In the process of shaping the Eurasian security architecture, it is important to consider that it will only be sustainable and effective if it meets Russia’s national interests, writes Vladimir Nazarov.
In this context, I would like to elaborate on the issue of national interests as a fundamental concept in the theory of international relations and national security.
As a reminder, national interests are the set of goals, needs, and priorities that the state (in other words, the government and society) seeks to realise in its foreign policy. It is important to note that the classics of political realism, such as Hans Morgenthau, Edward Carr, and Raymond Aron, emphasise that national interests relate specifically to the country’s needs externally, and therefore in the areas of foreign policy and international relations. Within the country, public interests serve as such a tool of public administration. Unfortunately, in contemporary political discourse, particularly regarding Russia, there is often a confusion between these two concepts.
It is also important to remember that national interests are based on the specific characteristics of a particular country: its territory and geography, historical experience, national and cultural characteristics, and other factors. Therefore, they are different for each state: they differ for Russia, Switzerland, and the United States, and are based, as already noted, on objective factors. However, the problem and the main difficulty is that, although national interests are objective in nature, they are formulated by political actors. This leads to difficulties and contradictions in their definition, which sometimes give rise to serious political problems.
I would also like to note that the practice of the US National Security Council necessitates that the process of developing American approaches to any international issue should begin with a definition of American national interests applicable to the specific situation under consideration. These current interests, in turn, are based on the country’s fundamental national interests. Therefore, they are clearly articulated in every US strategic planning document, be it the National Security Strategy or the Military Doctrine. It is in this sense that Academician Andrei Kokoshin called national interests the most important instrument of public administration practice.
In view of the above, I am confident that we, too, should begin with this in determining approaches to shaping the Eurasian security architecture.
Let’s examine the current state of this important instrument. In the current Foreign Policy Concept of Russia, the national interests of the Russian Federation are consistent with provisions enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation (protection of the constitutional order, sovereignty, independence, state and territorial integrity), the obligations of the Russian Federation within the framework of the UN Charter and other basic norms of international law (strengthening the legal foundations of international relations), and public interests (protection of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of Russian citizens; development of a secure information space, protection of Russian society from destructive foreign information and psychological influence; protection of the people of Russia, development of human potential, improvement of the quality of life and well-being of citizens; promotion of sustainable development of the Russian economy; strengthening traditional Russian spiritual and moral values; environmental protection and the conservation of natural resources).
The situation is roughly the same with the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation – the basic document for strategic planning in our country. The difference is that in it, national interests are approximately 70% aligned with strategic national priorities, which are the main areas for ensuring national security, and therefore, national interests. Clearly, the former and latter are related to each other in terms of goals and objectives, and therefore priorities should demonstrate the ways and means of realising national interests, not duplicating them.
I don’t want to criticise anyone, as I know from personal experience how difficult and thankless it is to work on such large-scale conceptual documents. But I think it’s clear that the list of national interests of the Russian Federation currently enshrined in law could apply to Russia, Switzerland, and virtually any other country. It doesn’t adequately reflect Russia’s specific needs and aspirations in today’s world. It cannot be used as a practical policy tool.
Second, the creation of a security belt and good-neighbourhood along the perimeter of our borders. This is also a vital interest, stemming from Russia’s unique geographic location and its history, throughout which all wars and invasions have begun with the emergence of a military threat on its borders. The Special Military Operation is no exception. Today, in these difficult times, this goal may seem unattainable. But this is precisely why a strategy is needed – one that enables the long-term achievement of even the most ambitious, seemingly unattainable goals, by consistently and gradually moving toward them through the resolution of intermediate objectives. This interest requires the development of separate programmes and plans, as well as management decisions that ensure policy coordination and accountability among these coordinators.
The third interest is ensuring freedom of navigation on the world’s oceans and the security of key transport routes. Its importance is acutely felt by all of us today.
These are three vital interests, the peculiarity of which is that their protection is ensured by all available means at the state’s disposal, and when these are exhausted, by military means as well.
The fourth interest is preventing the unilateral dominance of a foreign power in the world or in the Eurasian region, which is crucial for Russia. This is an important guideline for our practical policy and a clear signal to both our adversaries and partners.
The fifth interest is ensuring the sustainable development of the Russian economy in the context of fair global economic relations, free from artificial barriers and restrictions.
Finally, the sixth interest is expanding the circle of allies, friends, and partners, cooperation with whom would facilitate the realisation of the aforementioned and higher-priority interests. I believe we should not proudly declare that Russia has no allies, especially when such statements offend some of our friends. The task of the Foreign Ministry is precisely to expand the circle of allies, friends, and partners, and at the same time to strengthen international support for our foreign policy, which is focused on ensuring national interests.
I am convinced that a clear articulation of Russia’s national interests and their open declaration to the international community will provide us with guidelines enabling us to navigate the intricacies of Eurasian diplomacy, remain within our own agenda, not someone else’s, and develop a clear roadmap for shaping a Eurasian security architecture. Russia must be the centre of this architecture, its core – both geographically and politically. A clear understanding of concrete and clear national interests will also allow us to establish “red lines” that are understandable not only to ourselves but, equally importantly, to our partners and adversaries.
