India's engagement with Eurasia through connectivity projects represents one of the most significant strategic recalibrations in contemporary international relations. As global trade routes face unprecedented disruptions and geopolitical tensions reshape the world order, India's approach to Eurasian connectivity has evolved from tentative economic engagement to assertive strategic positioning. The Indian perspective on these projects reflects a complex interplay of historical connections, contemporary geopolitical pressures, and future economic aspirations.
Strategic Foundation: From Extended Neighbourhood to Continental Power
India began to see Eurasia, especially Central Asia, as part of its extended neighbourhood more clearly after the Cold War ended. This shift gained momentum when the region started being described as the arena of a ‘New Great Game’, drawing renewed global attention. For India, this marked a significant change in foreign policy: from a traditional focus on sea-based trade to a stronger interest in the continental heart of Asia. Theoretically, the Indian perspective on Eurasia can be better understood through the lens of Halford Mackinder’s Heartland theory, which suggests that whoever controls this central region of the continent can shape global power dynamics.
The launch of India's "Connect Central Asia" policy in 2012 represented the formalisation of this strategic vision. Unlike China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which India perceives as a policy with ‘hegemonic designs’, the Indian approach emphasises sovereignty-respecting connectivity based on “universally recognised international norms, good governance, rule of law, transparency, and equality”. This philosophical divergence reflects India's broader strategic autonomy doctrine, wherein connectivity projects serve not merely economic purposes but also function as instruments of geopolitical balance.
The INSTC: India's Strategic Corridor to Eurasia
The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) represents the cornerstone of India's Eurasian connectivity strategy. This 7,200-kilometre multimodal network, which connects Mumbai to St. Petersburg via Iran and the Caspian Sea, exemplifies India's vision of alternative trade architecture. From the Indian perspective, the INSTC offers multiple strategic advantages: reducing transit time by 40% and costs by 30% compared to traditional Suez Canal routes, whilst simultaneously providing geopolitical leverage against Chinese dominance in Central Asia.
Recent developments have enhanced the INSTC's viability significantly. The completion of the Rasht-Astara railway line in Iran, funded by a $1.7 billion Russian loan, would make for a crucial "missing link" in the corridor's infrastructure. In 2024, the transportation volume along the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) grew by 19%, reaching an estimated 26.9 million tons, according to data from the Russian Ministry of Transport and the Directorate of International Transport Corridors demonstrating the corridor's operational potential. This progress aligns with India's broader strategy of creating alternative trade routes that reduce dependence on Western-controlled maritime passages.
Chabahar Port: Gateway to Central Asia
Since connectivity through Pakistan is not possible, India has become effectively land-locked. Therefore, New Delhi's development of Iran's Chabahar Port through a recently signed 10-year agreement worth Rs 4 billion rupees ($45 mln) represents a pivotal component of its Eurasian strategy. India sees Chabahar not merely as a commercial venture but a strategic asset enabling access to Afghanistan and Central Asia while bypassing Pakistan. The port's location outside the Strait of Hormuz provides India with direct Indian Ocean access, offering significant advantages over Iran's Bandar Abbas port.
The port's operational success validates the Indian approach. Between 2018 and 2024, Chabahar handled over 450 vessels, 134,082 TEUs of containerised cargo, and more than 8.7 million tonnes of bulk cargo. The 43% increase in vessel traffic and 34% rise in container traffic in 2023-2024 demonstrate growing commercial viability. From India's perspective, Chabahar serves multiple purposes: facilitating humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, providing alternative energy access routes, and countering China's Gwadar Port in Pakistan.
Economic Realities and Trade Dynamics
Despite strategic ambitions, India's economic engagement with Central Asia reveals significant challenges. Bilateral trade between India and Central Asia reached approximately $2 billion, representing substantial growth from $500 million in 2010 but remaining modest compared to China's $66.2 billion trade volume with the region in 2024. This disparity reflects fundamental structural constraints that Indian policymakers must address.
Kazakhstan dominates India's Central Asian trade, accounting for 64.5% of India’s imports from the region and representing over $1 billion in bilateral trade. Uzbekistan serves as India's primary export destination, capturing 45.3% of Indian exports to the region. India's export basket to Central Asia consists primarily of pharmaceuticals (37.9%), electrical machinery (12.1%), and mechanical appliances (10.4%), while imports focus on mineral fuels and oil (35.3%), fertilisers (21.3%), and inorganic chemicals (13%).
