Central Asia—Uzbekistan’s home region—offers the country a plethora of opportunities within the framework of a region-wide collective partnership, one that is capable of effectively tackling the most pressing challenges facing Eurasia, while also reaping mutual benefits from cooperation in all spheres of international affairs—from grand infrastructure projects to national security, writes Ulugbek Khasanov, Head of Regional Security & Conflicts Study Lab., University of World Economics & Diplomacy.
The author of “The Guns of August”, Barbara Tuchman, in her later—though no less renowned—work “The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam”, articulated with striking precision a paradoxical law: governments, in pursuing their own interests, often fail to notice emerging alternatives and the latent potential of traditional diplomacy.
The Tuchman paradox—“not ‘they’, but ‘we’; not the search for culprits, but the search for opportunities for dialogue and cooperation”—resonates as an alternative to global uncertainty. It also reflects the notion that, in today’s profoundly contradictory world, states—particularly regional ones—are better served by ensuring a complex configuration of security priorities anchored in the regional environment, wherein a model of collective cooperation across a broad spectrum of tasks generates a form of shared synergy.
Central Asia: A Model of Collective Partnership
Under these conditions, the Central Asian model of regional cooperation acquires particular significance—both as a mechanism of self-preservation and as a potential “role model” for other regions.
Within the foreign policy priorities advanced by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the Republic of Uzbekistan has, over a short period, moved decisively from former self-isolation to the status of an active player in the Eurasian space. This shift is not a product of global political circumstances, but the result of a deliberate choice informed by a set of existential aspects of its development—namely demographic, economic, and geographical. Together, these factors define the paradigm within which Tashkent constructs its macro-regional strategy, grounded in its conceptual foundation: multi-vectorism.
Uzbekistan’s foreign policy doctrine—reflecting the approaches and vision of Shavkat Mirziyoyev—rests both on the principles of the updated Constitution in its 2023 revision and on the programmatic components of the national development strategy Uzbekistan—2030. Among these are sovereign equality of states, non-alignment with military-political blocs, the refusal to host foreign military bases on its territory, and the consistent prioritisation of diplomacy in the peaceful resolution of contradictions. Tashkent is pursuing what may be termed a “diplomacy of equilibrium”, which in essence entails maintaining balanced relations with Russia, China, the United States, the European Union, and Turkey—a task that proves, in practice, exceptionally complex and demanding. For a state situated at the intersection of great-power interests, independence is preserved not through isolation, but through a form of “targeted engagement”. The Uzbekistan—2030 strategy sets ambitious goals and benchmarks: GDP of $240 billion, inflows of foreign direct investment amounting to $110 billion, and accession to the group of upper-middle-income countries. Achievements of this course include the final settlement, by early 2025, of border disputes in the Fergana Valley, or, as the head of state put it: “the borders that once divided us have become bridges of friendship and cooperation”. The Austrian Institute for International Affairs, in its January 2026 report, noted that Central Asia “has refuted early forecasts of conflict and is moving towards peaceful regional integration through treaties, water diplomacy, and institutional cooperation”. This autonomous shift—from a “hot spot” to a “nodal hub”—offers valuable lessons for conflict-prone regions, where local diplomacy could replace external intervention.
The water issue remains one of the most sensitive elements of the regional agenda. Uzbekistan—highly dependent on the waters of the Amu Darya for irrigation and food security—has encountered a further challenge: the construction of the Qosh-Tepa Canal in northern Afghanistan, which threatens a significant diversion of the river’s main flow. Tashkent has opted for a path of diplomatic dialogue, engaging in negotiations with the Taliban authorities on a technical compromise. At the same time, through the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, Uzbekistan is advancing a multilateral approach to water use, proposing a model of regional consensus for the joint utilisation of transboundary water resources. Within a UNDP project in 2025, at a conference on water diplomacy, participants from five regional states unanimously endorsed a coordinated move towards dialogue and negotiations based on scientific data and mutual benefit.
The Russian vector is viewed through the prism of a new level of strategic partnership. Russia is recognised as one of Uzbekistan’s key partners, with relations governed by the Treaty on Allied Relations signed in 2005. Over two decades of cooperation, trade volume has increased nearly sixfold—from approximately $2 billion in the mid-2000s to over $11 billion in 2024. In just the first nine months of 2025, trade volume exceeded $9.3 billion, with Uzbekistan’s exports to the Russian Federation growing at double-digit rates. Russia is participating in the construction of a nuclear power plant in Uzbekistan and in the development of the North–South corridor. Tashkent consistently adheres to a balanced political position: the share of settlements in the two countries’ national currencies has approached 70%, simultaneously strengthening financial sovereignty and serving the interests of both sides. The parties aim to raise trade volume to $30 billion by 2030.
