Timofei Bordachev, Valdai Club Programme Director, explores the relationship between the Greater Eurasian space and its Middle Eastern segment—engulfed by crisis and instability; this region is bound to Eurasia yet still peripheral to its Sino-Russian core. While the likelihood of a grave threat to Eurasian security emerging from the Middle East is low, the author believes that events unfolding in the Gulf may still come to shape the contours of international order.
The US-Israeli attack on Iran on the final day of winter 2026 has become an event of exceptional importance in the context of the development of contemporary Eurasia and international politics as a whole. Although we cannot yet know what the outcome of the Middle Eastern confrontation will be, the unfolding events already allow us to reconsider a number of the most important issues of regional and global development.
In itself, the situation in the Middle East does not have fundamental significance for global security—it does not create a substantial likelihood of a direct clash of interests between the principal military powers of the modern world. At the same time, Iran’s retaliatory actions, provoked by the United States and Israel, have already led to serious disruptions in the global economy, which may have long-term consequences for the achievement of development goals across a significant group of states, and for the viability of major international projects that until recently were discussed with a high degree of confidence. This is particularly relevant for the countries of Greater Eurasia, many of which are directly connected to the troubled region or are seeking to establish stable economic partnerships with its states.
It is perhaps best to begin by noting that the crisis in the Middle East has a dual relationship to issues of international security and politics in Greater Eurasia. On the one hand, it is undoubtedly an important factor in the development of this vast region for at least two reasons. First, the Gulf region—balancing on the brink of chaos—is connected to the rest of Eurasia through a significant number of political and, especially, economic ties. The countries located there are key suppliers of energy resources to the most powerful economy of Greater Eurasia—China—as well as smaller states wielding less influence on global affairs. Second, the course and outcome of the confrontation between the United States and Iran may have highly contradictory effects on the global agenda as a whole, to which the leading countries of Eurasia are connected either directly or indirectly. This concerns both strategic issues—the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the crisis of international institutions and law—and more conceptual questions—how we understand Greater Eurasia in the modern world, and which aspects of its development are of greatest importance.
On the other hand, the Middle East as a whole, including Iran as an active participant in regional politics, represents a relatively peripheral part of Eurasia and does not create immediate threats to the situation at its geographical core—where the interests of Russia and China genuinely converge. The only conceivable scenario in which such a negative effect might arise would be a descent into complete political chaos in Iran and its surrounding region, which would lead to the spread of such instability into the countries of Central Asia. However, such a scenario appears highly unlikely, since, according to the view of all involved observers, there is not even a theoretical probability of the collapse of Iranian statehood. We can be confident that even adjustments to the country’s internal system will not lead to it posing a threat to its immediate neighbours. In a certain sense, Iran itself serves to “shield” Greater Eurasia from the permanently unstable Middle East.
There can be little doubt that this part of the world will remain, for the foreseeable future, a focal point of international instability. This is due simply to its internal structure, which simultaneously includes a significant group of countries sharing a common language and religion, alongside the State of Israel, which differs radically from its neighbours. The policies of the Arab states of the Middle East inevitably remain competitive with one another, drawing external powers into the region, while Israel, for its part, resolutely fights to preserve its distinct position, implying the ability to impose its interests on its neighbours by force. Iran, in turn, is a Middle Eastern state in terms of the orientation of its principal foreign policy priorities, but Eurasian in that it is organically embedded within a broader space. In other words, the Arab countries of the Gulf or the Eastern Mediterranean can never be regarded as full participants in Eurasian political life—their interests are either localised or lie far beyond Eurasia. Iran, however, whose adversaries include not only Israel but also the Arab monarchies of the Gulf, is capable of participating in broader Eurasian processes of cooperation. This, in fact, explains the participation of the Islamic Republic in organisations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation—the flagship of cooperation in Greater Eurasia.
Now, however, this task must be reconsidered in light of a transforming context. It is evident that the crisis in US foreign policy is leading that power down a path of partially dismantling the very principle of collective governance in addressing the most important issues of security and development. As a result, the world’s wealthiest and most heavily armed state is taking vigorous steps aimed at removing from the global agenda precisely those issues that the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or BRICS might address more effectively than the West. The task facing the leaders of both organisations is to understand in what form global governance can be preserved, and how this corresponds to the interests of their respective countries.
Another crucial issue concerns the position of Greater Eurasia within the system of global economic relations, the strengthening of its internal transport connectivity, and its interaction with the world economy. In recent years, the shared neighbours of Russia and China have clearly sought to diversify their external economic ties, symbolised by the development of the so-called Middle Corridor—running through the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Turkey. However, this route, as well as the North–South direction included in Russia’s plans, is now under threat of declining attractiveness from a security perspective. Should the situation in and around Iran continue to destabilise, there is a high probability of a reduction in the potential of these new transport corridors. This would be particularly likely if, in the future, we witness an escalation of the gradually accumulating contradictions between Israel and Turkey, and if the United States proves unable to contain them effectively.
Overall, the current crisis surrounding Iran demonstrates that Greater Eurasia—even its “core” in the form of the Sino-Russian alignment and the states of Central Asia—requires even more vigorous efforts to strengthen precisely its internal political and economic ties.
