While no imminent breakthrough can be envisaged in the Palestine - Israel conflict, Syria, the Iran nuclear issue or the establishment of a regional security system, there is room for a Russian contribution to improving the security environment in the Middle East in a way that paves the way to peace, writes Ramzy Ezzeldin Ramzy, Deputy Special Envoy for Syria of the United Nations (2014-2019).
When discussing Russia’s role in the Middle East, three salient points come to mind.
First, Moscow’s connection to the region is long-standing, dating back centuries, primarily through Christianity and Islam.
Second, Russia enjoys strong and balanced relations with all the main regional players: the Arab countries, Iran, Israel and Turkey.
Third, cooperation between Moscow and Washington has been the best means of improving the security environment in the region.
First, on Russia’s links to the region.
In addition to the deep cultural and historical links between Russia and the Islamic people that date back many centuries, beginning in the nineteenth century Russian involvement in the Middle East intensified. Initially this took the form of offers of protection to Orthodox Christian communities.During the twentieth century, Moscow supported Arabs in their struggle against colonialism, and then in their conflict with Israel.
Second, on the state of relations between Russia and the main regional players.
Starting in the 1950s, Moscow was able to gradually strengthen its relationship with most Arab republics. Its relations with the monarchies was neither entirely friendly nor overtly hostile. Although the Soviet Union was one of the first countries to recognize the state of Israel in 1948, its relations with Tel Aviv gradually deteriorated due to the latter’s alignment with the West.
The real breakthrough for Moscow occurred in 1955, when the young revolutionary government in Egypt, disappointed by the refusal of the United States to provide weapons, turned to the Soviet Union.
From 1955 until 1972, when Soviet military advisors were asked to leave Egypt, Moscow was able to establish extremely close relations not only with the country, but also with Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Yemen and Libya.
Undoubtedly, Moscow’s support for Arab countries in their conflict with Israel was instrumental in bolstering the Arab position at the international level.
During the same period, Moscow’s relations with Iran, Israel and Turkey were problematic because of the latter countries’ alignment with the West during the Cold War.
After the end of the Cold War, while managing to maintain amicable relations with most Arab republics(albeit with an interlude of some fifteen years in the wake of Egyptian President Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem), Moscow gradually transformed its once frosty relations with the monarchies to a mutually beneficial relationship in numerous areas, including with regards to energy and military cooperation.
Following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Moscow was able to establish better relations with Tehran. Overall relations have improved since then and cooperation has increased, especially with Syria.
After the end of the Cold War, Moscow was also able to forge better relations with both Israel and Turkey. Clearly in the past decade, relations with both countries - with brief interludes- have reached a historic high.
In short, when compared to the Cold War period, Moscow’s overall relations with the key regional actors has markedly improved.
Third, when Moscow and Washington worked together, this had a positive impact on the region. When they worked at cross purposes, they were detrimental to the security of the region.
Regrettably, even when they cooperated, the positive results were ephemeral, falling victim to the global rivalry between the two countries.
A detour in history would be instructive.
The first instance when both countries took similar, albeit apparently uncoordinated, positions was in 1956, when France, Israel and United Kingdom attacked Egypt. As a result, this tripartite aggression against Egypt came to a rapid end, with the armed forces of all three countries made to withdraw from the Suez Canal region and the Sinai Peninsula.
In the subsequent years and in spite of the global rivalry between Moscow and Washington during the Cold War, there were a number of occasions when both countries cooperated on the Middle East.
Although supporting opposite sides in the 1967 and 1973 wars, their cooperation enabled the UN Security Council to adopt resolutions 242 and 338 that brought an end to hostilities and attempted to initiate negotiations, first indirect (in 1967) and then direct (in 1973 in Geneva).
Also after the end of the Cold War, there were numerous instances in the Security Council where their cooperation resulted in the adoption of resolutions on the status of Jerusalem, settlements and the two-state solution.
Cooperation was not confined to the Arab - Israeli conflict, but extended to other issues in the region, most notably the Iran nuclear issue, Lebanon and Syria.
A case in point is that the process that started in 2003 and culminated in 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear program ( JCPOA), would not have not been possible if Moscow and Washington hadn’t seen it in their mutual interest to cooperate.
On Syria, although Moscow and Washington supported opposite sides in the conflict, they were still able to agree in the Security Council on the main documents that continue to define the contours of a settlement in Syria: the 2014 Geneva Communique resolutions 2118 (on the removal of chemical weapons) and 2254 (which laid down the parameters for a political settlement).
The world is in disarray, transitioning from a bipolar system into hopefully what will be a multipolar one. For the past thirty years we have been witnessing disturbing trends. foremost amongst them has been the wanton use of force by Israel against innocent civilians, as witnessed in Gaza over the past year and most recently in Lebanon.
The Middle East has always been an extremely complicated region with multiple interlinked problems. The creation of Israel in 1948 took these complications to a different level. At the heart of it all is the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. However, one should not overlook Israeli occupation of Arab lands in Syria and Lebanon.
None of these problems are easily solvable in the short run, but every effort should be made to prevent a further deterioration and prepare the ground for a settlement when conditions allow.
First, Moscow’s longstanding historical relationship with the region is an advantage. This has always provided Russia with an unrivalled deep and thorough understanding of a region in close proximity to its heartland, with direct implications for its national security.
