Finland’s accession to NATO put an end to the country’s famed neutral course in international affairs and accelerated a destructive loop of mutually reinforcing hostility with Russia. Nikita Lipunov details the securitization of Russia in Finnish policy discourse, highlighting the dangers and drawbacks of Helsinki’s new approach to relations with Moscow.
The year 2022 marked a turning point in Russian–Finnish relations. For decades after the Second World War, the two states had built their relations in the spirit of good neighbourliness and actively developed cooperation in a wide range of areas, from icebreaker construction and environmental protection in the Arctic to tourism and academic mobility. Following the escalation of the Ukraine crisis, Finland witnessed a rapid and far-reaching intensive securitisation of Russia. This trend continued and even intensified after Finland joined NATO. In July 2026, amendments to the nuclear energy legislation came into force, paving the way for stationing nuclear weapons in the country’s territory. What is behind Helsinki’s persistent perception of insecurity?
During the Cold War, Finland maintained military and political neutrality while developing multifaceted cooperation both with the Soviet Union and with Western countries. After joining the European Union in 1995, Helsinki announced its transition from neutrality to “military non-alignment”, justifying this by its membership in a political union of European states. The question of NATO membership remained central to discussions on Finland’s security policy for decades. Given the low level of public support for membership and the stable military and political situation in the region, Finland’s leadership chose a “middle path” in order not to provoke increased tensions in relations with Russia. By retaining the hypothetical possibility of joining NATO (the “NATO option”), Helsinki gradually developed military and political ties with the Alliance. In 2014, Finland acquired the status of an “enhanced opportunities partner” of NATO, while remaining de jure outside the scope of the collective defence clause. Guided by the doctrine of “national defence”, Finns maintained a relatively high level of military readiness throughout these years.
The beginning of the Ukraine crisis—and, more broadly, the crisis of European security—in 2014 did not radically alter Finland’s perception of its eastern neighbour. Helsinki joined the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and partially reduced contacts with Moscow, but political dialogue and economic cooperation continued. The situation began to change at the end of 2021, when Russia categorically raised the issue of preventing NATO’s eastward expansion, which implied Finland’s non-aligned status. After the start of the special military operation in Ukraine, public support for NATO membership in Finland rose to almost 80 per cent, and the country’s leadership began substantive discussions about the need to join the Alliance. In May 2022, Finland and Sweden jointly submitted their applications, and in April 2023 Finland officially became the bloc’s 31st member. Elected in 2024, President Alexander Stubb proclaimed a new Finnish foreign policy doctrine—“value-based realism”—which presupposes a bloc affiliation, strong national defence capabilities, and commitment to Western values of “democracy, the rule of law, and human rights”.
The qualitative transformation of Finland’s military and political course since 2022 has been accompanied by intensive militarisation and securitisation of Russia in Finnish policy discourse by the country’s leadership and leading media outlets, particularly with regard to hybrid threats.
Having abandoned military non-alignment, Helsinki began an accelerated integration into the Alliance’s system. In 2023—even before formally joining NATO—Finland began constructing a 200-kilometre fence along its border with Russia. At the end of the year, it closed the border entirely, citing a “hybrid operation by Moscow” that had allegedly triggered a migration crisis at several border crossings. Later that same year, Finland signed a defence cooperation agreement with the United States, granting US forces unhindered access to 15 military facilities on Finnish territory. In 2024, Helsinki joined NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence programme, agreeing to host a Swedish-commanded contingent in Lapland, and also announced the creation of NATO’s land forces headquarters for Northern Europe in Mikkeli, close to the Russian border. In 2025, Finland initiated withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention on the prohibition of anti-personnel mines in order to have the legal possibility of mining sections of its eastern border. In 2026, the Finnish government submitted a bill to parliament aimed at allowing nuclear weapons to be stationed in the country’s territory, something prohibited by the 1987 Nuclear Energy Act. According to Defence Minister Antti Häkkänen, this was necessary to bring Finnish legislation into line with the rules of other Nordic countries and NATO as a whole. The amendments entered into force on July 1.
The current Finnish leadership actively securitises Russia and perceives it as an “expansionist and imperialist power”. According to President Stubb, Moscow “understands only the language of force”, while Prime Minister Petteri Orpo has repeatedly described Russia as an “unchanging threat” to Europe as a whole “in the long term”.
The peak of the escalation of the “Russian threat” came with the Eagle S vessel case at the end of 2024. The ship was detained on suspicion of intentionally damaging the EstLink 2 underwater cable and, according to Finnish authorities, was linked to Russia’s “shadow fleet”. After several months of investigation, Russia’s involvement in the incident could not be proven. The absence of a “Russian trail” was confirmed even by the head of Finland’s Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO), who noted that underwater cables in the Baltic Sea had been damaged periodically in the past as well, but that these incidents had not constituted acts of sabotage. At the same time, the Eagle S case was unequivocally presented by politicians and the media as “Russian sabotage” and was used by NATO as a pretext for launching the “Baltic Sentry” mission. It involves intensified patrolling of the Baltic Sea to protect underwater infrastructure and was reasonably perceived by Russia as a threat to the security of navigation in the Baltic.
In 2022, the decisive argument in favour of NATO membership was the issue of legal security guarantees from the Alliance, which, according to Finnish politicians, were supposed to “strengthen security”. If membership in the North Atlantic Alliance truly strengthened the sense of security among the country’s leadership and population, why has intensive securitisation of Russia continued in Finland after NATO accession?
NATO accession undoubtedly opened up new opportunities for Finland’s militarisation; however, membership in a military bloc per se does not necessarily lead to increased securitisation. The dynamics of militarisation and securitisation in Finland after 2023 demonstrate that NATO membership is merely a link in the “securitisation spiral”—its multiplier, but not its root cause. The driving force behind this process is the perception of threats characteristic of a small state, shaped by the strategic culture of “republican realism”. It implies that Finland seeks to prevent any single power from establishing dominance within the regional and pan-European security system—in other words, to achieve military and political deterrence of Russia.
Nevertheless, one should not forget the “axiom” of Russian–Finnish relations—geography. And, as history teaches us, interstate relations are never static. President Stubb’s statements on the need to resume relations with Moscow indicate the transitional nature of the current confrontation, but how long it will last remains an open question. The situation is further complicated by the diametrically opposed visions of post-conflict settlement and Ukraine’s role in the future regional security system. Helsinki, extending its approach to ensuring national security to the European level, categorically insists on Ukraine’s full integration into the EU and NATO in order to “contain Russia” in the future. This demonstrates a profound misunderstanding of Russia’s strategic interests. Moreover, Finland has forgotten the constructive role it played in the 20th and early 21st centuries by acting as a “bridge” between Russia and the West.
