022, the figure exceeded 20%, 21%, and even 22%. This allowed the country to rank second in terms of supply volumes, immediately after Norway. In liquefied natural gas, however, Algeria’s achievements are more modest: with 7.4%, it ranked third after the United States (57.7%) and Russia (12.9%). Nevertheless, even here the situation has slightly improved since 2022, with Algeria overtaking Qatar (7.1%) and Nigeria (5.5%).
In her 2022 annual State of the Union address, the President of the European Commission stated: “We [the EU] have diversified away from Russia towards reliable suppliers.” Alongside the United States and Norway, Ursula von der Leyen mentioned Algeria. Yet how promising is this country, and why did it appear on this list—both verbally and subsequently in practice?
It is no secret that the primary reason for the change in the structure of gas supplies to Europe was the crisis in relations with Russia. Prior to 2022, the two sides were linked by stable long-term contracts and reliable infrastructure. In particular, the launch of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline had been anticipated. Earlier difficulties had more often stemmed from moves made by the European Union itself (primarily caused by new regulatory requirements under the revised 2019 Gas Directive) and the actions of certain member states, especially Poland and the Baltic states, as well as the United States (through sanctions), and Ukraine in its capacity as a transit state.
Since February 2022, a series of additional restrictive measures has been introduced against Russia, once the leading supplier. The most severe included the coal embargo (fifth package, April 2022), oil and petroleum products embargo (sixth package, June 2022), and liquefied petroleum gases embargo (twelfth package, December 2023). Natural gas was not initially subject to such comprehensive legal restrictions. However, for political reasons, the overwhelming majority of former routes became unavailable, and TurkStream remained the only fully functioning pipeline. In October 2025 (nineteenth package), the EU went even further by agreeing on a phased rejection of Russian liquefied natural gas by 2027. The termination of pipeline supplies has also been preliminarily agreed, although it will likely be realized by 2028. Meanwhile, Russia’s share in EU pipeline gas imports has already declined significantly—from 38.8% at the beginning of 2022 to 7.8% in the second quarter of 2025, according to the latest published data. In LNG supplies, Russia’s participation has decreased by roughly one and a half times.
Another factor of particular importance for Algeria is the combination of two interrelated circumstances: geographical proximity and developed infrastructure. Like several other Maghreb states, it is separated from continental Europe only by the Mediterranean Sea, with Spain and Italy as the two nearest European countries. Algeria is connected to their networks through three gas pipelines: Maghreb–Europe (to Spain via Morocco, not operational since 2021), Medgaz (directly to Spain), and the Trans-Mediterranean pipeline (via Tunisia to Italy). In this respect, Algeria is unique among African suppliers in terms of both the number and the diversity of operational pipelines. This enabled it to promptly increase supplies at a decisive moment, potentially facilitating the consolidation of its position on the European market.
It should be noted that the Maghreb–Europe pipeline also ceased operations primarily for political reasons—the breakdown of diplomatic relations between Algeria and Morocco—after the contract expired.
Finally, Algeria’s substantial endowment of natural gas must be considered. The country ranks among the world’s top ten producers, accounting for 2.3% of global output, and holds 11th place worldwide in proven reserves. Potential for supplies from other countries with comparable or even larger reserves has been restricted by three key factors: political disagreements (Venezuela, Iran, among others), infrastructure limitations (Qatar, the United States, among others), and domestic consumption priorities (China, Saudi Arabia, among others). This dynamic made Algeria one of the key directions for diversification. In the EU’s view, maximising diversification reflects a move towards strategic autonomy and resilience.
However, Algeria’s prospects on the European gas market face several structural constraints. Chief among them are the 2019 European Green Deal and the 2021 European Climate Law, which together aim to achieve climate neutrality by 2050. Under the European taxonomy, natural gas is recognised as a “transitional” source due to its relative cleanliness and safety compared with coal and oil. Nevertheless, in the long term it too is expected to be phased out in favour of green energy.
Other obstacles for the EU-Algeria energy relationship include rising domestic gas consumption in Algeria, the need for large-scale investment, differing political values, disagreements with certain EU member states—France over colonial history, Spain over Western Sahara—competition from other suppliers such as Azerbaijan, and the hypothetical restoration of EU–Russia relations. Unlike the case of South Africa, which temporarily led coal supplies to the EU before quickly ceding ground to larger players such as the United States, Algeria’s position appears more stable. Given that transatlantic gas pipelines are economically and technically unfeasible, continued tensions between the EU and Russia would mean Algeria competes primarily with regional rather than global players. The latter could rival it in LNG, yet LNG is a less competitive alternative due to capacity shortages, the need for more complex liquefaction and regasification infrastructure, and higher costs. Algeria’s LNG share in EU supplies has also grown less dramatically than its pipeline gas share largely for these reasons.
Thus, the European Union’s firm decision to abandon Russian gas, although do so gradually, has opened a window of opportunity for Algeria specifically, enabling it to emerge as a leader in supplies. On the one hand, a unique political conjuncture has created conditions for Algeria to consolidate its presence on the European market. On the other, the EU’s long-term strategic vision and various domestic challenges act as limiting factors. Algeria faces a lengthy process of internal transformation if it is to firmly establish itself as a key energy partner.
Similar complexities affect the question of Algeria’s growing geopolitical influence. While several Southern European states are becoming increasingly dependent on Algerian energy supplies—enhancing its clout in North Africa and the Sahel—economic influence is not always stable, nor does it automatically translate into political leverage. This is further complicated by competition on the European energy market, infrastructure constraints, and political instability within the African region.
Analysing these trends is essential, as they document the redistribution of global energy flows and shifts in Russia’s traditional export markets. For the international community, this represents a vivid example of the profound transformation of the energy architecture under the influence of political instability, increasing the role of regional players like Algeria.
