The evolution of the Russian approach to Africa in the official conceptual documents of the Russian Federation underwent significant changes in the 1993-2023 period. A qualitatively new stage in modern Russian foreign policy is reflected in the current Concept of 2023, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Oleg Barabanov.
In recent years, Africa has become one of the most important priorities for Russia’s foreign policy. This is due to the similar national interests of Russia and many African countries as well as their common views on the value system in the modern world and the peculiarities of the global geopolitical situation.
The first Russia-Africa summit was held, as we know, in 2019, and the second one followed in 2023. In connection with the preparation for these events, and then the implementation of their decisions, a fairly powerful campaign was launched in Russia to strengthen partnerships with the states of the African continent. At the same time, especially in 2019, the thesis of “Russia’s return to Africa”, which “left” the continent after the collapse of the Soviet Union, was quite popular. However, this thesis was disputed by a number of well-known Russian Africanists. In particular, Vladimir Shubin published an article on the Valdai Discussion Club web site and stated, that Russia, the heir of the Soviet Union, had never left Africa.
In any event, it’s interesting to trace the evolution of approaches to African states in the main conceptual documents that have determined the nature of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy.
The main provisions of the first Concept of the Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy were approved by President Boris Yeltsin on April 23, 1993. It devoted a fairly large section of 6 paragraphs to Africa. It should be noted that, ironically, it was a far more detailed official presentation of Russian approaches to Africa than subsequent Concepts of Russian Foreign Policy up to 2023. Of the geographic regions highlighted in separate sections in the 1993 Concept, Africa was in seventh place out of eight (after the CIS, the USA, Europe, the Asia-Pacific, South and West Asia and the Middle East, and only ahead of Latin America). There is a certain symbolic stereotype that the higher a region is placed in the Concept, the more significant a priority it is for Russia. Naturally, this symbolic order should not be overestimated, but nevertheless, Africa’s penultimate place is quite indicative (and this will be the case for quite a long time).
There is another symbolic stereotype, that if a state is named separately in the text of the Concept, this also indicates its significance. In this regard, the 1993 Concept turned out to be a record-breaker: 68 countries were listed separately in it, and subsequently there were significantly fewer. Of these, 10 African states were named separately. This is also a record, and later on individual African countries would be listed either in very small numbers or they won’t be named at all.
The basis for interaction between the new Russia and Africa in this Concept was directly proclaimed to be the “de-ideologisation of interstate relations” and the rejection of “military-political bias”. In general, the 1993 Concept in relation to Africa was, in our opinion, super-pragmatic. It focused on relations “with those states that are a promising market for the acquisition of Russian products (South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, etc.), as well as suppliers of unique goods or raw materials we need (Guinea, Ghana, Madagascar, Côte d’Ivoire, Zaire, Zambia, etc.).” We can note that much later in the Russian foreign policy discourse, a similar approach, already applied to Western countries, would be called neo-colonialism. Among the tasks is also mentioned the activation of economic relations with the most industrially developed countries of Africa in order to promote economic reform in the Russian Federation. Interaction with African states should be “used as a lever to encourage them to repay their debt to the former USSR, including through reinvestment, resale of debt obligations, etc.” Here, too, the super-pragmatic attitude was reflected in the open text, although usually such intentions are not put forward in public documents. This sharply contrasts with the subsequent course of the Russian Federation to write off the debts of African countries. Another point of the 1993 Concept reads as follows: “Rethinking the nature of relations with African states presupposes the optimisation of cooperation in the military sphere. The discussion should be about transferring the remaining ties to a commercial basis.” In general, Russia’s African policy was supposed to be transferred “to a new basis” and the emphasis shifted to “countries that had previously remained outside our sphere of influence.” At the same time, the entire pathos of the rejection of the Soviet legacy in the 1993 Concept is immediately linked, through dialectical self-denial, to the fact that “decades of multifaceted relations with many states of the continent have provided us with certain positions and reserves.”
The next Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation was adopted under Vladimir Putin on June 28, 2000. With regards to Africa, it differed sharply from the previous one in almost everything except one: Africa again found itself in the penultimate place in the list of regional areas, ahead of Central and South America. In contrast to the detailed (albeit cynically and super-pragmatic) text of 1993, only one short paragraph was devoted to Africa. It stated that Russia “will expand interaction with African states, and promote the earliest possible settlement of regional military conflicts in Africa.” But elements of the super-pragmatism of the previous period remained here: “It is also necessary to develop a political dialogue with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and subregional organisations, and use their capabilities to connect Russia to multilateral economic projects on the continent.” Not a single African country was mentioned separately in the 2000 Concept (a total of 19 states were named, another contrast with 68 countries in 1993).