A joint India Exim Bank-Eurasian Development Bank report identifies untapped potential worth an additional $2 billion in trade, contingent upon resolving connectivity bottlenecks and enhancing trade finance mechanisms. Indian investment in Central Asia, totalling approximately $1.5 billion between 2010 and 2023, has become concentrated in the energy, mining, and textiles sectors.
India is in talks with the EAEU to formalise a Free Trade Agreement as part of a strategy to diversify trade, reduce dependence on the US market and strengthen its economic presence in Eurasia, particularly due to huge US tariffs on Indian goods which were introduced as a means of retaliation for New Delhi’s decision to keep purchasing Russian oil.
Chennai-Vladivostok Maritime Corridor and India's Strategic Engagement in Russia's Far East
The Chennai-Vladivostok Maritime Corridor (CVMC), officially operationalised in November 2024, represents a transformative maritime link spanning approximately 10,300 kilometers that connects India's eastern coast with Russia's Far East region. This strategic sea route, first conceptualised during Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok in September 2019, has achieved a 40% reduction in transit time from 40 days to just 24 days compared to the traditional route via the Suez Canal. The corridor has already begun facilitating the transport of crucial commodities including crude oil, liquefied natural gas, fertilisers, machine parts, textiles, coal, and metals, with coal shipments surging 87% and crude oil transport rising 48% in FY 2024-2025.
The investment relationship was significantly strengthened in 2019, when Prime Minister Modi announced an unprecedented $1 billion line of credit specifically for Russia's Far East development, the first-ever region-specific credit line extended by India to any foreign region.
The strategic relevance of this corridor extends beyond economic benefits, as it aligns with India’s Act East Policy and provides enhanced energy security by diversifying import sources away from volatile West Asian markets. Furthermore, the corridor serves as a crucial alternative to traditional shipping routes disrupted by geopolitical tensions, particularly the Red Sea crisis, while strengthening India's presence in the Indo-Pacific region and supporting bilateral trade goals of reaching $100 billion by 2030. The operationalisation of this corridor positions both nations to leverage the resource-rich Russian Far East as a strategic economic hub connecting the Atlantic and Pacific trade networks.
Challenges and Constraints
India faces significant obstacles constraining Eurasian connectivity ambitions. Geographical challenges, including the absence of direct land routes and dependence on third-country transit arrangements, impose structural limitations. The security situation in Afghanistan compounds these difficulties, disrupting traditional land-based access routes to Central Asia.
Financial constraints represent another critical challenge. Unlike China's substantial BRI funding capabilities, India lacks comparable financial resources for large-scale infrastructure development. The slow pace of INSTC completion—despite agreements dating to 2000—reflects these resource limitations and complex multilateral coordination requirements.
Sanctions regimes pose additional complications. US sanctions on Iran create operational uncertainties for Indian businesses engaged in Chabahar’s development, despite American recognition of the port's humanitarian significance. The recent withdrawal of the US sanctions waiver for Chabahar operations creates new compliance challenges for Indian entities.
Future Prospects and Strategic Vision
For India, Eurasian connectivity reflects a long-term strategic vision extending beyond immediate economic returns. The successful operationalisation of the INSTC, combined with Chabahar's development and potential integration with emerging corridors, could transform India's continental engagement capabilities. India's approach emphasises creating ‘rules-based connectivity’ that respects sovereignty whilst fostering mutual development. This vision contrasts with perceived Chinese state-capitalist models, offering regional partners alternative engagement frameworks. The focus on digital connectivity, renewable energy cooperation, and people-to-people exchanges supplements traditional infrastructure development.
Conclusion
India's perspective on Eurasian connectivity projects reflects a sophisticated understanding of contemporary geopolitical realities combined with an evolving Eurasian balance of power and pragmatic economic calculations. Russia's role in Indian calculations remains particularly significant.
Despite significant challenges, including financial constraints, geopolitical tensions, and operational complexities, India's commitment to alternative connectivity frameworks demonstrates its determination to shape Eurasian integration patterns.
The success of these initiatives will ultimately depend upon India's ability to translate strategic vision into operational reality. As global trade patterns shift and traditional routes face disruption, India's Eurasian connectivity projects may prove to be prescient investments in future economic and strategic influence. The Indian perspective, emphasising sovereignty in an emerging multi-polar world, offers an alternative model for 21st-century connectivity that could reshape continental integration dynamics.
