Since the previous Central Asian conference in Tomsk, there have been significant changes in the system of bilateral and multilateral relations in the region. These changes have been prompted by various factors, including internal developments within the five countries, as well as the actions of external actors nearby, such as Russia, China, and Iran, as well as those of states that see Central Asia as a strategic region rather than a daily concern, such as the United States, the European Union, India, and Japan, writes Stanislav Tkachenko, Professor of the Department of European Studies at the St. Petersburg State University, for the 4th Central Asian conference of the Valdai Discussion Club.
The alarming expectations in Russia in the spring of 2023, which were associated with the potential strengthening of Western sanctions and Kiev’s preparations for a counter-offensive in the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions, never materialised. The Armed Forces of Ukraine, despite being equipped and trained by NATO countries, have lost a significant portion of their offensive capabilities in the battles that took place in the Azov steppes during the summer and autumn of 2023. As a result, the ongoing armed conflict in Ukraine has taken on a more static nature, with the Russian Armed Forces increasingly gaining the upper hand.
A year ago, in May 2023, the Special Military Operation (SMO) had a deterring effect on the initiative and resources of the Russian Federation in the Central Asia region. Now, this effect has largely diminished. Russian diplomacy has resumed its activities in the region with a renewed focus on traditional priorities, including integration projects in the economic field, the development of transportation and logistics routes, counter-terrorism efforts, and development aid. Although issues related to the SMO, such as the threat of secondary sanctions against companies from the region that are interested in organizing parallel imports, may have a minor negative impact on some aspects of Russian business, these issues do not significantly impede cooperation between Moscow and the five countries of the region.
Since the end of the last century, the Russian Federation has been trying to put into practice in Central Asia the integration models borrowed from the European Union. Over the past years, some of these models have been quite successfully applied: a free trade zone, a customs union, a single market for goods, services, capital and labour, and a common transport policy. But it is important to emphasise that only in relation to two states in the region (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) were these initiative implemented in parallel by the Russian Federation. The remaining three countries (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) have more than once demonstrated a desire to avoid Russian-promoted joint-projects with the other two.
Today, the “hot economy, cold politics” strategy is being increasingly used by the countries of Central Asia, both in their relations with each other and with neighbouring and distant countries. In the future, it is likely to become crucial for the Russian Federation. The “European model” is based on the priority of individual rights over collective rights, the protection of minorities as well as majority groups, and international integration, including the merger of sovereignties and the establishment of supranational governance structures. Russia has been disappointed with the European model, and is now seeking and implementing other values and institutions in its domestic and foreign policy.
It appears to us that the European model has never been closely aligned with the elite and mainstream groups of society in the Central Asian countries. The region’s integration owes not only to the active efforts of EU institutions, but also to Russia’s post-Soviet conviction that larger actors, primarily in the form of regional integration organisations, should replace sovereign states.
The escalation of the conflict between Russia and the Western bloc in 2014 marked the end of the “Euro-optimist” period in Russian history. This turn has had an impact on the five countries in the region. Today, the pragmatic economic cooperation between Central Asian states combines with a cautious approach to sovereignty and security, which is achieved not through traditional European membership in military alliances, but through participation in amorphous “international forums”, bilateral agreements, and individual partnerships.
In this process, Russia could play the role of mediator in negotiations and guarantor for the implementation of any agreements reached. It has a network of embassies and consulates in Central Asia and is also a member state of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), having proven its ability and willingness to carry out such tasks during the recent unrest in Kazakhstan in January 2022.
Today, membership in established, multilateral intergovernmental organisations is not the only option for regional powers. A review of the agreements signed by Uzbekistan with Russia and other countries reveals that, in practice, the level of engagement between Tashkent and its partners is not significantly different from the current stage of integration within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in terms of ensuring freedom of movement for goods, services, capital, and people, as well as the implementation of complex infrastructure projects such as the regular AgroExpress train service that operates along the Russia-Uzbekistan-Russia corridor. There are indications that Tajikistan may pursue a similar course in its political and economic development by expanding its cooperation outside the EAEU integration framework.