The agreement defined in Scotland will be remembered not so much for what it grants, but for what it reveals: the urgent need for Europe to no longer be merely a market space, but a geopolitical power, aware and capable of defending its own interests independently, even with respect to its allies, write General Pasquale Preziosa and Professor Dario Velo.
The trade agreement recently reached between the United States and the European Union in Scotland should be interpreted less as an economic compromise and more as an act of geo-strategic rebalancing, one unfavourable to Europe.
Behind the veneer of a shared understanding lies an effort to consolidate US primacy over the economic and industrial architecture of the West, at a time when Europe appears divided, vulnerable, and strategically exposed.
The result is an asymmetric agreement, a symptom of Europe’s structural subordination, both in terms of negotiating capacity and decision-making autonomy. This interpretation is reinforced by the Commission’s own clarification that the agreement has no binding legal value: this leaves the field open for future US administrations to initiate separate negotiations with individual member states, bypassing Brussels and fuelling centrifugal forces within the Union.
No less significant is the style in which the summit was conducted: according to rumours, the discussions were held during the interval between two of Trump’s golf outings. A seemingly minor detail, yet highly revealing of the level of asymmetry now reached in transatlantic relations.
The critical point is not only the technical content of the agreement, already unbalanced in itself, but above all the political and strategic context in which it was developed: an ongoing war on the EU’s eastern borders, growing dependence on the United States for defence and intelligence, and the bloc’s structural inability to act as a unified geo-economic power.
The EU’s failure to establish a credible “response function” to Washington’s unilateral manoeuvres has made Brussels predictable and docile, refusing to exploit the windows of opportunity offered by America's internal fragility and the growing polarisation of the global market.
From a geo-economic perspective, the negotiating sequence saw the EU pre-emptively abandon pressure tools, such as retaliatory measures against US tariffs on steel and aluminium, opting for a freeze that nullified its effective negotiating capacity.
Ambitions to achieve a “zero tariffs” regime has shifted to a form of “forced accommodation,” with a structure similar to a “Japanese-style” agreement, characterised by selective tariffs and high non-tariff concessions.
This is a clear surrender to the United States’ mercantilist vision, according to which every agreement must establish American strategic superiority, even at the cost of systemic distortions. This dynamic is not new, but it is currently developing in a context in which Washington uses tools of geoeconomic competition—subsidies, tariffs, and restrictions on critical technologies—as veritable levers of geopolitical dominance, in the absence of a coordinated and structured response from Europe.
While the Union has a single market of global importance, it continues to suffer from a deficit of assertiveness and strategic vision, exacerbated by the lack of a fiscal, industrial, and military union capable of meeting systemic challenges.
The agreement has highlighted not only Europe’s external vulnerability, but also its internal fractures. The European Commission, despite proclaiming an ambitious agenda for economic transformation (Draghi–Letta), has failed to mobilise the resources necessary to support it.
The lack of a multiannual budget commensurate with these ambitions and divisive pressure from key member states, primarily Germany, have undermined the bloc’s internal coherence and weakened its external image.
This has resulted in a latent crisis of institutional credibility: the Commission is perceived not as a strong geopolitical player, but as a technical body incapable of influencing systemic balances.
The most alarming aspect concerns the EU’s strategic autonomy, which is now more precarious than ever. Structural dependence on American protection, strengthened by the war in Ukraine, has made it nearly impossible for Brussels to negotiate with Washington on equal terms. Europe has preferred to yield on trade rather than compromise the transatlantic axis at a time of heightened international tension.
In doing so, it has ended up reinforcing a dynamic of strategic subordination: military solidarity is exchanged for economic influence, in an increasingly unbalanced balance of power. Furthermore, the agreement contains no mechanism for strengthening Europe’s industrial and technological autonomy.
On the contrary, it facilitates US entry into strategic sectors, hindering timid attempts at reshoring and continental reindustrialisation.
Nor has there been any progress towards an integrated European defence. The increase in military spending post-2022 has largely favoured the US defence industry, perpetuating dependence on overseas supplies, standards, and operational approaches.
The US-EU agreement represents a historic crossroads: either Europe will finally acknowledge its geo-economic vulnerability and structure itself as a unified player with true industrial, military, and technological autonomy, or it will continue to pursue a supposed “partnership of equals” that, in reality, is increasingly shaping up as an asymmetric hegemonic relationship.
The time for illusions is over. Systemic challenges, from the US-China confrontation to the decoupling of global supply chains, from energy security to the technological arms race, require the EU to shift from tactical defence to structural strategy.
The agreement defined in Scotland will be remembered not so much for what it concedes, but for what it reveals: the urgent need for Europe to no longer be merely a market space, but a geopolitical power aware and capable of defending its interests, independently, also with respect to its allies.
