When the air cooled in the Gulf capitals this year, Pakistan’s silhouette loomed larger than ever before. Once regarded as a distant partner, Islamabad has in 2025 quietly transformed into a pivotal actor in the evolving security architecture of the Middle East. This transformation did not occur by chance; it is the result of a convergence between Pakistan’s own strategic resilience and a regional order shaken by war, aggression, and realignments.
The May 2025 war between Pakistan and India was one of those rare inflection points in South Asian history. While brief, it forced observers across the Middle East to reconsider Pakistan’s strategic profile. The conflict demonstrated not only Pakistan’s military preparedness but also its ability to withstand coordinated pressure while avoiding uncontrolled escalation. For Gulf governments already anxious about their vulnerability to external shocks, Islamabad’s capacity to absorb and manage a major-power crisis gave it newfound credibility.
That credibility was quickly translated into policy. On September 17, 2025, Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement in Riyadh, which specified that aggression against one would be treated as aggression against both. The pact institutionalised cooperation in intelligence, joint training, counterterrorism, and defence industry collaboration. While Pakistan has clarified that its nuclear capabilities remain outside the agreement’s remit, the symbolism was unmistakable: Riyadh now views Islamabad as a dependable Muslim-majority partner at a moment when traditional Western security guarantees appear increasingly uncertain.
For Pakistan, the pact was not simply a diplomatic triumph, it signalled an elevation of status. The partnership provided material benefits, energy assurances, investment opportunities, and technology sharing, but, more importantly, it affirmed Pakistan’s return as a co-shaper of Gulf security, not merely a subordinate supplier of manpower.
The shift in perception was reinforced by subsequent events that convulsed the region. Israel’s renewed aggression, culminating in its attack on Qatar, starkly revealed the fragility of Gulf deterrence. If a wealthy, well-armed state under US protection could still be struck, the logic of outsourcing regional security to distant powers appeared unsustainable. Within days of the assault, Gulf policymakers and think tanks began openly debating the need for “intra-regional” and “South-South” defence ties. Pakistan, with one of the Muslim world’s most experienced militaries and a proven nuclear deterrent, naturally emerged as an indispensable partner.
The reverberations extended to Iran as well. The latest Iran–Israel confrontation, which inflicted significant infrastructure losses on both sides, has compelled Tehran to reassess its strategic environment. Long wary of Pakistan’s closeness to Saudi Arabia, Iranian policymakers now appear to see value in Islamabad’s expanded role, provided it remains anchored in a broader multipolar and Islamic framework rather than a purely Saudi-centric axis. The Iran–Israel confrontation has subtly shifted Tehran’s calculus toward its eastern neighbour. Iranian media coverage and official statements have avoided antagonising Pakistan over its defence pact with Riyadh, reflecting a pragmatic recognition that Islamabad’s enhanced engagement could help preserve stability in the Persian Gulf rather than undermine it.
The implications of the Saudi–Pakistan defence pact appear to extend well beyond Riyadh and Islamabad. In Gulf strategic circles, there is increasing speculation that other regional states such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and even Qatar, may seek to associate themselves with or formally join this evolving security framework. Such a development would not only reinforce Pakistan’s role as a legitimate and central actor in Middle Eastern security but could also mark the emergence of a more indigenous, cooperative architecture within the Islamic world.
Interestingly, extra-regional powers seem to view this evolution with quiet approval. China perceives it as complementary to its Belt and Road vision of regional connectivity and stability; Russia sees it as a step toward strategic autonomy for the Gulf that aligns with its own multipolar agenda; and even the United States, while publicly silent, appears to regard it as a burden-sharing mechanism that could enhance regional cohesion without directly challenging its interests. Together, these converging perspectives suggest that Pakistan’s defence alignment with Saudi Arabia may become the nucleus of a broader, multilateral security framework for the Middle East.
Structural realities reinforce these perceptions. The Pakistani diaspora in the Gulf exceeds 4 million, out of roughly 10.8 million Pakistanis living abroad, constituting one of the largest expatriate communities in the region. Their economic contribution is immense: during FY 2024-25, Pakistan received $38.3 billion in remittances, a 27 percent increase from the previous year. Saudi Arabia accounted for $9.34 billion, the UAE $7.83 billion, and the other Gulf states another $6 billion combined. These flows equal roughly 10 percent of Pakistan’s GDP and cover one-quarter to three-fifths of its trade deficit annually. The economic lifeline thus binds Pakistan’s prosperity to the stability of the Gulf and, reciprocally, ties Gulf social stability to the welfare of millions of Pakistani workers.
Alongside this economic interdependence lies Pakistan’s enduring military credibility. Few states in the broader Muslim world possess comparable combat experience. For decades, Pakistani officers have trained Gulf militaries, staffed advisory missions in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha, and contributed to regional counterterrorism. This shared institutional memory underpins the trust that made the 2025 defence pact possible.
The broader global context magnifies this dynamic. As Western influence in the Middle East fragments, regional powers are experimenting with multipolar security arrangements. Pakistan’s strategic geography, linking South Asia, the Gulf, and Eurasia, allows it to function as a connector among China, Russia, and the Arab world. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), offers Gulf exporters overland and maritime routes toward Central Asia and western China, potentially reducing dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. Russia, seeking new economic corridors amid sanctions, sees in Pakistan both a counterterrorism partner and a potential logistical bridge to warm-water access via Gwadar. Together, these linkages situate Pakistan within the emerging “World Majority” framework of cooperative security.
However, Islamabad’s ascent is not without peril. Overextension is a real risk. Domestic political volatility, inflation above 20 percent, and repeated IMF negotiations constrain the state’s ability to sustain external commitments. Over-identification with Riyadh could alienate Tehran, undermining the delicate balance that grants Pakistan credibility on both sides of the Gulf. And while Israel’s aggression has created diplomatic space, an uncontrolled regional escalation could quickly force Pakistan to make choices it would prefer to avoid.
Still, the opportunities outweigh the hazards. By maintaining strategic restraint and offering partnership without partisanship, Pakistan can convert its current visibility into enduring influence. Rather than inserting itself militarily into every crisis, it can serve as a mediator and stabiliser, leveraging its credibility with both Sunni monarchies and Shia Iran. Its voice in multilateral forums such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) could articulate a new language of collective security rooted in the Global South, complementing but not dependent on Western or external designs.
Seen from Riyadh, Doha, Tehran, and even Moscow, Pakistan’s 2025 trajectory represents a quiet but consequential transformation: from a peripheral state exporting labour and security assistance to a core stakeholder in Middle Eastern stability. The May 2025 war proved its resilience, the defence pact institutionalised its partnerships, Israel’s aggression revealed its necessity, and Iran’s recalibration confirmed its legitimacy.
Pakistan’s challenge now is internal, to match strategic opportunity with domestic coherence. If it can sustain political stability and economic reform, Islamabad may find itself performing a role few envisioned a decade ago: that of a bridge between the Arab heartlands and Eurasia, a state whose security and diplomacy reinforce not only the stability of the Gulf but the architecture of a more multipolar world order.