Second, this important advantage is reinforced by the fact that, compared to the United States, it enjoys good relations with all key regional players. China, the other major power, also enjoys good relations with all regional players, but appears reluctant to engage in any security-related activities, preferring to concentrate on furthering its economic interests.
Third, with the deterioration in relations between Russia and the United States due to the conflict in Ukraine, it is virtually impossible to envisage any modicum of cooperation between both countries on the Middle East in the near future.
However, in spite of the regrettable state of Russia-United States relations, Moscow can still make an important contribution to security and stability in the Middle East, and in the process prepare the ground for the settlement of the problems when cooperation with the US is restored.
Such a role becomes all the more necessary and urgent, given the serious wide-ranging ramifications of the calamitous situation in Gaza, and the recent escalation in Lebanon.
With the war on Gaza, the paradigm for a regional settlement has shifted. It is no longer Arabs/Palestine versus Israel, with the rest of the world divided between bystanders and supporters of one side or the other to different degrees. Now it virtually the entire international community against Israel and a handful of supporters, including the US. However, even that is changing. Suffice it to refer to the resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly since October 2023, the last of which was issued on September 18 when it adopted resolution ES- 10/24 on the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, where only 14 states voted in support of Israel ( 43 abstained and 124 voted in favour).
With the understanding that no real breakthrough in the problems that plague the region is possible until some form ofunderstanding and cooperation between Russia and the US is restored, what can Russia specifically do to improve the security environment in the region?
First, Russia’s relations with Israel have never been better, in spite of what appears to be a temporary setback as a result of the conflict with Ukraine.
Regrettably with the present Israeli government, prospects for a solution to the Palestinian problem, let alone the Israeli occupation of Syrian and Lebanon territories, are close to nil. At most, one can aim for a ceasefire, humanitarian assistance, the establishment of conditions for the people of Gaza to return to their homes, and the rolling back of escalatory measures in the West Bank. Additional high-priority objectives include a rapid halt to Israeli attacks on Lebanon and ensuring the stability of the Israeli- Lebanese border. Russia can contribute to achieving all of these.
Russia needs to convince the present Israeli government and people that they can no longer enjoy the kind of relations they have with Moscow if the present policies continue. In short, a measure of tough love could prove useful. In this regard, one should not underestimate the role of the large Russian diaspora in Israel.
Second, Russia can also make a contribution where it is directly involved, namely : Syria, Libya, Sudan and Iran.
The situations in both Libya and Sudan do not lend themselves to any rapid movement toward a settlement, due to the deep internal fissures that seem to preclude reaching any form of domestic understanding.
Moscow has good relations with all the involved parties, whether they are local or regional, primarily Egypt, Turkey and the UAE. It is also in communication with the local antagonists. It should be able to use this advantage to influence to help at least deescalate tensions.
Syria and Iran are in a category of their own, albeit for different reasons. More importantly, they are linked, by virtue of Ankara and Tehran being major players in Syria.
The issue of the removal of the Iranian and Turkish presence in Syria is critical for the long-term stability of the country, and for that matter,the relations Ankara and Tehran maintain with the Arab countries.
Insofar as Syrian - Turkish relations are concerned, Moscow is in an advantageous position to broker an Adana-plus agreement that would safeguard the security interests of both countries. Moscow can take a number of steps in conjunction with the Arab countries, Iran and Turkey that would bring the situation in Syria closer to a durable settlement.
As the Iranian presence is also a matter of concern to Arab countries, Moscow can also play a role working out an interim arrangement that addresses the concerns of both Arabs and Iranians.
Ultimately a settlement in Syria will only materialise when both Moscow and Washington reach some sort of understanding.
Third, Middle East regional security and nuclear non-proliferation have always been matters of priority for Russia. Russia’s relations with Iran can also be employed to address the security concerns of all regional and international parties. This would be possible by reviving the Five Plus One negotiations with Iran as well as its efforts at establishing a regional security system.
Establishing a regional security system is a complex and lengthy process which will not materialise anytime soon (my article “Towards a Middle East Regional Security Architecture” in Al Ahram Weekly, April 22, 2022).
At present there are two main initiatives. A Russian one that dates as far back as the late 1990s,the latest version of which was presented in 2020. It envisages a sub-regional security system for the Gulf region which would as a second stage be enlarged to encompass the entire Middle East region.
The other is the Negev Forum, spearheaded by Israel with strong support from the United States. The latter envisages a politico-military alliance directed against Iran.
The common denominator of both initiatives is the issue of nuclear non-proliferation. While Iran’s nuclear ambitions pose serious concerns, the more significant threat to regional security is Israel. Any ambition of Iran to possess nuclear weapons can still be thwarted. Israel, on the other hand, is known to possess a nuclear arsenal. Recent events in Gaza and Lebanon indicate that Israel knows no limits in using its weaponry.
Both initiatives have stalled in the past eighteen months.
Also, the latest developments in Gaza and Lebanon have underlined the strong link between Gulf security and overall Middle East security.
It is time to for Moscow to consider reviving its initiative. But this time around, some changes may be necessary to reflect the changed regional security environment resulting from the war on Gaza and its regional ramifications.
Regrettably the disarray that the world is experiencing will be with it for sometime and will, no doubt, cast its shadow on the Middle East. But that is no excuse for paralysis.
While no imminent breakthrough can be envisaged in the Palestine - Israel conflict, Syria, the Iran nuclear issue or the establishment of a regional security system, there is room for a Russian contribution to improving the security environment in the Middle East in a way that paves the way to peace.
