The capture of Raqqa raised hopes for the possibility of developing military success. From this perspective, the well-known formula “no military solution in Syria exists” can only turn into a boring mantra for those who will try to maximize their positions for the future in the time remaining before the final victory over ISIS.
The capture of Raqqa by the troops of the American-led coalition has a serious impact on the further development of the situation in the Syrian conflict zone. The immediate results of the liberation of the city from ISIS* are obvious – the territory controlled by terrorists (now 5-10% of the territory of Syria) has been narrowed even more, the organization is weakened, although it has retained the most prepared militants who can continue relocation to other states. After four months of bombing and shelling, Raqqa was turned into ruins and it will take a lot of money and time to restore the city.
But in addition to the obvious consequences, the conclusion of the operation caused many questions with no unambiguous answers. Participation of regional and global players in the Syrian conflict with their own interests and with their allies on the ground helped transform the long-awaited event into another source of disagreement and uncertainty.
It can be recalled that in the Syrian civil war the Americans prepared and supported a number of irregular military formations, including the Free Syrian Army and armed the Kurdish groups, whose combat missions included the fight against ISIS and the liberation of the territories it occupied. At the same time, they fight against Assad, the government forces and their allies – the Iranian Guards of the Islamic revolution and Hezbollah. According to former US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, almost all the fighters joined the armed groups and everyone was ready to fight against Assad, as well as against ISIS. When the opposition groups, with the support of regional forces and the United States, began to press government troops, the dichotomy of their military objectives did not seem contradictory at all to the “curators”.
The change in the balance of forces after the Russian Aerospace Forces began supporting the government coalition, the successes of the Syrian army and the strengthening of the regime's positions, the creation of de-escalation zones with the active role of the Russian Federation, Turkey and Iran seemed to make the continuation of the opposition’s military resistance increasingly problematic.
Nevertheless, the liberation of Raqqa has become an important marker of possible aggravation of political differences and military clashes. As we know, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who led the assault of Raqqa with US air support, include the Kurdish self-defense units (YPG), which tend to view Raqqa as their future capital. While celebrating the victory, they even deployed the banner of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), which is considered a terrorist organization in Turkey. Its leader, Ocalan, is serving a prison sentence. The Turkish government has always thought that there is a close relationship between the PKK and the Syrian Kurds, and the fact that the capture of Raqqa has led to the strengthening of the position of the Kurds, provokes open resentment of the Turkish leadership.
The US is apparently ready to support the Kurds in their attempts to gain a foothold along the Euphrates River. According to Colonel Ryan Dillon, the Americans help and train the Syrian Democratic Forces and, although they “do not intend to stay in Syria indefinitely,” they believe that there is “something else to fight for.” Ultimately, the posture to strengthen the Kurdish enclave can provoke opposition not only from Turkey, but also from the Syrian government. Moreover, the Syrian Arabs are extremely suspicious of the plans of their Kurdish compatriots. Thus, the negative reaction of the Syrian Arabs who inhabited Raqqa and did not want to fall under the Kurdish administration was quite predictable.
Finally, the capture of Raqqa further exacerbates the struggle for control of the most important resources and facilities. Previously, military campaigns led by the two coalitions were conducted mainly in parallel ways (government forces in the west and opposition in the east), but as the territory was cleared of ISIS and the initiative was developed by the government troops (the capture of Aleppo and Homs) they began to be ever closer, sometimes simultaneously approaching the same objects. This, in particular, refers to operations to establish control over oil fields.
The potential for conflict aggravation increases, as the United States switches from the fight against ISIS, which becomes an increasingly less important factor in Syria militarily, toward the deterrence of Iran, which could lead to further aggravation of the confrontation in Syria.
Despite the concern of experts, in particular, of the former US Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford, who points to the danger of pulling the United States into the “politics of the Syrian civil war,” the military hardly thinks about an exit strategy. The capture of Raqqa raised hopes for the possibility for developing military success. From this perspective, the well-known formula “no military solution in Syria exists” can only turn into a boring mantra for those who will try to maximize their positions for the future in the time remaining before the final victory over ISIS.
* Banned in Russia