Mutual desire to strengthen security is justified in the context of the growing Iranian-Israeli confrontation. If the Jewish state manages to draw the Islamic Republic into a direct war, the Arabian monarchies are unlikely to be able to stay on the side-lines, Dmitry Polyakov writes.
Amid the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which over the past year has gone far beyond its geographical boundaries and taken the form of an Iranian-Israeli standoff, the opposite process is taking place in the Middle East – the normalisation of relations between former rivals. The trend is characteristic to varying degrees throughout the region, but it is most clearly visible in the Persian Gulf area. The latest example is the process of restoring ties between Bahrain and Iran. Fear of a regional war and a common desire to avoid being drawn into one, where the Gulf states would have to act on opposite sides, have given new impetus to a process that was launched several years ago.
It is important that at the current stage the countries of the region are gradually moving away from the bloc confrontation that was characteristic of the 2010s, when the Middle East was engulfed in the crises and conflicts that arose after the Arab Spring. Regional conflicts, which used to be system-forming and were the basis of bloc confrontation, have lost their former significance. Today, the term “cold war in the Middle East”, which implies direct and indirect confrontation between Iran and its “Axis of Resistance” allies, on the one hand, and the Arabian monarchies and their allies, on the other, has practically fallen out of use. Moreover, the very model of their relations has undergone significant changes. Of course, the former rivals did not become friends over several short years. However, they have moved to adopt the principle of peaceful coexistence, which also includes discussing and developing a regional security system.
The process of restoring ties between Iran and Bahrain also corresponds to this trend. The parties broke off diplomatic relations in 2016. Although a formal reason was given, in reality the rupture was determined by the general logic of bloc confrontation, where Manama clearly followed in the wake of the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The current warming in relations, on the contrary, is associated with a general trend towards de-escalation in the region. Statements about readiness for normalisation, the development of its possible modality and search for mediators in extra-regional actors – all this demonstrates the desire of the parties to achieve success in the designated matter. It is important that several circumstances are driving this process simultaneously.
Mutual desire to strengthen security is justified in the context of the growing Iranian-Israeli confrontation. If the Jewish state manages to draw the Islamic Republic into a direct war, the Arabian monarchies are unlikely to be able to stay on the side-lines. First of all, this is due to the presence of American military facilities on their territories. For example, the headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet is located in Bahrain. But the nations that signed the Abraham Accords with Israel in 2020, including Manama and Abu Dhabi, may be especially vulnerable. In addition, as part of the normalisation process with the Jewish state, Bahrain signed with it a memorandum on mutual understanding in the field of security.
It is noteworthy that the Abraham Accords themselves were concluded at the end of the bloc confrontation in the region. In the 2010s, one of the key trends in the development of the Middle East subsystem of international relations was the consolidation of actors which were opposed to Iran. Therefore, the Jewish state was seen as another provider of security services.
Iran, as one of the leading powers of the Middle East, in the current conditions seeks to transfer the rivalry in the Gulf to a new format that will not require the use of the resources and forces characteristic of the previous bloc confrontation. In addition, it is important for Tehran to reduce the level of threat near its borders in order to effectively respond to challenges emanating from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict zone. For Iran, it is necessary to maintain military cooperation between Bahrain and Israel at the initial level. It is especially important for Manama to limit interaction with the Jewish state within the framework of the American integrated system of air and missile defence in the Middle East, while the project itself continues to remain amorphous. It is noteworthy that during Iran’s first direct attack on Israel on April 13, 2024, air defence and missile defence systems deployed in some Arabian monarchies participated in the interception of Iranian missiles and drones, and also provided information about the start of their launch.
The next circumstance is the impact of the external environment. It is important that the other actors in the Persian Gulf have a positive attitude towards the establishment of relations between Manama and Tehran. The restoration of their ties is part of a comprehensive regional détente process, which includes the general Arab-Iranian rapprochement and, in particular, the Iranian-Saudi detente. This means that other states involved in the general regional process are pushing the two antagonists to achieve progress.
In addition, the Gulf monarchies are seriously concerned about the possibility of a regional war between Iran and Israel. Today, the GCC members tend to remain equidistant from potential participants in the conflict. This position implies some distancing from the Jewish state, but at the same time increasing diplomatic contacts with the Islamic Republic. Especially after the IRI’s strikes on Israeli targets, the Arabian states noted that they consider interaction with Tehran the best defence against the Iranian arsenal. Iran, in turn, has also stepped up interaction with the GCC countries and received from them assurances of neutrality in the event of a direct conflict with Israel.
Meanwhile, there are serious obstacles to normalisation. First of all, the problem of bilateral relations has not yet been resolved. Manama fears that Tehran will again use the religious factor and its ties with the Bahraini opposition as a tool to put pressure on the kingdom. For Iran, on the contrary, it is important that the Shiite opposition be included in the political life of Bahrain.
Another significant obstacle is the military component, or more precisely, how countries resolve their security issues. In the absence of formalised military alliances or unions, Iran has relied on cooperation with various non-state actors (NSAs) within the framework of the “Axis of Resistance” project. It is noteworthy that Tehran uses Bahrain’s NSAs in its confrontation with Israel, which irritates the kingdom’s authorities. Bahrain, as a small state that does not have its own resources to maintain its defence capability, uses security services provided by external actors, mainly the United States. The downside of such cooperation is the need to participate in various American military initiatives. For example, in Operation Prosperity Guardian against the Yemeni Houthis, which caused a negative reaction in Iran.
But, most importantly, there is no “golden age” in the relations between the two countries that Manama and Tehran could use as a basis. On the contrary, the history of their relations is characterized by numerous conflicts, crises and mutual claims. Therefore, it will be very difficult to build a dialogue without taking the past into account. Moreover, the parties are unlikely to quickly win each other’s trust. If such an issue is even on the agenda, and normalisation is not explained only by the current situation.