The most important political task facing those who are sincerely committed to fostering joint development and cooperation in Eurasia is interaction with external factors which cannot be completely excluded, even theoretically. This means that even while successfully developing interaction between Russia and Eurasian partners in the South and East, we cannot forget about Europe or the United States, whose capabilities remain quite significant. Moreover, practice shows that it is only possible to create a cooperation zone that is relatively closed to external influence by ensuring that the interests of its states are opposed to all the others. Or by subordinating their development to the will of one of the participants in the process.
Both seem impossible in Greater Eurasia. First, because its states are truly not interested in any kind of comparative self-isolation from the outside world. Second, because it is impossible for a hegemonic country to emerge in Greater Eurasia that is truly ready to make sacrifices for the sake of political influence in such a significant space. Finally, no one wants Eurasia to be torn away from the global economy, where the presence of the US, Europe or the Middle East will remain significant, if not decisive. Given rigorous international competition, most medium or small countries objectively need to maintain access to the maximum number of opportunities provided by general market openness.
History so far knows only one example of the creation of a closed community of states that set themselves the goal of joint development — this is modern Europe, which created a unique mechanism for European integration. This association was created in very special historical conditions, obeyed the rules developed for these conditions, and developed quite successfully over a long period of time. In a sense, the definition of Europe as a “blooming garden”, proposed a couple of years ago by the hapless head of foreign policy of the European Union, really reflects the nature of this phenomenon.
But we see that in the end it did not lead to anything good. Having found itself in an acute foreign policy crisis, modern Europe was not ready for it. Its special relationship with Russia, a gas pipeline stretching from the “jungle” to the “blooming garden”, was easily interrupted by the efforts of God knows who. Now, three years after the crisis around Ukraine entered the military-technical phase, Europe has found itself completely economically dependent on the USA, quite freely invading the European economic space over all sorts of barriers established at the level of secondary legislation of the European Union. This final failure in achieving economic autonomy has been accompanied by internal political upheavals. Now the European Union is no longer a single community, even if maliciously disposed towards the outside world, but a collection of political players of varying weight, weaving fierce intrigues against each other. In other words, the path of building a community protected from the outside world by aggressive regulation has shown itself to be a dead end and cannot be considered an example for Eurasia. It is very good that within the framework of the comparatively small and less ambitious Eurasian Economic Union, Russia and its partners did not follow this path.
An alternative to such a failed solution could be the creation of a community of joint development, where a certain wise hegemon would guide participants down a path. Within the framework of what is commonly called the collective West in Russia, the United States, for example, has long claimed such a role. However, we now see that the costs for the leader itself have already exceeded the estimated gains, and American voters have selected a candidate who is a supporter of a radical reduction in investments in so-called global leadership. In the Greater Eurasia space, some observers seriously consider China, which shows the most convincing examples of economic achievements, as a contender for the position of the dominant power, and not only in traditional areas, but in such important areas for the modern world as modern information technology and artificial intelligence.
There are, however, fundamental doubts that the implementation of such a mission by China is possible even theoretically. First, the nomination of a leader is required by those communities that are going to enter into a struggle with the rest of the world. For the West, this is a traditional way of behaving and organising the entire surrounding space. For China, as well as other Eurasian countries, this is not a preferable option for the future. Second, there are at least three powers in Greater Eurasia that are relatively comparable in strength and foreign policy ambitions: Russia, China, and India. It is difficult to imagine that one of them would be ready to risk absolutely everything in order to arrange everything within the largest continent on the planet “for itself.” The lack of such ambitions has, in fact, already led to the success of organisations like the SCO or BRICS, when it comes to cooperation on a global scale. And finally, China, like Russia and India, simply cannot have the desire to take responsibility for such a huge region — this would deal an irreparable blow to their own ability to develop. Thus, the leadership model of closed cooperation, like the isolationist one, seems completely impossible.
It would be even stranger to seriously talk about the fact that the countries of Eurasia, including the largest and most powerful of them, are ready to tear themselves and the region away from the world economy, with all its benefits and opportunities. This is especially true, considering that over the past few years, it has really demonstrated a very serious ability to adapt to political challenges — even the “hurricane” of US and European sanctions against Russia did not result in a serious blow to international trade. In turn, the global economy is an area where the presence of the US, Europe and the Middle East will remain significant, if not decisive. We may not like them all from a political point of view, but they contribute to the global market, create technology and simply trade. Considering that the resources available for development purposes in the world are becoming fewer, and the number of “consumers” is not decreasing, most medium and small countries objectively need to maintain access to the maximum number of opportunities provided by general market openness. Moreover, it is the large countries of Eurasia — Russia, China, and India — that are even more interested in remaining part of the global economy and trade. They have the resources to develop transport and logistics systems, and will certainly use them when favourable circumstances arise.
Thus, when thinking about how to inflict the most sensitive defeat on Europe in its history, to deprive the leading European countries of the ability to actively harm the development of Russia and other Eurasian states, we should not forget that it will be difficult to completely fence ourselves off from Europe; it will most likely be impossible. We need to think, and discuss with Eurasian partners and like-minded people how to reduce the damage from the European or American presence, and also to extract certain benefits from it, without creating temptations for external players to confidently contribute to the internal split in Eurasia.
