Valdai Club

Regardless of our attitude toward Armenia’s leaders, their proposed “Fourth Republic” project can be seen as an attempt to deviate from the historical path the country embarked on after the collapse of the USSR. Independence prompted Armenia to question the meaning of its own existence. However, the Karabakh discourse quickly dominated both the domestic life of society and relations with its neighbours: the topic of Nagorno-Karabakh became the cornerstone of Armenia's national identity as an independent subject in international politics.

It can be assumed that this predetermined a series of shocks: internal destabilisation was fuelled by value-oriented narratives, while external challenges compounded the deepening identity crisis, triggering a total transformation and even the collapse of the entire coordinate system within which the republic had previously existed. The intertwining of these two variables undoubtedly set the framework for the ongoing transition, the further trajectory of which will determine the stability and viability of Armenian statehood.

The Civil Contract party's victory in the recent parliamentary elections in June 2026 was entirely expected, yet the results have left a bitter aftertaste. Despite Nikol Pashinyan remaining the least desirable candidate for prime minister, he managed to successfully promote both his own image and that of his party. Against the backdrop of a fragmented opposition and the systematic weakening of pro-Russian candidates, Pashinyan remained virtually the only politician whose governance model voters had already experienced. While far from ideal, voting for other candidates felt more like a step into the unknown.

In this sense, despite the contradictory provisions of the Fourth Republic project and doubts surrounding its implementation, Pashinyan, unlike his opponents, has offered the public a new vision of Armenia, one based not on ideology but on the imperative of state survival. In other words, the foundation of the new concept is peace as such, in contrast to the Third Republic, which, according to Pashinyan himself, was inextricably linked to the logic of conflict and war. From this perspective, Armenia's independence since 1991 appears as an exhausted era, in need of a reconsideration of the fundamental tenets of Armenian statehood. The proposed Fourth Republic, by contrast, presupposes a decisive break with the legacy of the previous elites, not only in the political but also in the symbolic realm. The issue at hand is a re-examination of Armenian history and culture—a rejection of state symbols associated with the previous regime, the dismantling of Soviet and post-Soviet narratives, the demolition of Soviet monuments, and so on. According to the ruling party, all these measures are intended to clear the way for the construction of a new national identity, free from the burden of the past. The proposed republic is a product of its time and circumstances, and the key question here is what has driven the current transformation: the internal maturation of society or the external challenges to which the government is forced to respond?

What happened in 2018 was no accident. It was the result of Armenia's lengthy process of internal development and the evolution of its foreign relations system since the collapse of the USSR. For three decades, the country's post-Soviet history was built around people from Nagorno-Karabakh, who formed the core of the ruling elite. The theme of “miatsum” (the unity of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh) remained the main instrument of its legitimisation and the core of Armenian identity. The events of early 2018 were a direct response to the exhaustion of this model. Society was tired of injustice, corruption, the monopolisation of the economy and politics. However, having come to power on the wave of this demand, Pashinyan had not yet had the opportunity to dismantle the Karabakh agenda itself; otherwise, he would have faced an opposition that could have accused him of betraying national interests.

Had it not been for the 2020 war, the shift away from the Karabakh narrative would likely have occurred more slowly and in a different form. External challenges may not have been a catalyst for change, but they clearly accelerated its implementation. The September 2023 escalation and the final loss of control over Karabakh marked a turning point: Yerevan had no other option but to yield to Baku and build a new status quo on the victorious side's terms. Pashinyan acknowledged defeat in the face of a more powerful neighbour, understanding that the cost of another such mistake for Armenia would be too high.

It is within this logic that constitutional reform forms the core of the Fourth Republic project. It is intended to formalise the rejection of the 1990 Declaration of Independence, which contains a reference to the December 1, 1989, Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR and the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh “On the Reunification of the Armenian SSR and Nagorno-Karabakh.” This step was dictated by a direct demand from Azerbaijan, which views this constitutional provision as grounds for potential revanchism and territorial claims by Armenia. This position has also found understanding in Turkey, further complicating Yerevan's progress toward normalising relations with Ankara. As a result, the Armenian side finds itself in a deliberately asymmetrical negotiating position, consistently making concessions without any guarantee of peace.

This also includes the promotion of the "Crossroads of the World" initiative as the economic component of the Fourth Republic project. Its concept is clear, and the practical interests of the Armenian side are understandable. However, the desire to build good-neighbourly relations and position the country as a transit hub seems, at the very least, premature in the absence of a signed peace treaty, especially since the discussion regarding the Zangezur Corridor (the "Trump route") is far from over. Furthermore, Yerevan is aware of the positions of Iran and Russia, which cannot be thrilled with the prospect of a consolidated American presence in the South Caucasus. Given the combined effect of these factors, it is not yet reasonable to expect Armenia to reap economic dividends by becoming a magnet for foreign investment.

At the same time, Yerevan is actively pursuing a course toward rapprochement with the European Union. This dynamic directly correlates with Armenia's declining trust in Russia. The perception of Moscow's position as “inaction” during periods of military escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh has become deeply ingrained in public discourse in recent years. In this sense, Armenia's pivot toward the European Union is driven less by Armenian society’s European aspirations than by an attempt to fill the security vacuum created by the de facto loss of Nagorno-Karabakh. Demonstrative summits in Yerevan, meetings with European leaders, and rhetoric of commitment to European integration serve a largely symbolic function. Nevertheless, Pashinyan and his party have skilfully integrated the arrival of European politicians into the electoral narrative, presenting it as evidence of growing international recognition and confirmation of the validity of their chosen course. Importantly, behind this façade, neither security guarantees nor substantive dialogue on military-political cooperation are visible. This is the fundamental difference between the European vector and the format of interaction with Russia. Moscow, despite all the costs of an alliance, still has direct military-political obligations, whereas the EU offers no such mechanisms.

It seems that Nikol Pashinyan's Fourth Republic project cannot be reduced to the logic of purely internal development or to a mechanical response to external factors. Its origins undoubtedly lie in the exhaustion of the previous model of statehood, but the project acquired its current shape under unprecedented external pressure (military, political, and economic). Armenia has found itself embroiled in a process of profound transformation that is outpacing the formation of a coherent social consensus, which will continue to fuel strong political polarisation. Armenia's viability will depend on whether Armenian society and its leadership succeed in reconciling the state's survival under current conditions with the need to find a new identity.