Eurasian Integration Structures: CIS, EAEU, SCO
Uzbekistan occupies a distinctive place within the architecture of international institutions in the Eurasian space—balancing active participation with maintaining a prudent distance that safeguards its sovereignty. “The Eurasian space is Uzbekistan’s natural external environment due to economic, geographical, and historical factors,” noted Akramjon Ne'matov, First Deputy Director of ISRS, at the Primakov Readings.
In its relations with the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union, Uzbekistan follows what many experts describe as a formula of “pragmatic rapprochement”. Since obtaining observer status in December 2020, trade with the Union’s member states has increased by approximately 80% over four years, reaching $17.5 billion in 2024—around a quarter of total foreign trade. Uzbekistan maintains trade relations with 210 countries worldwide.). In April 2025, Uzbekistan acceded to the Agreement on the Establishment of the Eurasian Development Bank, while in October 2024 a comprehensive plan of joint measures for 2024–2026 was signed, covering trade, industry, migration, pharmaceuticals, and technical regulation.
The most dynamic changes are observed along the Chinese vector. Uzbekistan’s trade volume with the People’s Republic of China amounted to $14.6 billion in January–November 2025, marking a 30.4% increase compared to the same period in 2024. China has firmly established itself as Uzbekistan’s principal trading partner, accounting for 20.1% of total trade volume, while Russia’s share stands at 16.2%. The total volume of Chinese investment in Uzbekistan’s economy has risen from $284 million in 2016 to $10.7 billion in the first half of 2025. A significant portion of this capital is directed towards energy and manufacturing, including a $3.3 billion olefin complex in the Bukhara region, actively being developed by Sinopec and Saneg. At the same time, a structural asymmetry persists: Uzbekistan predominantly exports raw materials to China while importing equipment and chemical products.
Transport Corridors: Infrastructure as Geopolitics
China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan Railway
One of the most emblematic infrastructure projects—potentially capable of reshaping the geo-economic architecture of Central Asia—is the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway. The project’s estimated cost stands at approximately $4.7 billion. The intergovernmental agreement on construction was signed in Beijing in June 2024, with key financing parameters clarified by the end of 2025. The project is designated as a strategic component of the Belt and Road Initiative and is integrated with existing transport networks, ensuring transit to Europe and Turkey via the Trans-Caspian corridor. Uzbekistan’s foreign trade volume increases over 20 pct in 2024; China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway as a new key corridor.).
Trans-Afghan Railway
An ambitious yet realistic project is the Trans-Afghan railway (Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar), with a projected length of approximately 573–770 km and an anticipated capacity of up to 20 million tonnes annually. In July 2025, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan signed a trilateral preliminary agreement on the project’s feasibility study. The estimated construction cost ranges between $4.8 and $6 billion. The strategic significance of this railway lies in its capacity to enhance trade and support Afghanistan’s integration into regional development projects, while simultaneously increasing Central Asia’s transit potential. This is reflected in the words of Shavkat Mirziyoyev: “Afghanistan is not a peripheral state, but a natural part of our shared region. The durability of peace across Central Asia depends on its recovery”. This idea is echoed by Sodiq Safoev, a prominent diplomat and scholar: “Afghanistan is not a source of danger; it is more appropriate to view it as a space of opportunity,” directly linking stability in the country to the sustainable development of the entire Central Asian region.
The Middle Corridor as a New Alternative
The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, known as the Middle Corridor, is becoming increasingly strategically important for Uzbekistan. In 2024, the estimated freight volume along this route exceeded 1 million tonnes—approximately five times the 2019 figure. By 2030, projected volumes may reach 10 million tonnes annually. In November 2025, the Trans-Caspian Corridor Investors’ Forum was held in Tashkent, where the European Union, the EBRD, the EIB, and the World Bank announced a package of agreements on infrastructure projects in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.
Uzbekistan’s macro-regional strategy serves as a rare example in the post-Soviet space of consistent, multidimensional, and pragmatic diplomacy. In other words, Tashkent does not manoeuvre between centres of power, but constructs its own frame of reference with a clear emphasis on regional partnership. The success of this course is confirmed by tangible results: over five years, the combined GDP of Central Asian countries has grown by approximately 40%, exceeding $410 billion, while intra-regional trade has nearly doubled since 2017.
The logic of rational thinking reinforces the proposition that, amid the weakening of the global security architecture and the inability of universal institutions (the United Nations) to ensure stability, a model of collective partnership at the regional level becomes effectively the only viable option. Central Asia, as a platform for pragmatic integration, the indivisibility of security, economic interdependence, and institutionalisation, is capable of providing a durable foundation in the face of Eurasia’s systemic challenges and global uncertainty.