The next Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation was approved by President Dmitry Medvedev on July 15, 2008. Africa is again in penultimate place among with regional areas, ahead of Latin America. Three African countries are mentioned separately (out of a total of 46): Egypt, Algeria, and Libya, although this was not done in the African section itself, but in the section on the Middle East and North Africa. It is noted that Russia is “determined to further develop relations” with these three countries. The section on Africa is a single paragraph, which in many ways repeats almost the entire previous text of 2000. It is only added that Russia will conduct dialogue with African countries within the framework of the G8.
After Vladimir Putin returned to the post of President in 2012, among the so-called “May decrees” was the decree on “Measures to Implement the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” of May 7, 2012. It set tasks for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs similar to the wording of the Foreign Policy Concepts. In this decree, Africa was behind Latin America in the list of world regions. Not a single African country was mentioned separately (a total of 13 were mentioned). The paragraph of the decree dedicated to Africa differed from the texts of the Concepts of 2000 and 2008. It included the wording that it was necessary to “develop traditionally friendly ties with Africa”, which had not been the case before, but this had to be done “for the purpose of further promoting the geopolitical and economic interests of the Russian Federation”, i.e. the pragmatism of the approach was preserved.
However, contacts with the African Union and subregional associations were proposed to be developed not for the purpose of involving Russia in economic projects, as was the case in the Concepts of 2000 and 2008, but for “solving the problems of Africa’s development”. This constitutes a more inclusive approach. The Decree instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to prepare proposals for a new Foreign Policy Concept.
It was approved on February 12, 2013. Africa again ranked last in the list of regions. While 33 countries were mentioned separately, not a single African one was among them. The paragraph devoted to Africa in the 2013 Concept for the first time contained virtually no traces of pragmatism in Russia’s economic interests. It sounded as neutral and inclusive as possible: “Russia will expand multifaceted cooperation with African states on a bilateral and multilateral basis, with an emphasis on improving political dialogue and promoting mutually beneficial trade and economic cooperation, and will facilitate the resolution and prevention of regional conflicts and crises in Africa. An important component of this line is the development of partnership relations with the African Union and subregional organisations.”
A new Foreign Policy Concept was approved by Presidential Decree on November 30, 2016. The paragraph on Africa almost completely repeated (with the exception of a number of editorial changes) the 2013 text. Africa was again in last place in the list of regional areas, and again not a single African country was mentioned separately (there were 32 in total).
This situation changed with the new Foreign Policy Concept currently in effect, which was published on March 31, 2023. The dramatic change in the geopolitical balance of power in the world after 2022 caused Africa to rise quite high in the list of regions for the first time. Africa took sixth place out of ten, behind the Near Abroad, the Arctic, the Eurasian continent (with China and India), the Asia-Pacific region, the Islamic world and ahead of Latin America, the European region, the United States and “other Anglo-Saxon states”, and Antarctica. The United States and Europe were put below Africa in this list for the first time, symbolically signifying a change in priorities. For the first time since 1993, the section on Africa was given not just one short paragraph, but a fairly detailed text of five sub-items. The preamble of this section also focused for the first time on solidarity and values: “Russia is in solidarity with African states in their desire to establish a more just multipolar world and eliminate socio-economic inequality, which is growing due to the sophisticated neo-colonial policies of a number of developed states towards Africa. The Russian Federation intends to promote the further development of Africa as an original and influential centre of global development.”
Further, certain ideas were specifically disclosed: support for sovereignty and independence, assistance in conflict resolution, strengthening cooperation in various areas, including through the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum, created at the first summit in 2019, increasing trade and investment volumes, developing ties in the humanitarian sphere, as well as protecting traditional spiritual and moral values. Thus, a fairly detailed program of Russia’s actions in Africa was given, which differed both from the correctly inclusive, but very general (and if desired, one could say about nothing) paragraph of 2013-16, and from the search for its own economic benefit in 1993-2012. Of the 18 countries mentioned separately (far fewer than the 32 countries in the previous Concept), one African country was mentioned – Egypt. However, it was named in the section on the Islamic world rather than Africa.
In general, we see that the evolution of the Russian approach to Africa in the official conceptual documents of the Russian Federation underwent significant changes in the 1993-2023 period. A qualitatively new stage in modern Russian foreign policy is reflected in the current Concept of 2023. Its provisions at the political and normative level were detailed in the general declaration and action plan following the second Russia-Africa Summit.
